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1Abstract  This chapter introduces the recent academic literature on 
 algorithms and some of the popular concerns that have been expressed 
about algorithms in mainstream media, including the power and  opacity 
of algorithms. The chapter suggests that, in place of opening  algorithms 
to greater scrutiny, the academic literature tends to play on this algo-
rithmic drama. As a counter move, this chapter suggests taking seri-
ously what we might mean by the everyday life of the algorithm. Several 
approaches to everyday life are considered and a set of three analytic sen-
sibilities developed for interrogating the everyday life of the algorithm 
in subsequent chapters. These sensibilities comprise: how do algorithms 
participate in the everyday? How do algorithms compose the everyday? 
And how (to what extent, through what means) does the algorithmic 
become the everyday? The chapter ends by setting out the structure of 
the rest of the book.
Keywords  Science and Technology Studies · Accountability · Opacity · 
Transparency · Power · The Everyday
opening
An algorithm is conventionally defined as ‘a process or set of rules to be 
followed in calculations or other problem-solving operations, especially by 
a computer’.1 In this sense, an algorithm strictly speaking is nothing more 
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than the ordering of steps that a combination of software and hardware 
might subsequently put into operation. It might seem odd, then, to write 
a book about the everyday life of a set of instructions. What life might 
the instructions have led, into what romance or crime might the instruc-
tions have become entangled, what disappointments might they have had? 
These seem unlikely questions to pose. For an ethnographer, they also 
seem like questions that would be difficult to pursue. Even if the instruc-
tions were engaged in a variety of different social interactions, where do 
these take place and how could I ever get to know them?
A quick perusal of the instructions hanging around in my house 
reveals a slightly crumpled paper booklet on my home heating system, 
two sets of colourful Lego manuals setting out how to build a vehi-
cle, and a form with notes on how to apply for a new passport. I have 
no idea how the latter arrived in my house or for whom it is necessary. 
But it is clear in its formality and precision. I also know my sons will 
shortly be home from school and determined in their efforts to build 
their new Lego. And I am aware, but slightly annoyed, by the demands 
set by the heating instructions that suggest my boiler pressure is too high 
(above 1.5 bars; after a quick Google, it turns out that a bar is the force 
required to raise water to a height of 10 metres). The pressure needs 
to be reduced, and I have known this all week and not acted on it. The 
instructions have annoyed me by instilling a familiar sense of inadequacy 
in my own (in)ability to manage my domestic affairs—of course, the 
instructions provide numbers, a written diagram, even some words, but 
their meanings and my required response remain out of reach.
In a sense, then, we are already witnessing the social life in which 
these instructions participate. The passport form has arrived from some-
where, for someone, and is clear in its formal status. The Lego was a 
gift and will no doubt become the centre of my children’s attention. 
And the heating system might break down if I don’t do something rea-
sonably soon. These point to some of the cornerstones for contempo-
rary living. Travel and transport, government and formal bureaucracy, 
gift giving and learning, domestic arrangements and shelter are all wit-
ness-able through the instructions and the life in which they participate. 
As with other participants in social life, the instructions are demanding, 
occasionally quite austere and/or useless. Making sense of these every-
day entanglements might be quite important if we were interested in the 
everyday life of instructions, but is this the kind of everyday life in which 
algorithms participate?
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Reading through the ever-expanding recent academic literature on 
algorithms, the answer would be a qualified no. The everyday, humdrum 
banalities of life are somewhat sidelined by an algorithmic drama.2 Here, 
the focus is on algorithmic power, the agency held by algorithms in mak-
ing decisions over our futures, decisions over which we have no con-
trol. The algorithms are said to be opaque, their content unreadable. A 
closely guarded and commodified secret, whose very value depends upon 
retaining their opacity. All we get to see are their results: the continu-
ing production of a stream of digital associations that form consequen-
tial relations between data sets. We are now data subjects or, worse, data 
derivatives (Amoore 2011). We are rendered powerless. We cannot know 
the algorithm or limit the algorithm or challenge its outputs.
A quick read through the news (via a search ‘algorithm’) reveals fur-
ther numerous stories of the capacity of algorithms to dramatically trans-
form our lives. Once again, the humdrum banalities of the everyday 
activities that the instructions participated in are pushed aside in favour 
of a global narrative of unfolding, large-scale change. In the UK, the 
Guardian newspaper tells us that large firms are increasingly turning to 
algorithms to sift through job applications,3 using personality tests at the 
point of application as a way to pick out patterns of answers and steer 
applicants towards rejection or the next phase of the application pro-
cess. What is at stake is not the effectiveness of the algorithms, as little 
data is collected on whether or not the algorithms are making the right 
decisions. Instead, the strength of the algorithms is their efficiency, with 
employment decisions made on a scale, at a speed and at a low cost that 
no conventional human resources department could match.
In the USA, we are told of algorithmic policing that sets demands for 
police officers to continually pursue the same neighbourhoods for poten-
tial crime.4 Predictive policing does not actively anticipate specific crimes, 
but uses patterns of previous arrests to map out where future arrests 
should be made. The algorithms create their own effects as police officers 
are held accountable by the algorithm for the responses they make to 
the system’s predictions. Once a neighbourhood has acquired a statistical 
pattern denoting high crime, its inhabitants will be zealously policed and 
frequently arrested, ensuring it maintains its high crime status.
Meanwhile in Italy, Nutella launch a new marketing campaign in 
which an algorithm continually produces new labels for its food jars.5 
Seven million distinct labels are produced, each feeding off an algorith-
mically derived set of colours and patterns that, the algorithm believes, 
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consumers will find attractive. The chance to own a limited edition 
Nutella design, combined with these newspaper stories and an advertis-
ing campaign, drives an algorithmically derived consumer demand. But 
the story is clear: it is not the labels that are unique in any important 
way. It is the algorithm that is unique.
And in India, a robot that uses algorithms to detect patterns of activ-
ity in order to offer appropriate responses struggles with normativity.6 
The robot finds it hard to discern when it should be quiet or indeed 
noisier, what counts as a reasonable expectation of politeness, which sub-
tle behavioural cues it should pick up on or to which it should respond. 
This is one small part of the unfolding development of algorithmic arti-
ficial intelligence and the emergence of various kinds of robots that will 
apparently replace us humans.
These stories are doubtless part of a global algorithmic drama. But in 
important ways, these stories promote drama at the expense of under-
standing. As Ziewitz (2016) asks: just what is an algorithm? In these 
stories, the algorithm seems to be a central character, but of what the 
algorithm consists, why, how it participates in producing effects is all left 
to one side. There are aspects of everyday life that are emphasised within 
these stories: employment, policing, consumer demand and robotics 
are each positioned in relation to an aspect of ordinary activity from job 
interviews, to arrests and court trials, from markets and investments to 
the future role of robots in shaping conversations. But—and this seems 
to be the important part—we are not provided with any great insight 
into the everyday life of the algorithm. Through what means are these 
algorithms produced in the first place, how are they imagined, brought 
into being and put to work? Of what do the algorithms consist and to 
what extent do they change? What role can be accorded to the algorithm 
rather than the computational infrastructure within which it operates? 
And how can we capture the varied ways in which algorithms and every-
day life participate in the composition of effects?
These are the questions that this book seeks to engage. As I noted in 
the opening example of the instructions in various locations around my 
house, ordered sets of step-by-step routines can establish their own spe-
cific demands and become entangled in some of the key social relations 
in which we participate. As I have further suggested in the preceding 
media stories, such ordered routines in the form of algorithms portray 
a kind of drama, but one that we need to cut through in order to inves-
tigate how the everyday and algorithms intersect. In the next section, 
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I will begin this task by working through some of the recent academic 
literature on algorithms. I will then pursue the everyday as an important 
foreground for the subsequent story of algorithms. Finally, I will set out 
the structure of the rest of this book.
Algorithmic discontent
One obvious starting point for an enquiry into algorithms is to look at 
an algorithm. And here, despite the apparent drama of algorithmic opac-
ity (in Fig. 1.1) is an algorithm:
This is taken from a project that sought to develop an algorith-
mic surveillance system for airport and train station security (and is 
introduced in more detail along with the airport and train station and 
their peculiar characteristics in Chapter 2). The algorithm is designed 
as a set of ordered step-by-step instructions for the detection of aban-
doned luggage. It is similar in some respects to the instructions for my 
Fig. 1.1 Abandoned luggage algorithm
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home heating system or my children’s Lego. It is designed as a way to 
order the steps necessary for an effect to be brought about by  others. 
However, while my heating system instructions are (nominally and 
slightly uselessly) oriented towards me as a human actor, the instructions 
here are for the surveillance system, its software and hardware which 
must bring about these effects (identifying abandoned luggage) for 
the system’s human operatives. In this sense, the algorithm is oriented 
towards human and non-human others. Making sense of the algorithm 
is not too difficult (although bringing about its effects turned out to 
be more challenging as we shall see in subsequent chapters). It is struc-
tured through four initial conditions (IF questions) that should lead to 
four subsequent consequences (THEN rules). The conditions required 
are: IF an object is identified within a set area that is classified as lug-
gage, is separate from a human object, is above a certain distance from a 
human and for a certain time (with a threshold for distance and time set 
as required), THEN an ‘abandoned luggage’ alert will be issued. What 
can the recent academic literature on algorithms tell us about this kind of 
ordered set of instructions, conditions and consequences?
Recent years have seen an upsurge in writing on algorithms. This lit-
erature points to a number of notable themes that have helped estab-
lish the algorithm as a focal point for contemporary concern. Key has 
been the apparent power of algorithms (Beer 2009; Lash 2007; Slavin 
2011; Spring 2011; Stalder and Mayer 2009; Pasquale 2015) that is 
given effect in various ways. Algorithms are said to provide a truth for 
modern living, a means to shape our lives, play a central role in finan-
cial growth and forms of exchange and participate in forms of govern-
mentality through which we become algorithmic selves. In line with the 
latter point, it is said we have no option but to make sense of our own 
lives on the terms of algorithms as we are increasingly made aware of the 
role, status and influence of algorithms in shaping data held about us, 
our employment prospects or our intimate relations. At least two notions 
of power can be discerned, then, in these accounts. There is a traditional 
sense of power in which algorithms act to influence and shape particular 
effects. In this sense, algorithms might be said to hold power. A second 
notion of power is more Foucauldian in its inclination, suggesting that 
algorithms are caught up within a set of relations through which power 
is exercised. Becoming an algorithmic self is thus an expression of the 
exercise of this power, but it is not a power held by any particular party. 
Instead, it is a power achieved through the plaiting of multiple relations. 
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In either case, the algorithm is presented as a new actor in these forms 
and relations of power.
What can this tells us about our abandoned luggage algorithm? 
Written on the page, it does not seem very powerful. I do not anticipate 
that it is about to jump off the page (or screen) and act. It is not mute, 
but it also does not appear to be the bearer of any great agency. The 
notion that this algorithm in itself wields power seems unlikely. Yet its 
ordered set of instructions does seem to set demands. We might then 
ask for whom or what are these demands set? In making sense of the 
everyday life of this algorithm, we would want to pursue these demands. 
If the academic writing on power is understood as having a concern for 
effect, then we might also want to make sense of the grounds on which 
these demands lead to any subsequent action. We would have to follow 
the everyday life of the algorithm from its demands through to accom-
plishing a sense of how (to any extent) these demands have been met. 
This sets a cautionary tone for the traditional notion of power. To argue 
that the demands lead to effects (and hence support a traditional notion 
of power, one that is held by the algorithm) would require a short-cut-
ting of all the steps. It would need to ignore the importance of the 
methods through which the algorithm was designed in the first place, 
the software and hardware and human operatives that are each required 
to play various roles, institute further demands and that take action off 
in a different direction (see Chapters 3 and 5 in particular), before an 
effect is produced. We would need to ignore all these other actors and 
actions to maintain the argument that it is the algorithm that holds 
power. Nonetheless, the Foucauldian sense of power, dispersed through 
the ongoing plaiting of relations, might still hold some analytic utility 
here: pursuing the everyday life of the algorithm might provide a means 
to pursue these relations and the effects in which they participate.
At the same time as algorithms are noted as powerful (in the sense 
of holding power) or part of complex webs of relations through which 
power is exercised, an algorithmic drama (see Ziewitz 2016; Neyland 
2016) plays out through their apparent inscrutability. To be powerful 
and inscrutable seems to sit centrally within a narrative of algorithmic 
mystery (just how do they work, what do algorithms do and how do 
they accomplish effect) that is frequently combined with calls for algo-
rithmic accountability (Diakopolous 2013). Accountability is presented 
as distinct from transparency. While the latter might have utility for pre-
senting the content or logic of an algorithm, accountability is said to be 
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necessary for interrogating its outcomes (Felten 2012). Only knowing 
the content of an algorithm might be insufficient for understanding and 
deciding upon the relative justice of its effects. But here is where the 
drama is ratcheted up: the value of many commercial algorithms depends 
upon guarding their contents (Gillespie 2013). No transparency is a con-
dition for the accumulation of algorithmically derived wealth. No trans-
parency also makes accountability more challenging in judging the justice 
of an algorithm’s effects: not knowing the content of an algorithm makes 
pinning down responsibility for its consequences more difficult.
Our abandoned luggage algorithm presents its own contents. In this 
sense, we have achieved at least a limited sense of transparency. In forth-
coming chapters, we will start to gain insights into other algorithms to 
which the abandoned luggage example is tied. But having the rules on 
the page does not provide a strong sense of accountability. In the preced-
ing paragraphs, I suggested that insights into the everyday life of the 
algorithm are crucial to making sense of how it participates in bringing 
about effects. It is these effects and the complex sets of relations that 
in various ways underpin their emergence that need to be studied for 
the ordered steps of the abandoned luggage algorithm to be rendered 
accountable.
A further theme in recent writing has been to argue that algorithms 
should not be understood in isolation. Mythologizing the status or 
power of an algorithm, the capability of algorithms to act on their own 
terms or to straightforwardly produce effects (Ziewitz 2016) have each 
been questioned. Here, software studies scholars have suggested we need 
to both take algorithms and their associated software/code seriously and 
situate these studies within a broader set of associations through which 
algorithms might be said to act (Neyland and Mollers 2016). Up-close, 
ethnographic engagement with algorithms is presented as one means 
to achieve this kind of analysis (although as Kitchin [2014] points out, 
there are various other routes of enquiry also available). Getting close to 
the algorithm might help address the preceding concerns highlighted in 
algorithmic writing; opening up the inscrutable algorithm to a kind of 
academic accountability and deepening our understanding of the power 
of algorithms to participate in the production of effects. This further 
emphasises the importance of grasping the everyday life of the algorithm. 
How do the ordered steps of the abandoned luggage algorithm com-
bine with various humans (security operatives, airport passengers, ter-
minal managers and their equivalents in train stations) and non-humans 
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(luggage, airports, software, trains, tracks, hardware) on a moment to 
moment basis?
Yet algorithmic writing also produces its own warnings. Taken 
together, writing on algorithms suggests that there is not one single mat-
ter of concern to take on and address. Alongside power, inscrutability 
and accountability, numerous questions are raised regarding the role of 
algorithms in making choices, political preferences, dating, employment, 
financial crises, death, war and terrorism (Crawford 2016; Karppi and 
Crawford 2016; Pasquale 2015; Schuppli 2014) among many other con-
cerns. The suggestion is that algorithms do not operate in a single field 
or produce effects in a single manner or raise a single question or even a 
neatly bounded set of questions. Instead, what is required is a means to 
make sense of algorithms as participants in an array of activities that are 
all bound up with the production of effects, some of which are unan-
ticipated, some of which seem messy and some of which require care-
ful analysis in order to be made to make sense. It is not the case that 
making sense of the life of our abandoned luggage algorithm will directly 
shed light on all these other activities. However, it will provide a basis for 
algorithmically focused research to move forward. This, I suggest, can 
take place through a turn to the everyday.
everydAy
Some existing academic work on algorithms engages with  ‘algorithmic 
life’ (Amoore and Piotukh 2015). But this tends to mean the life 
of humans as seen (or governed) through algorithms. If we want to 
make sense of algorithms, we need to engage with their everyday life. 
However, rather than continually repeat the importance of ‘the everyday’ 
as if it is a concept that can somehow address all concerns with algo-
rithms or is in itself available as a neat context within which things will 
make sense, instead I suggest we need to take seriously what we might 
mean by the ‘everyday life’ of an algorithm. If we want to grasp a means 
to engage with the entanglements of a set of ordered instructions like 
our abandoned luggage algorithm, then we need to do some work to set 
out our terms of engagement.
The everyday has been a focal point for sociological analysis for sev-
eral decades. Goffman’s (1959) pioneering work on the dramaturgical 
staging of everyday life provides serious consideration of the behaviour, 
sanctions, decorum, controls and failures that characterise an array of 
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situations. De Certeau (1984) by switching focus to the practices of 
everyday life brings rules, bricolage, tactics and strategies to the centre 
of his analysis of the everyday. And Lefebvre (2014) suggests across three 
volumes that the everyday is both a site of containment and potential 
change. The everyday of the algorithm will be given more considera-
tion in subsequent chapters, but what seems apparent in these works is 
that for our purposes, the technologies or material forms that take part 
in everyday life are somewhat marginalised. Technologies are props in 
dramaturgical performances (in Goffman’s analysis of the life of crofters 
in the Shetland Islands) or a kind of background presence to practices 
of seeing (in de Certeau’s analysis of a train journey). Lefebvre enters 
into a slightly more detailed analysis of technology, suggesting for exam-
ple that ‘computer scientists proclaim the generalization of their theo-
retical and practical knowledge to society as a whole’ (2014: 808). But 
Lefebvre’s account is also dismissive of the analytic purpose of focusing 
on technologies as such, suggesting ‘it is pointless to dwell on equipment 
and techniques’ (2014: 812). Taken together, as far as that is possible, 
these authors’ work suggests few grounds for opening up the everyday 
life of technology. Perhaps the most that could be said is that, based on 
these works, an analysis of the everyday life of an algorithm would need 
to attend to the human practices that then shape the algorithm. Even 
everyday analyses that devote lengthy excursions to technology, such as 
Braudel’s (1979) work on everyday capitalism, tend to treat technologies 
as something to be catalogued as part of a historical inventory. To pro-
vide analytical purchase on the algorithm as a participant in everyday life 
requires a distinct approach.
One starting point for taking the everyday life of objects, materials 
and technologies seriously can be found in Latour’s search for the miss-
ing masses. According to Latour, sociologists:
are constantly looking, somewhat desperately, for social links sturdy 
enough to tie all of us together… The society they try to recompose with 
bodies and norms constantly crumbles. Something is missing, something 
that should be strongly social and highly moral. Where can they find it? … 
To balance our accounts of society, we simply have to turn our exclusive 
attention away from humans and look also at nonhumans. Here they are, 
the hidden and despised social masses who make up our morality. They 
knock at the door of sociology, requesting a place in the accounts of soci-
ety as stubbornly as the human masses did in the nineteenth century. What 
our ancestors, the founders of sociology, did a century ago to house the 
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human masses in the fabric of social theory, we should do now to find 
a place in a new social theory for the nonhuman masses that beg us for 
understanding. (1992: 152–153)
Here, the non-humans should not simply be listed as part of an inven-
tory of capitalism. Instead, their role in social, moral, ethical and physical 
actions demands consideration. But in this approach, ‘social’ is not to be 
understood on the conventional terms of sociologists as a series of norms 
that shape conduct or as a context that explains and accounts for action. 
Instead, efforts must be made to make sense of the means through which 
associations are made, assembled or composed. Everyday life, then, is 
an ongoing composition in which humans and non-humans participate. 
The algorithm might thus require study not as a context within which 
everyday life happens, but as a participant. Such a move should not be 
underestimated. Here, Latour tells us, we end the great divide between 
social and technical, and assumptions that humans ought to hold status 
over non-humans in our accounts. Instead, we start to open up an array 
of questions. As Michael suggests, in this approach: ‘everyday life is per-
meated by technoscientific artefacts, by projections of technoscientific 
futures and by technoscientific accounts of the present’ (2006: 9).
We can also start to see in this move to grant status to the  non-human 
that questions can open up as to precisely how such status might be con-
strued. Assembly work or composition certainly could provide a way to 
frame a study of the algorithm as a participant in everyday action, but 
how does the algorithm become (or embody) the everyday? Mol (2006) 
suggests that the nature of matters—questions of ontology—are accom-
plished. In this line of thought, it is not that ‘ontology is given before 
practices, but that different practices enable different versions of the 
world. This turns ontology from a pre-condition for politics into some-
thing that is, itself, always at stake’ (Mol 2006: 2). The analytic move 
here is not just to treat the algorithm as participant, but to understand 
that participation provides a grounds for establishing the nature of 
things, a nature that is always at stake. Being at stake is the political con-
dition through which the nature of things is both settled and unsettled. 
But what does this tell us of the everyday?
Pollner’s (1974) account of mundane reason points us towards a 
detailed consideration of the interactions through which the everyday 
is accomplished. Pollner draws on the Latin etymology of the word 
mundane (mundus) to explore how matters are not just ordinary or 
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pervasive, but become of the world. What is settled and unsettled, 
what is at stake, is this becoming. For Pollner, the pertinent question 
in his study of US court decisions on speeding is how putative evi-
dence that a car was driving at a certain speed can become of the world 
of the court charged with making a decision about a drivers’ possible 
speeding offence. Through what organisational relations, material stuff, 
responsibilities taken on, and accountabilities discharged, can poten-
tial evidence come to be of the world (a taken for granted, accepted 
feature) of the court’s decision-making process? Pollner suggests that 
in instances of dispute, accountability relations are arranged such that 
a car and its driver cannot be permitted to drive at both 30 and 60 
miles per hour simultaneously—the evidence must be made to act 
on behalf of one of the accounts (30 or 60), not both. Selections are 
made in order to demarcate what will and what will not count, what 
will become part of the world of the court and what will be dismissed, 
at the same time as responsibilities and accountabilities for action are 
distributed and their consequences taken on. Making sense of the algo-
rithm, its enactment of data, its responsibilities and accountabilities on 
Pollner’s terms, sets some demanding requirements for our study. How 
does the abandoned luggage algorithm that we initially encountered, 
insist that data acts on behalf of an account as human or luggage, 
as relevant or irrelevant, as requiring an alert and a response or not? 
Although these actions might become the everyday of the algorithm, 
they might be no trivial matter for the people and things of the air-
port or train station where the algorithm will participate. The status of 
people and things will be made always and already at stake by the very 
presence of the algorithm.
This further points towards a distinct contribution of the algorithm: 
not just participant, not just at stake in becoming, but also a means 
for composing the everyday. To return to Latour’s no-longer-missing 
masses, he gives consideration to an automated door closer—known 
as a groom—that gently closes the door behind people once they have 
entered a room. The groom, Latour suggests, can be treated as a partici-
pant in the action in three ways:
first, it has been made by humans; second, it substitutes for the actions 
of people and is a delegate that permanently occupies the position of a 
human; and third, it shapes human action by prescribing back what sort of 
people should pass through the door. (1992: 160)
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Prescribing back is the means through which the door closer acts on 
the human, establishing the proper boundaries for walking into rooms 
and the parameters for what counts as reasonably human from the 
groom’s perspective (someone with a certain amount of strength, abil-
ity to move and so on). Prescribing acts on everyday life by establish-
ing an engineered morality of what ought to count as reasonable in the 
human encounters met by the groom. This makes sense as a premise: to 
understand the abandoned luggage algorithm’s moves in shaping human 
encounters, we might want to know something of how it was made by 
humans, how it substitutes for the actions of humans and what it pre-
scribes back onto the human (and these will be given consideration in 
Chapter 3). But as Woolgar and Neyland (2013) caution, the certainty 
and stability of such prescribing warrants careful scrutiny. Prescribing 
might, on the one hand, form an engineer’s aspiration (in which case its 
accomplishment requires scrutiny) or, on the other hand, might be an 
ongoing basis for action, with humans, doors and grooms continuously 
involved in working through the possibilities for action, with the break-
down of the groom throwing open the possibility of further actions. In 
this second sense, prescribing is never more than contingent (in which 
case its accomplishment also requires scrutiny!).
Collectively these ideas seem to encourage the adoption of three kinds 
of analytical sensibility7 for studying the everyday life of an algorithm. 
First, how do algorithms participate in the everyday? Second, how do 
algorithms compose the everyday? Third, how (to what extent, through 
what means) does the algorithmic become the everyday? These will be 
pursued in subsequent chapters to which I will now turn attention.
the structure of the Argument
Building on the abandoned luggage algorithm, Chapter 2 will set out the 
algorithms and their human and non-human associations that will form 
the focus for this study. The chapter will focus on one particular algorith-
mic system developed for public transport security and explore the ways 
in which the system provided a basis for experimenting with what com-
puter scientists termed human-shaped objects. In contrast with much of 
the social science literature on algorithms that suggests the algorithm 
itself is more or less fixed or inscrutable, this chapter will instead set 
out one basis for ethnographically studying the algorithm up-close and 
in detail. Placing algorithms under scrutiny opens up the opportunity 
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for studying their instability and the ceaseless experimentation to which 
they are subjected. One basis for organising this experimentation is what 
Glynn (2010) terms elegance. Drawing on the recent growth of qual-
itative social science experimentation (Adkins and Lury 2012; Marres 
2013; Corsín Jiménez and Estalella 2016), the chapter will consider 
how elegance is (and to an extent is not) accomplished. A fundamen-
tal proposition of the security system under development was that the 
algorithmic system could sift through streams of digital video data, rec-
ognise and then make decisions regarding humans (or at least human-
shaped objects). Rather than depending on the laboratory experiments 
of natural science and economics analysed by science and technology 
studies (STS) scholars (focusing on the extension of the laboratory into 
the world or the world into the laboratory; Muniesa and Callon 2007), 
working on human-shaped objects required an ongoing tinkering with 
a sometimes bewildering array of shared, possible and (as it turned out) 
impossible controls. The chapter will suggest that elegance opens up 
a distinct way to conceive of the experimental prospects of algorithms 
under development and their ways of composing humans.
Chapter 3 will then develop the insights of Chapter 2 (on human-
shaped objects and elegance) in exploring the possibility of rendering the 
everyday life of algorithms accountable, and the form such accountability 
might take. Although algorithmic accountability is currently framed in 
terms of openness and transparency (James 2013; Diakopoulos 2013), 
the chapter will draw on ethnographic engagements with the algorith-
mic system under development to show empirically the difficulties (and 
indeed pointlessness) of achieving this kind of openness. Rather than 
presenting an entirely pessimistic view, the chapter will suggest that alter-
native forms of accountability are possible. In place of transparency, the 
chapter focuses on STS work that pursues the characteristics, agency, 
power and effect of technologies as the upshot of the network of rela-
tions within which a technology is positioned (Latour 1990; Law 1996). 
Moving away from the idea that algorithms have fixed, essential charac-
teristics or straightforward power or agency, opens up opportunities for 
developing a distinct basis of accountability in action.
While experimentation provides one means to take the algorithmic lit-
erature in a different direction, in the system under development, dele-
tion also opened up an analytic space for rethinking algorithms. Deletion 
became a key priority of the emerging system: just how could terabytes 
of data be removed from a system, freeing up space, reducing costs while 
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not threatening the kinds of security-related activities the system was 
designed to manage? In Chapter 4, the calculative basis for deletion will 
be used to draw together studies of algorithms with the long-standing 
STS interest in the calculative. STS work on calculation raises a num-
ber of challenging questions. These include how accuracy is constructed 
(MacKenzie 1993), the accomplishment of numeric objectivity (Porter 
1995), trading, exchange and notions of equivalence (Espeland and 
Sauder 2007; MacKenzie 2009). The kinds of concern articulated in 
these works is not focused on numbers as an isolated output of calcu-
lation. Instead, numbers are considered as part of a series of practical 
actions involved in, for example, solving a problem (Livingston 2006), 
distributing resources, accountabilities or responsibilities for action 
(Strathern 2002), governing a country (Mitchell 2002) and ascertain-
ing a value for some matter (Espeland and Sauder 2007; MacKenzie 
2009). Attuning these ideas to algorithms provides insight into not just 
the content of an algorithm, but its everyday composition, effects and 
associated expectations. However, deletion also poses a particular kind of 
problem: the creation of nothing (the deleted) needs to be continually 
proven. The chapter explores the complexities of calculating what ought 
to be deleted, what form such deletion ought to take and whether or 
not data has indeed been deleted. These focal points and the difficul-
ties of providing proof are used to address suggestions in contemporary 
research that algorithms are powerful and agential, easily able to enact 
and execute orders. Instead, the chapter calls for more detailed analysis 
(picked up in the next chapter) of what constitutes algorithmic success 
and failure.
Following on from Chapter 4’s call for more detailed analysis of suc-
cess and failure, Chapter 5 explores the problems involved in demon-
strating an algorithmic system to a variety of audiences. As the project 
team reached closer to its final deadlines and faced up to the task of 
putting on demonstrations of the technology under development to 
various audiences—including the project funders—it became ever more 
apparent that in a number of ways the technology did not work. That 
is, promises made to funders, to academics, to potential end users on an 
advisory board, to ethical experts brought in to assess the technology 
may not be met. In project meetings, it became rapidly apparent that 
a number of ways of constituting a response to different audiences and 
their imagined demands could be offered. This was not simply a binary 
divide between providing a single truth or falsehood. Instead, a range 
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of different more or less ‘genuine’ demonstrations with greater or lesser 
integrity were discursively assembled by the project team, and ways 
to locate and populate, witness and manage the assessment of these 
demonstrations were brought to the table. Holding in place witnesses, 
technologies and practices became key to successfully demonstrating the 
algorithm. In this chapter, the notion of integrity will be used to sug-
gest that ideas of sight, materiality and morality can be reworked and 
incorporated into the growing literature on algorithms as a basis for 
investigating the everyday life of what it means for an algorithmic sys-
tem to work.
The final chapter explores how a market can be built for an algorith-
mic system under development. It draws together studies of algorithms 
with the growing literature in STS on markets and the composition of 
financial value (Callon 1998; MacKenzie et al. 2007; Muniesa et al. 2007, 
2017). In particular, it focuses on performativity (see, e.g., MacKenzie 
et al. 2007; MacKenzie 2008; Cochoy 1998; drawing on Austin 1962). 
Although STS work on markets has on occasions looked into financial 
trading through algorithms, the move here is to explore market making 
for algorithms. To accomplish this kind of market work and build a value 
for selecting relevance and deleting irrelevance, the project co-ordinators 
had to look beyond accountable outputs of technical certainty (given that, 
as we will have seen in Chapter 5, the machine had trouble delineating 
relevance and adequately deleting data). Instead, they looked to build 
a market for the algorithmic system through other means. From trying 
to sell technological efficacy, the project co-ordinators instead sought to 
build a market of willing customers (interested in a technology that might 
enable them to comply with emerging regulations) who were then con-
stituted as a means to attract others to (potentially) invest in the system. 
Building a market here involved different kinds of calculations (such 
as Compound Annual Growth Rates for the fields in which the system 
might be sold) to forecast a market share. This might accomplish value by 
attracting interested parties whose investments might bring such a forecast 
closer to reality. The calculations had to enter a performative arena. This 
final chapter will suggest that market work is an important facet of the 
everyday life of an algorithm, without which algorithmic systems such as 
the one featured in this book, would not endure. The chapter concludes 
with an analysis of the distinct and only occasionally integrated everyday 
lives of the algorithm.
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notes
1.  See Concise Oxford Dictionary (1999).
2.  Ziewitz (2016) and Neyland (2016).
3.  https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/sep/01/how-algorithms- 
rule-our-working-lives.
4.  http://uk.businessinsider.com/harvard-mathematician-reveals-algo-
rithms-make-justice-system-baised-worse-black-people-crime-police-2017-
6?r=US&IR=T.
5.  https://www.dezeen.com/2017/06/01/algorithm-seven-million- 
different-jars-nutella-packaging-design/.
6.  http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/science/new-algo-
rithm-to-teach-robots-human-etiquettes/articleshow/59175965.cms.
7.  An analytic sensibility is a way of thinking about and organising a deter-
mined scepticism towards the ethnographic material that a researcher 
is presented with during the course of their fieldwork. It is not as strong 
as an instruction (there is no ethnographic algorithm here), neither is it 
entirely without purpose. The analytic sensibility can set a direction which 
then subsequently can be called to sceptical account as the study develops.
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Abstract  This chapter sets out the algorithms that will form the focus 
for this book and their human and non-human associations. The chapter 
focuses on one particular algorithmic system developed for public trans-
port security and explores the ways in which the system provided a basis 
for experimenting with what computer scientists termed human-shaped 
objects. In contrast to much of the social science literature on algorithms 
that suggests the algorithm itself is more or less fixed or inscrutable, this 
chapter will instead set out one basis for ethnographically studying the algo-
rithm up-close and in detail. Placing algorithms under scrutiny opens up 
the opportunity for studying their instability and the ceaseless experimen-
tation to which they are subjected. An important basis for this experimen-
tation, the chapter will suggest, is elegance. The chapter will suggest that 
elegance opens up a distinct way to conceive of the experimental prospects 
of algorithms under development and their ways of composing humans.
Keywords  Experimentation · Human-shaped objects · Elegance · 
Objects
opening
How can we get close to the everyday life of an algorithm? Building 
on the Introduction to this book, how can we make sense of the ways 
algorithms participate in everyday life, compose the everyday or are 
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continually involved in the becoming of the everyday? In this chapter, 
I will focus on the question of how an algorithm can (at least begin to) 
participate in everyday life. I will set out one particular project that pro-
vided a means to get close to the everyday life of an algorithm (or what 
might be more appropriately termed an ‘algorithmic system’, as we will 
go on to see). I will then investigate one focus for algorithmic exper-
imentation in this project: efforts to identify humans. As the project 
developed, the notion of human-shaped objects became more and more 
apparent in project documents, meetings and demonstrations. We will 
look into what counts as an anticipated human-shaped object, and we 
will see how our algorithm struggles to grasp such objects. I will also 
suggest that the human-shaped object becomes itself a matter for exper-
imentation. This is, I will contend, an important aspect of the everyday 
life of the algorithm: that it becomes entangled with the incredibly banal 
everyday life of the human (addressing questions such as what is the 
shape of a human). I will also suggest that the systems with which algo-
rithms participate in construing effects are not stable and certainly not 
opaque within these project settings. Instead, algorithms and their sys-
tem are continually inspected and tested, changed and further developed 
in order to try and grasp the human-shaped object. Within this experi-
mental setting, we can hence note that the algorithms and their system 
do not operate entirely in line with expectations or within parameters 
that instantly make sense. Much of the everyday life of the algorithm 
is thus made up of attempts to get algorithms, their system, computer 
scientists or others to adequately account for what it is that they have 
produced. The chapter begins with a consideration of experimentation.
whAt is experimentAtion?
The tradition of studying the experiment in science and technol-
ogy studies (STS) has been focused around the space of the laboratory 
(Latour and Woolgar 1979), forms of expertise (Collins and Evans 
2007) and devices (Latour 1987) that render the laboratory a cen-
tre of, for example, calculation. The laboratory becomes the space into 
which the outside world is drawn in order to approximate its conditions 
for an experiment. Or alternatively, the conditions of the laboratory are 
extended into the world beyond the laboratory in order to take the labo-
ratory experiment to the world (Latour 1993). The experiment as such, 
then, becomes a replicable phenomenon through which some feature of 
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the world is proclaimed. And we see some parallels drawn with economic 
experiments that similarly seek to draw up variables to manage and con-
trol, a world to be drawn into the economic laboratory or a set of condi-
tions to be extended beyond the laboratory (Muniesa and Callon 2007). 
The economic experiment, like the laboratory experiment, is as much 
about demonstration, as it is about discovery (Guala 2008).
In Chapter 5, we will see that in the later stages of the everyday life 
of our algorithm, these concerns for control and demonstration came to 
the fore—particularly when research funders wanted to see results. But 
for now, our algorithm—the abandoned luggage algorithm from the 
Introduction—sits somewhat meekly and unknowing in an office. It is 
waiting, but it does not know for what it waits: not for an experiment 
in the closely controlled sense of the term, not for a pristine laboratory 
space and not for a set of controlled variables, even human or luggage 
variables, through which it can demonstrate its capacity to grasp the 
world around it. To begin with it awaits experimentation.
Experimentation sits somewhat apart from experiments. In place 
of controls or neatly defined space come proposals, ideas, efforts to try 
things and see what happens. Experimentation can be as much a part of 
qualitative social science as it can be a part of algorithmic computer sci-
ence. In the social sciences, experimentation has been used as an impetus 
by Marres (2013) to experimentalise political ontology and by Johansson 
and Metzger (2016) to experimentalise the organisation of objects. What 
these works point towards is the fundamental focus for experimentation: 
that the nature of just about anything can be rendered at stake within 
the experimental realm. Scholars have also begun to conceive of exper-
imentalising economic phenomena (Wherry 2014; Muniesa 2016a, b). 
This is interesting for drawing our attention towards the ways in which 
what might otherwise be quite controlled, laboratory-like settings can 
be opened up for new lines of thought through experimentation. These 
works draw on a patchy history of social science experimentation that 
has tended to raise insights and ethical concerns in equal measure. One 
historical route for the development of such experimentation has been 
Garfinkel’s (1963, 1967) breach experiments. Here, the aim was to dis-
rupt—or breach—taken-for-granted features of everyday life in every-
day settings in order to make those features available for analysis. But 
unlike the laboratory tradition, the breaches for Garfinkel were broadly 
experimental in the sense of providing some preliminary trials and find-
ings to be further worked on. They were heuristic devices, aiding the 
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sluggish imagination that provoked new thoughts and new lines of 
enquiry. Our algorithm is awaiting such provocation. But it is also 
awaiting experimentation that opens up questions of very fundamental 
features of everyday life, such as what is a human and how ought we 
to know. And it awaits experimentation that opens up what might oth-
erwise be a pristine laboratory space to new questions, new forms of 
liveliness.
Experimentation began from the outset of the project in which the 
algorithm was a participant. We will begin here with the initial develop-
ment of the project in order to provide a prior step to experimentation. 
Although the experimentation was more open than a controlled labo-
ratory experiment, it was not free from any constraints or expectations. 
The experimentation had a broad purpose that was successively set and 
narrowed as the experimentation proceeded. What was being experi-
mented upon and what was anticipated as the outcome of experimenta-
tion was the product of successive rounds of experimentation. To make 
sense of these expectations, we need to see how the project produced its 
algorithms in the first place.
the Algorithmic project
The project upon which this book is based began with an e-mail invita-
tion: Would I be interested in participating in a project that involved the 
development of a new ‘ algorithmic’, ‘smart’ and ‘ethical’ video-based 
surveillance system? The project coordinator informed me that the 
project would involve a large technology firm (TechFirm1), two large 
transport firms where the technology would be tested and developed 
(SkyPort, which owns and operates two large European city airports, and 
StateTrack, a large European state railway) and two teams of computer 
scientists (from University 1, UK, and University 2, Poland) and that the 
project would be managed by a consultancy firm (Consultor, Spain). I 
was being invited to oversee the ethics of the technology under devel-
opment and to provide an (at least partially) independent ethical assess-
ment. The project would involve developing a system that would use 
algorithms to select security-relevant images from the CCTV systems of 
the airport and train station. It would use this ability to demarcate rele-
vance as a basis for introducing a new, ethical, algorithmic system.
The coordinator suggested the project would provide a location for 
experimentation with three ethical aims: that algorithms could be used to 
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reduce the scope of data made visible within a video-based surveillance 
system by only showing ‘relevant’ images; that algorithms could be used 
to automatically delete the vast majority (perhaps 95%) of surveillance 
data that was not relevant; and that no new algorithms or surveillance 
networks would need to be developed to do so. These aims had been 
developed by the coordinator into an initial project bid. The coordinator 
hoped the ‘ethical’ qualities of the project were clear in the way the aims 
were positioned in the bid as a response to issues raised in popular and 
academic discussions about, for example, privacy, surveillance and exces-
sive visibility (Lyon 2001; Davies 1996; Norris and Armstrong 1999; 
Bennett 2005; Van der Ploeg 2003; Taylor 2010; McCahill 2002) and 
concerns raised with algorithmic surveillance (Introna and Woods 2004). 
In particular, the project bid set out to engage with contemporary con-
cerns regarding data retention and deletion, as very little data would be 
kept (assuming the technology worked).
The proposal was a success, and the project was granted €2.8m (about 
$3.1m in mid-2015) under the European Union’s 7th Framework 
Programme. A means to fulfil the promises of ethical algorithms com-
mitted to the project bid would now have to be found. This set the scene 
for early rounds of experimentation.
estAblishing the grounds for experimentAtion  
And the missing Algorithms
The basis for initial experimentation within the project was a series of 
meetings between the project participants. Although there were already 
some expectations set in place by the funding proposal and its success, 
the means to achieve these expectations and the precise configuration of 
expectations had not yet been met. I now found myself sat in these meet-
ings as an ethnographer, watching computer scientists talking to each 
other mostly about system architectures, media proxies, the flow of digi-
tal data—but not so much about algorithms.
Attaining a position as an ethnographer on this project had been the 
result of some pre-project negotiation. Following the project coordi-
nator’s request that I carry out an ethical review of the project under 
development, I had suggested that it might be interesting, perhaps vital, 
to carry out an assessment of the system under development. Drawing 
on recent work on ethics and design and ethics in practice,2 I suggested 
that what got to count as the ethics of an algorithm might not be easy 
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to anticipate at the start of a project or from a position entirely on the 
outside. It might make more sense to work with the project team, stud-
ying the development of the technology and feeding in ethical questions 
and prompts over the three years of the project. Although this seemed 
to be an interesting proposition for project participants, questions were 
immediately raised regarding my ability to be both in the project (on 
the inside) and offer an ethical assessment (something deemed to be 
required from the outside). I suggested that during the course of the 
project I could use the emerging ethnography of system development to 
present the developing algorithm to various audiences who might feed-
back interesting and challenging questions, I could set up meetings with 
individuals who might provide feedback on the developing technology 
and I would put together an ethics board. The latter would be outsiders 
to the project, enabling me to move between an inside and outside posi-
tion, working with, for example, the computer scientists in the project 
at some points and with the ethics board members at other moments. 
As we will see in Chapter 3, this ethical assessment formed one part of 
a series of questions regarding accountability that were never singularly 
resolved in the project. However, for now, at the outset, my role as eth-
nographer was more or less accepted, if not yet defined.
But what of the algorithms? In these early project meetings when I 
was still developing a sense of what the project was, what the technol-
ogy might be, and what the challenges of my participation might involve, 
algorithms still retained their mystery. In line with academic writing on 
algorithms that emphasises their opacity (see Introduction to this book), 
at this moment the nature and potential of algorithms in the project was 
unclear. Occasionally during these meetings, algorithms were mentioned, 
and most project participants seemed to agree with the computer scien-
tists from University 1 and University 2 that the ‘algorithms’ were sets 
of IF-THEN rules, already complete with associated software/code that 
could be ‘dropped into’ the system. The system seemed to be the thing 
that needed to be developed, not the algorithms. As we will see, this 
notion of ‘dropping in’ an algorithm turned out to be a wildly specula-
tive and over-optimistic assessment of the role and ability of algorithms, 
but for now in project meetings, the system was key.
Establishing the precise set-up for the algorithmic system under devel-
opment involved the computer scientists and transport firms involved in 
the project (the airport and train operator) discussing first steps in tech-
nology development. Although this could be described as a negotiation, 
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it mostly seemed to involve the computer scientists proposing system 
components and then later an order of system components (more or 
less setting out how data would flow through the system and how each 
component could talk to each other) and then the transport firms would 
respond. There was never an occasion where the transport firms would 
make the first proposal. This seemed to be a result of the meetings being 
framed as technical discussions primarily, rather than being focused on, 
for example, usability. It was also the case that with more than a decade 
of experience in developing these systems, University 1 and University 2 
computer scientists could talk with a fluency, eloquence and technical 
mastery that no one else could match. When the computer scientists 
made a proposal, it was up to the transport firms to accept or not the 
proposal and then it was down to the computer scientists to make any 
necessary adjustments.
But working together in this kind of complex multiparty, international 
project was not entirely straightforward. The experience of the computer 
scientists in developing these kinds of systems was thus a welcome contri-
bution to the project in itself. It established a way of working that others 
could fit in with. Its absence might have meant a significant number of 
meetings to decide on ways of meeting. The meetings became framed 
as technical matters in which the computer scientists would lead partly 
because of the lack of any alternative way to frame meetings that anyone 
put forward. The ethnographer certainly didn’t propose to have meet-
ings framed around ethnography (at least not yet, see Chapters 3 and 5).
The meetings worked as follows. The participants would be gathered 
around a semicircle of tables or, on one occasion, an oval table, with a 
screen and projector at one end. Onto the screen would be projected 
a technical matter under discussion—often the system architecture. This 
set out the distinct components of the system under development and 
the role such components might play. Discussions in meetings then 
focused on the implications of setting up the system in one way or 
another, along with discussions of individual components of the system 
and, in early meetings, new components that might be needed. One 
computer scientist would sit at a laptop linked to the projector with the 
system architecture on their screen and make adjustments as discussions 
continued so that meeting participants could further discuss the emerg-
ing system. As they made changes on their laptop, these were projected 
onto a large screen for meeting participants to discuss. Sometimes two 
or more computer scientists would gather round the laptop to further 
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discuss a point of detail or refine precisely what it was that had just been 
proposed in the meeting and what this might look like for the system. 
A typical architecture from one of the later meetings looked like this as 
shown in Fig. 2.1.
By this point in the project, it had been agreed that the existing sur-
veillance cameras in transport hubs operated by SkyPort and StateTrack 
would feed into the system (these are represented by the black cam-
era-shaped objects on the left). After much discussion, it had been 
agreed that the digital data from these cameras would need to feed into 
a media proxy. Both sets of computer scientists were disappointed to 
learn that the transport hubs to be included in the project had a range 
of equipment. Some cameras were old, some new, some high definition 
and some not, and each came with a variable frame rate (the number 
of images a second that would flow into the algorithmic system). The 
media proxy was required to smooth out the inconsistencies in this flow 
of data in order that the next component in the system architecture 
would then be able to read the data. Inconsistent or messy data would 
prove troublesome throughout the project, but in these meetings, it was 
assumed that the media proxy would work as anticipated.
After some discussion, it was agreed that the media proxy would 
deliver its pristine data to two further system components. These com-
prised the Event Detection system and the Route Reconstruction 
Fig. 2.1 System architecture
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system. The Event Detection system was where the algorithms (includ-
ing the abandoned luggage algorithm of the Introduction to this book) 
would sit. The idea was that these algorithms would sift through tera-
bytes of digital video data and use IF-THEN rules to select out those 
events that security operatives in a train station or airport would need 
to see. In discussions between the computer scientists and transport 
firms, it was agreed that abandoned luggage, people moving the wrong 
way (counter-flow) and people moving into forbidden areas (such as the 
train track in train stations or closed offices in airports) would be a use-
ful basis for experimentation in the project. These would later become 
the basis for algorithmically experimenting with the basic idea that rel-
evant images could be detected within flows of digital video data. For 
now, it was still assumed that algorithms could simply be dropped into 
this Event Detection component of the architecture. Relevant images 
would then be passed to the User Interface (UI) with all data deemed 
irrelevant passed to the Privacy Enhancement System. This was put for-
ward as a key means to achieve the ethical aims of the project. It was 
suggested that only a small percentage of video data was relevant within 
an airport or train station, that only a small percentage of data needed 
to be seen and that the rest of the data could be stored briefly in the 
Privacy Enhancement System before being securely deleted. It later tran-
spired that detecting relevant images, getting the algorithms to work and 
securely deleting data were all major technical challenges. But for now, in 
these early project meetings, it was assumed that the system would work 
as expected.
The Route Reconstruction component was a later addition. This fol-
lowed on from discussions between the transport firms and the computer 
scientists, in which it became clear that having an image of, for example, 
an abandoned item of luggage on its own was not particularly useful in 
security terms. Transport operatives wanted to know who had left the 
luggage, where they had come from and where they went next. The the-
ory behind the Route Reconstruction system (although see Chapter 3 
for an analysis of this) was that it would be possible to use probabilistic 
means to trace the history around an event detected by an algorithm. 
The UI would then give operatives the option to see, for example, how 
an item of luggage had been abandoned, by whom, with whom they 
were walking and so on. This would mean that the Privacy Enhancement 
System would need to store data for as long as these reconstructions 
were required. It was assumed that most would be performed within 
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24 hours of an incident. Any data deemed relevant and any reconstruc-
tions viewed by operatives would be moved out of the auto-deletion fea-
ture of the Privacy Enhancement System and kept (in Video Storage). 
According to the computer scientists, this should still mean that around 
95% of data was deleted and that the ethical aims to see less and store 
less data would be achieved.
The meetings were discursive fora where the computer scientists took 
the lead in making proposals and other participants, mostly the transport 
firms, offered their response. The overall effect was that the algorithmic 
system began to emerge and take shape, at least on a computer screen 
and as a projection. The components that would need to be developed 
were discussed, the future role of algorithms in Event Detection was 
more or less set, and a specific shape was given to the project’s ethical 
proposals. A technical means was proposed for limiting the range of data 
that would be seen and the amount of data that would be stored. As we 
will see, producing a UI and Route Reconstruction system (Chapter 3) 
and deleting data (Chapter 4) were problematic throughout the life of 
the project. However, for now we will retain our focus on experimenting 
with the human-shaped object.
elegAnce And the humAn-shAped object
With the system architecture agreed at least in a preliminary form, 
the computer scientists could get on with the task of making the sys-
tem work. Key to having a working system was to ensure that the data 
flowing from surveillance cameras through the Media Proxy could be 
understood by the Event Detection component. If events could not be 
detected, there would be no system. Figuring out ways to detect aban-
doned luggage, moving the wrong way and moving into a forbidden 
space were crucial. Central to Event Detection was the human-shaped 
object. As digital video was streamed through the system, the algorithms 
would need to be able to pick out human-shaped objects first, and then 
the actions in which they were engaged second. Relevant actions for this 
experimental stage of system development would be a human-shaped 
object moving the wrong way, a human-shaped object moving into a for-
bidden space and a human-shaped object abandoning its luggage.
How could this human-shaped object be given a definition that made 
sense for operationalisation within the system? The algorithms for Event 
Detection used in video analytic systems are a designed product. They 
take effort and work and thought and often an amount of reworking. 
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The algorithms and their associated code for this project built on the 
decade of work carried out, respectively, by University 1 and University 
2. As these long histories of development had been carried out by var-
ious colleagues within these Universities over time, tinkering with the 
algorithms was not straightforward. When computer scientists initially 
talked of ‘dropping in’ algorithms into the system, this was partly in the 
hope of avoiding many of the difficulties of tinkering, experimenting 
and tinkering again with algorithms that were only partially known to 
the computer scientists. As we saw in the Introduction with the aban-
doned luggage algorithm, the algorithm establishes a set of rules which 
are designed to contribute to demarcating relevant from irrelevant video 
data. In this way, such rules could be noted as a means to discern peo-
ple and things that could be ignored and people and things that might 
need further scrutiny. If such a focus could hold together, the algorithms 
could indeed be dropped in. However, in practice, what constituted a 
human-shaped object was a matter of ongoing work.
Let’s return to the subject of the Introduction to then explore exper-
imentation with human-shaped objects. As a reminder, these are the 
IF-THEN rules for the abandoned luggage algorithm (Fig. 2.2):
Fig. 2.2 Abandoned luggage algorithm
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As I noted in the Introduction, what seems most apparent in these 
rules is the IF-THEN structure. At its simplest, the ‘IF’ acts as a con-
dition and the ‘THEN’ acts as a consequence. In this particular algo-
rithm, the IF-THEN rules were designed to operate in the following 
way. IF an object was detected within a stream of digital video data fed 
into the system from a particular area (notably a train station operated 
by StateTrack or an airport operated by SkyPort), THEN the object 
could be tentatively allocated the category of potentially relevant. IF that 
same object was deemed to be in the class of objects ‘human-shaped’, 
THEN that object could be tentatively allocated the category of a poten-
tially relevant human-shaped object. IF that same human-shaped object 
was separate from a luggage-shaped object, THEN it could maintain its 
position as potentially relevant. IF that same human-shaped object and 
luggage-shaped object were set apart beyond a specific distance thresh-
old set by the system (say 2 or 10 metres) and the same objects were 
set apart beyond the temporal threshold set by the system (say 30 sec-
onds or 1 minute)—that is, if the person and luggage were sufficiently 
far apart for sufficiently long—THEN an alert could be sent to surveil-
lance operatives. The alert would then mean that the package of data rel-
evant to the alert would be sent to the UI and operatives could then 
click on the data, watch the video of abandoned luggage and offer a rel-
evant response (see Chapter 3). What is important for now is how these 
putative objects were given shape and divided into relevant and irrelevant 
entities.
If this structuring and division of various entities (humans, luggage, 
time, space, relevance and irrelevance) occurred straightforwardly and 
endured, it might be tempting to argue that this is where the power 
of algorithms is located or made apparent. A straightforward short cut 
would be to argue that the algorithm structures the social world and 
through this kind of statement we could then find what Lash (2007) 
refers to as the powerful algorithm and what Beer (2009) suggests are 
algorithms’ ability to shape the social world. We could argue that the 
outputs of the system demonstrated an asymmetrical distribution of the 
ability to cause an effect—that it is through the algorithm that these divi-
sions between relevant and irrelevant data can be discerned. However, 
such a short cut requires quite a jump from the algorithmic IF-THEN 
rules to their consequences. It ignores the everyday life in which the 
algorithm must be a successful participant for these kinds of effects to be 
brought about. If instead we pay attention to the everyday work required 
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for algorithmic conditions and consequences to be achieved, what we 
find is not that the algorithm structures the social world. Instead, exper-
imentation takes place (and fails, takes place again, things are reworked 
and then sometimes fail again or work to a small extent) to constitute 
the conditions required for the system to participate in the production of 
effects or the system gets partially redrawn to fit new versions of the con-
ditions. This continual experimentation, rewriting and efforts to achieve 
conditions and consequences are not only central to the work of com-
puter scientists but also crucial to the life of the algorithm. It is where 
the distinction between relevant and irrelevant data is continuously in 
the process of being made for the system. It is where the human-shaped 
object is drawn up and pursued. It is where the nature of things is made 
at stake.
The experimental basis designed to enable the algorithm to partici-
pate in the everyday life of the airport and train station had, what was 
for the ethnographer, a peculiar organising principle. The computer sci-
entists of University 1 and University 2 talked of ‘elegance’ during the 
meetings around system architecture, huddled around the laptop on 
which they made updates to the system and in the subsequent human-
shaped object experimentation that we will now consider. This seemed 
like an odd term to me in a series of meetings that mostly involved 
quite specialist, technical language. Elegance seemed to come from a 
different field—perhaps fashion or furniture design. What could it 
mean for the computer scientists to talk of elegance, or rather how was 
the term elegance given meaning by the practical work of the computer 
scientists?
Ian Glynn (2010) captures something of what elegance can mean in 
his study of experiments and mathematical proofs. Glynn suggests ele-
gance can be found in scientific and mathematical solutions which 
combine concision, persuasion and satisfaction. As I followed the exper-
imentation of the computer scientists, this approach to elegance seemed 
useful for making sense of the ways they discussed system architecture. 
The composition of the different system components, their location in 
relation to each other within the system architecture and how they might 
talk to each other was each discernible as a discussion focused on what 
might be elegant. However, this came to the fore even more strongly 
with the human-shaped object. What would count as concise, persua-
sive and satisfying as a human-shaped object seems a useful way to group 
together much of the discussion that took place.
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For the IF conditions of the Event Detection algorithms to be 
achieved required coordinated work to bring together everyday compe-
tences (among surveillance operatives and computer scientists), the cre-
ation of new entities (including lines of code), the further development 
of components (from algorithmic rules to new forms of classification) 
and the development of a sense of what the everyday life was in which 
the algorithms would participate (in the train station or airport). It also 
required consideration of the changes that might come about in that 
everyday life. Elegance could be noted as the basis for this coordinated 
work in the following way. The first point of contention was the tech-
nical basis for developing a means to classify putative objects. Readers 
will recall that first identifying a putative object is important within the 
stream of digital video data in order that other data can be ignored. 
What might count as a human-shaped object or a luggage-shaped object 
as a precise focus for classification was vital. However, what might count 
as a concise means to achieve this classification was an important but 
slightly different objective. As project meetings progressed, it became 
clear that the amount of processing power required to sift through all 
the data produced in a train station or airport in real time and classify all 
human-shaped objects precisely would be significant. Face recognition, 
iris recognition and gait recognition (based on how people walked) were 
all ruled out as insufficiently concise. These approaches may have been 
persuasive as a means to identify specific individuals in particular spaces, 
but their reliability depended on having people stand still in controlled 
spaces and have their features read by the system for a few seconds. This 
would not be very satisfying for passengers or airports whose business 
models depended on the rapid movement of passengers towards shops 
(Woolgar and Neyland 2013).
How then to be concise and satisfying and persuasive in classifying 
human-shaped objects? As Bowker and Star (2000) suggest, classification 
systems are always incomplete. This incompleteness ensures an ambigu-
ity between the focus of algorithmic classification (the putative human-
shaped object) and the entity being classified (the possible human going 
about their business). Concision requires various efforts to classify to 
a degree that is satisfying and persuasive in relation to the needs of the 
system and the audiences for the algorithmic system. The system needs 
to do enough (be satisfying and persuasive), but no more than enough 
(be concise) as doing more than enough would require more process-
ing of data. In the process of experimenting with human-shaped objects 
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in this project, various more or less concise ways to classify were drawn 
up and considered or abandoned either because they would require too 
much processing power (probably quite persuasive but not concise) or 
were too inaccurate (quite concise, but produced results that were not at 
all persuasive). At particular moments, (not very serious) consideration 
was even given to change the everyday life into which the algorithms 
would enter in order to make classification a more straightforward mat-
ter. For example, computer scientists joked about changing the airport 
architecture to suit the system, including putting in higher ceilings, con-
sistent lighting and flooring, and narrow spaces to channel the flow of 
people. These were a joke in the sense that they could never be accom-
modated within the project budget. Elegance had practical and financial 
constraints.
A first move in classifying objects was to utilise a standard practice 
in video analytics: background subtraction. This method for identifying 
moving objects was somewhat time-consuming and processor intensive, 
and so not particularly elegant. But these efforts could be ‘front-loaded’ 
prior to any active work completed by the system. ‘Front-loading’ in this 
instance meant that a great deal of work would be done to produce an 
extensive map of the fixed attributes of the setting (airport or train sta-
tion) prior to attempts at classification work. Mapping the fixed attrib-
utes would not then need to be repeated unless changes were made to 
the setting (such changes included in this project a change to a shop-
front and a change to the layout of the airport security entry point). 
Producing the map provided a basis to inform the algorithmic system 
what to ignore, helping to demarcate relevance and irrelevance in an ini-
tial manner. Fixed attributes were thus nominally collated as non-suspi-
cious and irrelevant in ways that people and luggage, for example, could 
not be, as these latter objects could not become part of the map of 
attributes (the maps were produced based on an empty airport and train 
station). Having a fixed map then formed the background from which 
other entities could be noted. Any thing that the system detected that 
was not part of the map would be given an initial putative identity as 
requiring further classification.
The basis for demarcating potentially relevant objects depended to 
some degree, then, on computer scientists and their understanding of 
spaces such as airports, maps that might be programmed to ignore for 
a time certain classes of objects as fixed attributes, and classification sys-
tems that might then also—if successful—provide a hesitant basis for 
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selecting out potentially relevant objects. It is clear that anything that 
algorithms were able to ‘do’ was situated in continual reconfigurations of 
the entities involved—making sense of the everyday life of the algorithm 
was thus central.
Mapping for background subtraction was only a starting point. 
Objects noted as non-background entities then needed to be further 
classified. Although background subtraction was a standard technique 
in video analytics, further and more precise object classification was the 
subject of some discussion in the project. Eventually, two means were 
set for classifying those entities noted as distinct from the background 
that might turn out to be human-shaped objects, and these became the 
focus for more intense experimentation in the project. The first of these 
involved bounding boxes, and the second involved a more precise pix-
el-based classification. Both approaches relied on the same initial param-
eterisation of putative objects. To parameterise potential objects, models 
had to be computationally designed. This involved experimenting with 
establishing edges around what a human-shaped object was likely to be 
(in terms of height, width and so on). Other models then had to be built 
to parameterise other objects, such as luggage, cleaners’ trolleys, sign-
posts and other non-permanent attributes of the settings under surveil-
lance. The models relied on 200-point vector analysis to set in place 
what made up the edges of the object under consideration and then to 
which model those edges suggested the object belonged. This was ele-
gant insofar as it would produce rapid, real-time classifications because 
it was concise, using only a minimal amount of processing power and 
being achievable very quickly. Parameterisation was presented by the 
computer scientists as a form of classification that the developing algo-
rithmic system could manage while the system also carried out its other 
tasks. In this way, parameterisation would act as an initial but indefinite 
basis for object classification that could be confirmed by other system 
processes and even later by surveillance operatives when shown images 
of, for example, an apparently suspicious item of luggage. However, 
these parameterisations could only be adjudged as satisfactory and per-
suasive when they were put to use in the airport and train station. There 
were just too many possible mitigating issues to predict how an initial 
experimentation with parameterisation would turn out in practice. Initial 
parameterisation did at least allow the computer scientists to gain some 
confidence that their putative classifications could be achieved within the 
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bounds of processing possibility and could be achieved by making selec-
tions of relevance from streams of digital video data.
Once parameterised as putative human-shaped or luggage-shaped 
objects, the action states of these objects also required classification, 
for example, as moving or not moving. This involved object tracking to 
ascertain the action state of the objects being classified. To achieve the 
conditions established in the algorithmic IF-THEN rules, the system had 
to identify, for example, that a putative item of luggage demarcated as 
potentially relevant, based on a designed model used to initiate param-
eterisation, was no longer moving and that a human-shaped object that 
was derived from a similar process, had left this luggage, had moved at 
least a certain distance from the luggage and for a certain time. In order 
to track objects that had been given an initial and hesitant classifica-
tion, human-shaped objects and luggage-shaped objects would be given 
a bounding box. This was a digitally imposed stream of metadata that 
would create a box around the object according to its already established 
edges (Fig. 2.3).
The box would then be given a metadata identity according to its 
dimensions, location within the airport or train station (e.g. which 
Fig. 2.3 An anony-
mous human-shaped 
bounding box
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camera it appeared on) and its direction and velocity. For the Event 
Detection algorithms of moving into a forbidden space or moving in 
the wrong direction (e.g. going back through airport security or going 
the wrong way through an entry or exit door in a rush hour train sta-
tion), these bounding boxes were a concise form of identification. They 
enabled human-shaped objects to be selected with what might be a 
reasonable accuracy and consistency and without using too much pro-
cessing effort. They were elegant, even if visually they looked a bit ugly 
and did little to match the actual shape of a human beyond their basic 
dimensions.
However, for abandoned luggage, something slightly different was 
required. In experimentation, in order to successfully and consistently 
demarcate human-shaped objects and luggage-shaped objects and their 
separation, a more precisely delimited boundary needed to be drawn 
around the putative objects. This required the creation of a pixel mask 
that enabled the algorithmic system to make a more precise sense of 
the human- and luggage-shaped objects, when and if they separated 
(Fig. 2.4).
This more closely cropped means to parameterise and classify objects 
could then be used to issue alerts within the system. IF a human-
shaped object split from a luggage-shaped object, IF the human-shaped 
object continued to move, IF the luggage-shaped object remained sta-
tionary, IF the luggage-shaped object and human-shaped object were 
Fig. 2.4 A close-
cropped pixelated 
parameter for human- 
and luggage-shaped 
object
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over a certain distance apart and IF the human-shaped object and 
 luggage-shaped object stayed apart for a certain amount of time, THEN 
this would achieve the conditions under which the algorithmic system 
could issue an alert to operatives. As the following figure shows, once 
a close-cropped image of what could be classified as a luggage-shaped 
object was deemed by the system to have lingered beyond a defined time 
and distance from its human-shaped object, then it would be highlighted 
in red and sent to operatives for confirmation and, potentially, further 
action (Fig. 2.5).
In place of the concise elegance of the imprecise bounding box, this 
more precise pixel cropped form of parameterisation was computation-
ally more demanding, requiring a little more time and more processing 
power. However, it was key to maintaining a set of results in these initial 
experimentations that satisfied the needs of the system as agreed with 
SkyPort and StateTrack and could be persuasive to all project partners. 
That is, it produced results that suggested the project was feasible and 
ought to continue (although as we will see in Chapter 5, problems with 
classification continued to be difficult to resolve). The bounding boxes 
lacked the precision to give effect to the IF-THEN rules of the aban-
doned luggage algorithm.
The human-shaped object was thus accomplished in two forms—as a 
bounding box and a more closely cropped image. The bounding boxes 
although somewhat crude were central to the next stages in algorithmic 
experimentation in Route Reconstruction and the issuing of alerts to 
operatives (see Chapter 3) and deletion (see Chapter 4). For now, our 
algorithm could be satisfied that it had been able to participate in at least 
a modified, initial and hesitant, experimental form of everyday life. It had 
Fig. 2.5 An item of 
abandoned luggage
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not succeeded entirely in meeting all the goals of the project yet, it had 
struggled to initially produce a set of results that could elegantly capture 
sufficient information to accurately and consistently identify abandoned 
luggage and had to be changed (to a pixel-based process), and it was reli-
ant on digital maps and background subtraction, but it had nonetheless 
started to get into the action.
conclusion
In this chapter, I have started to build a sense of the everyday life in 
which our algorithm was becoming a participant. In experimental spaces, 
our algorithm was starting to make a particular sense of what it means to 
be human and what it means to be luggage. The IF-THEN rules and the 
development of associated software/code, the building of a system archi-
tecture and set of components provided the grounds for rendering things 
like humans and luggage at stake. To return to Pollner’s (1974) work 
(set out in the Introduction), the algorithm was starting to set out the 
basis for delimiting everyday life. The algorithm was beginning to insist 
that the stream of digital video data flowing through the system acted on 
behalf of an account as either luggage-shaped or human-shaped or back-
ground to be ignored. In addressing the question how do algorithms 
participate in everyday life, we have started to see in this chapter that 
they participate through technical and experimental means. Tinkering 
with ways to frame the human-shaped object, decide on what might 
count as elegant through concision, satisfaction and persuasion, are all 
important ways to answer this question. But we can also see that this 
participation is hesitant. The bounding box is quite elegant for two of 
the system’s algorithmic processes (moving the wrong way and moving 
into a forbidden area) but not particularly persuasive or satisfactory for 
its third process (identifying abandoned luggage). And thus far, all we 
have seen is some initial experimentation, mostly involving the human-
shaped objects of project participants. This experimentation is yet to fully 
escape the protected conditions of experimentation. As we will see in 
Chapters 4 and 5, moving into real time and real space, many of these 
issues in relation to algorithmic participation in everyday life have to be 
reopened.
It is in subsequent chapters that we will start to look into how the 
algorithm becomes the everyday and how algorithms can even compose 
the everyday. For now, these questions have been expressed in limited 
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ways, for example when the computer scientists joked about how they 
would like to change the airport architecture to match the needs of the 
system. In subsequent chapters, as questions continue regarding the 
ability of the algorithm to effectively participate in everyday life, these 
questions resurface. In the next chapter, we will look at how the algo-
rithmic system could become accountable. This will pick up on themes 
mentioned in the Introduction on transparency and accountability and 
will explore in greater detail the means through which the everyday life 
of the algorithm could be made at stake. As the project upon which this 
book is based was funded in order to produce a more ethical algorithmic 
system, these questions of accountability were vital.
notes
1.  The names have been made anonymous.
2.  Design and ethics have a recent history (Buscher et al. 2013; Introna and 
Nissenbaum 2000; Suchman 2011). However, Anderson and Sharrock 
(2013) warn against assuming that design decisions set in place an algo-
rithmic ethic.
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Abstract  This chapter develops insights on human-shaped objects and 
elegance in exploring the possibility of rendering the everyday life of 
algorithms accountable and the form such accountability might take. 
Although algorithmic accountability is currently framed in terms of open-
ness and transparency, the chapter draws on ethnographic engagements 
with the algorithmic system under development to show empirically the 
difficulties (and indeed pointlessness) of achieving this kind of openness. 
Rather than presenting an entirely pessimistic view, the chapter suggests 
that alternative forms of accountability are possible. In place of transpar-
ency, the chapter focuses on science and technology studies (STS) work 
that pursues the characteristics, agency, power and effect of technolo-
gies as the upshot of the network of relations within which a technol-
ogy is positioned. Moving away from the idea that algorithms have fixed, 
 essential characteristics or straightforward power or agency, opens up 
opportunities for developing a distinct basis of accountability in action.
Keywords  Accountability · Agency · Power · Effects · Transparency
opening
Simply being able to see an algorithm in some ways displaces aspects 
of the drama that I noted in the Introduction to this book. If one of 
the major concerns with algorithms is their opacity, then being able 
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to look at our abandoned luggage algorithm would be a step forward. 
However, as I have also tried to suggest thus far in this book, looking at 
a set of IF-THEN rules is insufficient on its own to render an algorithm 
accountable. Algorithms combine with system architectures, hardware 
components, software/code, people, spaces, experimental protocols, 
results, tinkering and an array of other entities through which they take 
shape. Accountability for the algorithm would amount to not just see-
ing the rules (a limited kind of transparency) but making sense of the 
everyday life of the algorithm—a form of accountability in action. In 
this chapter, we will move on with the project on airport and train sta-
tion security and the development of our algorithm to try and explore 
a means by which accountability might be accomplished. We will again 
look at the question of how an algorithm can participate in everyday life, 
but now with an interest in how that everyday life might be opened to 
account. We will also look further at how an algorithmic means to make 
sense of things becomes the everyday and what this means for account-
ability. And we will explore how algorithms don’t just participate in the 
everyday but also compose the everyday. The chapter will begin by set-
ting out a possible means to think through algorithmic accountability. In 
place of focusing on the abandoned luggage algorithm, we will look at 
how the algorithmic system makes sense of and composes the everyday 
through its User Interface and Route Reconstruction system. Then, we 
will consider a different form of accountability through an ethics board. 
The chapter will conclude with some suggestions on the everyday life of 
algorithmic accountability.
AccountAbility
Within the project we are considering, the ethical aims put forward from 
the original bid onwards were to reduce the amount of visual data made 
visible within a video surveillance system, to reduce the amount of data 
that gets stored and to do so without developing new algorithms. These 
were positioned as a basis on which my ethnographic work could hold 
the system to account. They were also presented as a potential means 
to address popular concerns regarding questions of algorithmic open-
ness and transparency, at least theoretically enabling the algorithm, its 
authorship and consequences to be called to question by those subject 
to algorithmic decision-making processes (James 2013; Diakopoulos 
2013). A more accountable algorithm might address concerns expressed 
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in terms of the ability of algorithms to trap us and control our lives 
(Spring 2011), produce new ways to undermine our privacy (Stalder and 
Mayer 2009) and have power, an independent agency to influence every-
day activities (Beer 2009; Lash 2007; Slavin 2011). A formal process of 
accountability might also help overcome the troubling opacity of algo-
rithms, addressing Slavin’s concern that: ‘We’re writing things we can no 
longer read’ (2011: n.p.).
However, the social science literature provides a variety of warnings 
on systems and practices of accounting and accountability. For example, 
Power (1997) suggests in his formative audit society argument that the 
motifs of audit have become essential conditions for meeting the aims of 
regulatory programmes that problematically reorient the goals of organ-
isations. This work draws on and feeds into neo-Foucauldian writing on 
governmentality (Ericson et al. 2003; Miller 1992; Miller and O’Leary 
1994; Rose 1996, 1999). Here, the suggestion is made that, for exam-
ple, government policies (from assessing value for money in public sec-
tor spending, through to the ranking of university research outputs) 
provide rationales to be internalised by those subject to accounts and 
accountabilities. The extent and adequacy of the take-up of these ration-
ales then forms the basis for increasing scrutiny of the accounts offered 
by people or organisations in response. This sets in train a program of 
responsibilisation and individualisation whereby subjects are expected to 
deliver on the terms of the rationale, while taking on the costs of doing so, 
allowing ‘authorities … [to] give effect to government ambitions’ (Rose 
and Miller 1992: 175). For Foucault (1980), this provides: ‘A superb for-
mula: power exercised continuously and for what turned out to be a mini-
mal cost’ (1980: 158).
In this literature, the endurance of accounts and accountabilities is 
explained through the structured necessity of repetition. That is, along-
side efficiency, accounts and accountabilities become part of an ordered 
temporality of repeated assessment in, for example, performance meas-
urements where the same organisations and processes are subject to 
accounts and accountabilities at set intervals in order to render the 
organisation assessable (Power 1997; Rose 1999; Rose and Miller 1992). 
For Pentland, this repetition forms audit rituals which have: ‘succeeded 
in transforming chaos into order’ (1993: 606). In particular, accounts 
and accountabilities have introduced a ‘ritual which transforms the finan-
cial statements of corporate management from an inherently untrustwor-
thy state into a form that the auditors and the public can be comfortable 
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with’ (1993: 605). Efforts to make algorithms accountable might thus 
need to consider the kinds of rituals these procedures could introduce, 
the power relations they could institute and the problematic steering of 
organisational goals that could result.
This literature on the formal processes and repetitive procedures for 
accounting and accountabilities suggests emerging calls for algorithmic 
accountability would provide a fertile ground for the continued expan-
sion of accounts and accountabilities into new territories. Procedures 
for accountability might expand for as long as there are new organisa-
tions, technologies or audiences available, presenting new opportunities 
for carrying out the same processes (see, e.g., Osborne and Rose [1999] 
on the expansion of governmentality; also see Ferguson and Gupta 
[2002] on the creation of the individual as auditor of their own ‘firm’). 
Accounts and distributions of accountability then become an expecta-
tion, something that investors, regulators and other external audiences 
expect to see. Being able to account for the accountability of a firm can 
then become part of an organisation’s market positioning as transparent 
and open, as ethical, as taking corporate social responsibility seriously 
(Drew 2004; Gray 1992, 2002; Neyland 2007; Shaw and Plepinger 
2001). Furthermore, as Mennicken (2010) suggests, once accountability 
becomes an expectation, auditors, for example, can seek to generate mar-
kets for their activities. Alternatively, the outcomes of forms of accounts 
and accountabilities become market-oriented assets in their own right, as 
is the case with media organisations promoting their league tables as one 
way to attract custom (such as the Financial Times MBA rankings, see 
Free et al. 2009). As we will see in Chapter 6, being able to promote the 
ethical algorithmic system as accountable became key to the project that 
features in this book, as a way to build a market for the technology.
This may sound somewhat foreboding: accountability becomes a 
ritual expectation, it steers organisational goals in problematic ways, 
and it opens up markets for the processes and outputs of accountability. 
Yet what we can also see in Chapter 2 is that what an algorithm is, 
what activities it participates in, and how it is entangled in the produc-
tion of future effects, is subject to ongoing experimentation. Hence, 
building a ritual for algorithmic accountability seems somewhat dis-
tant. It seems too early, and algorithms seem too diverse, to introduce 
a single and universal, ritualised form of algorithmic accountability. It 
also seems too early to be able to predict the consequences of algorith-
mic accountability. A broad range of consequences could ensue from 
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algorithmic accountability. For example, accounts and accountabilities 
might have unintended consequences (Strathern 2000, 2002), might 
need to consider the constitution of audience (Neyland and Woolgar 
2002), the enabling and constraining of agency (Law 1996), what works 
gets done (Mouritsen et al. 2001), who and what gets hailed to account 
(Munro 2001), the timing and spacing of accounts (Munro 2004) and 
their consequence. But as yet we have no strong grounds for assessing 
these potential outcomes of accountability in the field of algorithms. And 
calls for algorithmic accountability have thus far mostly been focused on 
introducing a means whereby data subjects (those potentially subjected 
to algorithmic decision-making and their representatives) might be noti-
fied and be given a chance to ask questions or challenge the algorithm. 
An audit would also require that the somewhat messy experimentation of 
Chapter 2, the different needs and expectations of various different part-
ner organisations, my own struggles to figure out what I was doing as an 
ethnographer would all be frozen in time and ordered into an account. 
The uncertainties of experimentation would need to be ignored, and my 
own ongoing questions would need to be side-lined to produce the kind 
of order in which formal processes of accountability excel. The everyday 
life of the algorithm would need to be overlooked. So what should an 
accountable algorithm look like? How could I, as an ethnographer of a 
developing project, work through a means to render the emerging algo-
rithm accountable that respected these uncertainties, forms of experi-
mentation and ongoing changes in the system but still provided a means 
for potential data subjects to raise questions?
One starting point for moving from the kinds of formal processes of 
accountability outlined above to an approach specifically attuned to algo-
rithms is provided by Science and Technology Studies (STS). The recent 
history of anti-essentialist or post-essentialist research (Rappert 2001) in 
STS usefully warns us against attributing single, certain and fixed char-
acteristics to things (and people). Furthermore, STS research on tech-
nologies, their development and messiness also suggests that we ought 
to maintain a deep scepticism to claims regarding the agency or power 
of technology to operate alone. As I suggested in the Introduction to 
this book, in STS work, the characteristics, agency, power and effect 
of technologies are often treated as the upshot of the network of rela-
tions within which a technology is positioned (Latour 1990; Law 1996). 
Rather than seeing agency or power as residing in the algorithm, as sug-
gested by much of the recent algorithm literature, this STS approach 
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would be more attuned to raising questions about the set of relations 
that enable an algorithm to be brought into being.
If we take accountability to mean opening up algorithms to question 
by data subjects and their representatives, this STS approach prompts 
some important challenges. We need to get close to the everyday life in 
which the algorithm participates in order to make sense of the relations 
through which it accomplishes its effects. We need to make this everyday 
life of the algorithm open to question. But then we also need to know 
something about how the algorithm is itself involved in accounting for 
everyday life. How can we make accountable the means through which 
the algorithm renders the world accountable?
The ethical aims to see less and store less data provided one basis for 
holding the system to account, but developing the precise method for 
rendering the algorithmic system accountable was to be my responsi-
bility. Traditional approaches to ethical assessment have included con-
sequentialist ethics (whereby the consequences of a technology, e.g., 
would be assessed) and deontological ethics (whereby a technology 
would be assessed in relation to a set of ethical principles; for a discus-
sion, see Sandvig et al. 2013). However, these traditional approaches 
seemed to fit awkwardly with the STS approach and its post-essentialist 
warnings. To judge the consequences of the algorithm or to what extent 
an algorithm matched a set of deontological principles appeared to 
require the attribution of fixed characteristics and a fixed path of future 
development to the algorithm while it was still under experimentation 
(and, for all I knew, this might be a ceaseless experimentation, without 
end). As a counter to these approaches, ethnography seemed to offer 
an alternative. In place of any assumptions at the outset regarding the 
nature and normativity of algorithms, their system, the space, objects or 
people with whom they would interact in the project (a deontological 
ethics), my ethnography might provide a kind of unfolding narrative of 
the nature of various entities and how these might be made accountable. 
However, unlike a consequentialist ethics whereby the outcomes of the 
project could be assessed against a fixed set of principles, I instead sug-
gested that an in-depth understanding of how the algorithms account for 
the world might provide an important part of accountability.
If putting in place a formal process of accountability and drawing on 
traditional notions of ethics were too limited for rendering the algo-
rithm accountable, then what next? My suggestion to the project par-
ticipants was that we needed to understand how the algorithm was at 
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once a participant in everyday life and used that participation to compose 
accounts of everyday life. Algorithmic accountability must thus move 
between two registers of accountability. This first, sense of accountability 
through which the algorithm might be held to account needed to 
be combined with a second sense of accountability through which the 
algorithm engages in the process of making sense of the world. I sug-
gested we could explore this second sense of accountability through 
ethnomethodology.
In particular, I looked to the ethnomethodological use of the hyphen-
ated version of the term: account-able (Garfinkel 1967; Eriksen 2002). 
Garfinkel suggests that “the activities whereby members produce and 
manage settings of organized everyday affairs are identical with mem-
bers’ procedures for making those settings ‘account-able’” (1967: 1). 
For ethnomethodologists, this means that actions are observable-report-
able; their character derives from the ability of other competent members 
to assess and make sense of actions. Importantly, making sense of actions 
involves the same methods as competently taking part in the action. To 
be account-able thus has a dual meaning of being demonstrably open to 
inspection as an account of some matter and being able to demonstrate 
competence in making sense of some matter (see Lynch 1993; Dourish 
2004 for more on this). This might be a starting point for a kind of algo-
rithmic account-ability in action.
Although ethnomethodologists have studied the account-able char-
acter of everyday conversations, they have also developed a corpus of 
workplace studies (Heath and Button 2002). Here, the emphasis is on 
the account-able character of, for example, keeping records, following 
instructions, justifying actions in relation to guidelines and informing 
others what to do and where to go (Lynch 1993: 15). For Button and 
Sharrock (1998), actions become organisationally account-able when 
they are done so that they can be seen to have been done on terms rec-
ognisable to other members within the setting as competent actions 
within that organisation. Extending these ideas, studying the algo-
rithm on such terms would involve continuing our study of the work of 
computer scientists and others involved in the project as we started in 
Chapter 2, but with an orientation towards making sense of the terms 
of account-ability within which the algorithm comes to participate in 
making sense of a particular scene placed under surveillance. This is not 
to imply that the algorithm operates alone. Instead, I will suggest that 
an understanding of algorithmic account-ability can be developed by 
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studying how the algorithmic system produces outputs that are designed 
to be used as part of organisational practices to make sense of a scene 
placed under surveillance by the algorithmic system. In this way, the 
human-shaped object and luggage-shaped object of Chapter 2 can be 
understood as part of this ongoing, account-able production of the sense 
of a scene in the airport or train station in which the project is based. 
I will refer to these sense-making practices as the account-able order of 
the algorithmic system. Importantly, having algorithms participate in 
account-ability changes the terms of the account-able order (in compar-
ison with the way sense was made of the space prior to the introduction 
of the algorithmic system).
Making sense of this account-able order may still appear to be some 
distance from the initial concerns with accountability which I noted 
in the opening to this chapter, of algorithmic openness and transpar-
ency. Indeed, the ethnomethodological approach appears to be char-
acterised by a distinct set of concerns, with ethnomethodologists 
interested in moment to moment sense-making, while calls for algo-
rithmic accountability are attuned to the perceived needs of those 
potentially subject to actions deriving from algorithms. The account-
able order of the algorithm might be attuned to the ways in which 
algorithms participate in making sense of (and in this process compos-
ing) everyday life. By contrast, calls for algorithmic accountability are 
attuned to formal processes whereby the algorithm and its consequences 
can be assessed. However, Suchman et al. (2002) suggest that work-
place actions, for example, can involve the simultaneous interrelation of 
efforts to hold each other responsible for the intelligibility of our actions 
(account-ability) while located within constituted ‘orders of accountabil-
ity’ (164). In this way, the account-able and the accountable, as different 
registers of account, might intersect. In the rest of this chapter, I will 
suggest that demands for an algorithm to be accountable (in the sense of 
being transparent and open to question by those subject to algorithmic 
decision-making and their representatives) might benefit from a detailed 
study of the account-able order of an algorithmic system under devel-
opment. Being able to elucidate the terms of algorithmic participation 
in making sense of scenes placed under surveillance—as an account-able 
order—might assist in opening the algorithmic system to accountable 
questioning. However, for this to be realised requires practically manag-
ing the matter of intersecting different registers of account.
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For the account-able to intersect with the accountable took some 
effort even before the project began. I proposed combining my eth-
nomethodologically inflected ethnography of the algorithm’s account-able 
order with a particular form of accountability—an ethics board to whom 
I would report and who could raise questions. The interactions through 
which the algorithm came to make sense of particular scenes—as an 
account-able order—could be presented to the ethics board so that they 
could raise questions on behalf of future subjects of algorithmic deci-
sion-making—a form of algorithmic accountability. As the following sec-
tions will show, intersecting registers of accounts (account-ability and 
accountability) did not prove straightforward. The next section of the 
chapter will detail efforts to engage with the account-able order of the 
algorithm through the User Interface and Route Reconstruction compo-
nents of the system. We will then explore the intersection of account reg-
isters through the ethics board.
Account-Ability through the user interfAce  
And route reconstruction
In order for the algorithm to prove itself account-able—that is demon-
strably able to participate in the production of accounts of the every-
day life of the train station and the airport—required an expansion of 
the activities we already considered in Chapter 2. Being able to classify 
human-shaped and luggage-shaped objects through mapping the fixed 
attributes of the setting, parameterisation of the edges of objects, object 
classification, identifying the action states of objects, the production of 
bounding boxes or close-cropped images was also crucial to figuring out 
a means to participate in the production of accounts. These efforts all 
went into the production of alerts (a key form of algorithmic account) 
for operatives of the train station and airport surveillance system who 
could then take part in the production of further accounts. They could 
choose to ignore alerts they deemed irrelevant or work through an appro-
priate response, such as calling for security operatives in, for example, the 
Departure Lounge to deal with an item of luggage. At least, that was how 
the project team envisaged the future beyond the experimental phase of 
algorithmic work. Project participants from StateTrack and SkyPort who 
worked with the existing surveillance system on a daily basis, at this exper-
imental stage, also more or less concurred with this envisaged future.
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A future in which alerts were sent to operatives cutting down on the 
data that needed to be seen and cutting down on the data that needed 
to be stored seemed a potentially useful way forward for operatives 
and their managers (who were also interested in cutting down on data 
storage costs, see Chapters 4 and 6). But this was a cautious optimism. 
At this experimental stage of the project, operatives wanted to know 
what the alerts would look like when they received them, how would 
responses be issued by them, how would others in the airport receive 
these responses and further respond? Their everyday competences were 
oriented towards seeing as much as possible in as much detail as possible 
and reading the images for signs of what might be taking place. They 
mostly operated with what Garfinkel (1967) referred to as a relation of 
undoubted correspondence between what appeared to be happening in 
most images and what they took to be the unfolding action. In moments 
of undoubted correspondence, it was often the case that images could 
be ignored—they appeared to be what they were because very little was 
happening. However, it was those images that raised a concern—a rela-
tion of doubted correspondence between what appeared to be going 
on and what might unfold—that the operatives seemed to specialise in. 
It was these images of concern that they had to read, make sense of, 
order and respond to, that they would need to see translated into alerts 
(particularly if all other data was to remain invisible or even be deleted). 
How could the algorithms for abandoned luggage, moving the wrong 
way and entry into a forbidden area act as an experimental basis for han-
dling this quite complex array of image competencies?
The computer scientists established an initial scheme for how the 
three types of relevance detection algorithm would work. The Event 
Detection system would sift through video frames travelling through the 
system and use the media proxy we met in Chapter 2 to draw together 
the streams of video from cameras across the surveillance network. This 
would use a Real-Time Streaming Protocol for MPEG4 using JSON 
(JavaScript Object Notification) as a data interchange format for sys-
tem analysis. Each stream would have a metadata time stamp. The rel-
evance detection algorithms for abandoned luggage, moving the wrong 
way and entering a forbidden space would then select out putative 
object types (using a Codebook algorithm for object detection) focus-
ing on their dimensions, direction and speed. As we noted in Chapter 2, 
the system would then generate bounding boxes for objects that would 
then generate a stream of metadata related to the bounding box based 
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on its dimensions and timing—how fast it moved and in what  direction. 
This would also require a further development of the map of fixed 
attributes used for background subtraction in Chapter 2. Areas where 
entry was forbidden for most people (e.g. secure areas and train tracks) 
and areas where the direction of movement was sensitive (e.g. exits at 
peak times in busy commuter train stations) would need to be added 
to the maps. Producing an alert was no longer limited to identifying a 
human-shaped object (or luggage-shaped or any other shaped object)—
even though that was challenging in its own ways. The system would 
now have to use these putative classifications to identify those human-
shaped objects moving in the wrong direction or into the wrong space, 
along with those human-shaped objects that became separate from 
their luggage-shaped objects. Objects’ action states as moving or still, 
for example, would be central. For the algorithms to be able to do this 
demonstratively within the airport and train station was crucial to being 
able to produce alerts and participate in account-ability.
But this didn’t reduce the surveillance operatives’ concerns about 
the form in which they would receive these alerts. Participating in 
account-ability was not just about producing an alert. The alerts had 
to accomplish what Garfinkel (1963) termed the congruence of rele-
vances. Garfinkel suggested that any interaction involved successive turns 
to account-ably and demonstrably make sense of the scene in which the 
interactions were taking place. This required the establishment of an at 
least in-principle interchangeability of viewpoints—that one participant 
in the interaction could note what was relevant for the other participants, 
could make sense of what was relevant for themselves and the other par-
ticipants and could assume that other participants shared some similar 
expectations in return. Relevances would thus become shared or congru-
ent through the interaction. Garfinkel (1963) suggested that these were 
strongly adhered to, forming what he termed constitutive expectancies 
for the scene of the interaction. In this way, building a shared sense of 
the interaction, a congruence of relevances, was constitutive of the sense 
accomplished by the interaction.
The algorithmic system seemed to propose a future that stood in 
some contrast to the operatives’ current ways of working. Prior to the 
algorithmic system, surveillance operatives’ everyday competences were 
oriented towards working with images, other operatives, airport or train 
station employees, their managers and so on, in making a sense of the 
scene. The rich and detailed interaction successively built a sense of what 
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it was that was going on. Constitutive expectancies seemed to be set in 
place. The move to limit the amount of data that was seen seemed to 
reduce the array of image-based cues through which accomplishing the 
sense of a scene could take place. Given that an ethical aim of the pro-
ject was to reduce the scope of data made visible and given that this was 
central to the funding proposal and its success, the computer scientists 
needed to find a way to make this work. They tried to work through 
with the surveillance operatives how little they needed to see for the 
system still to be considered functional. In this way, the ethical aims of 
the project began to form part of the account-able order of the algorith-
mic system that was emerging in this experimental phase of the project. 
Decision-making was demonstrably organised so that it could be seen to 
match the ethical aims of the project at the same time as the emerging 
system could be constituted as a particular material-algorithmic instanti-
ation of the ethical aims. Accomplishing this required resolution of issues 
for the operatives and the computer scientists of just what should be seen 
and how should such visibility be managed.
This required a series of decisions to be made about the User 
Interface. The computer scientists suggested that one way to move for-
ward with the ethical aims of the project was to develop a User Interface 
with no general visual component. This was both made to make sense as 
a demonstrable, account-able response to the ethical aims (to reduce vis-
ibility) and constituted a visually and materially available form for these 
otherwise somewhat general aims. In place of the standard video surveil-
lance bank of monitors continually displaying images, operatives would 
be presented only with text alerts (Fig. 3.1) produced via our algorithms’ 
‘IF-THEN’ rules. An operative would then be given the opportunity to 
click on a text alert and a short video of several seconds that had created 
the alert would appear on the operative’s screen. The operative would 
then have the option of deciding whether the images did indeed portray 
an event worthy of further scrutiny or could be ignored. An operative 
could then tag data as relevant (and it would then be stored) or irrele-
vant (and it would then be deleted; see Chapter 4). The User Interface 
could then participate in the accomplishment of the ethical aims to see 
less and store less. It would also provide a means for our algorithms to 
become competent participants in the account-able order of interactions. 
The User Interface would provide the means for the algorithms to dis-
play to operatives that they were participating in the constitutive expec-
tancies of making sense of a scene in the airport or train station. They 
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were participating in establishing the shared or congruent relevance of 
specific images—that an image of a human-shaped object was not just 
randomly selected by the algorithm, but displayed its relevance to the 
operative as an alert, as something to which they needed to pay attention 
and complete a further turn in interaction. The algorithm was displaying 
its competence in being a participant in everyday life.
This might seem like a big step forward for our algorithms. It might 
even mean a step from experimentation towards actual implementation. 
But the operatives and their managers swiftly complained when they 
were shown the User Interface: How could they maintain security if all 
they got to see was (e.g.) an image of an abandoned item of luggage? As 
I mentioned in Chapter 2, to secure the airport or train station the oper-
atives suggested that they needed to know who had abandoned the lug-
gage, when and where did they go? A neatly cropped image of an item 
of luggage with a red box around it, a human-shaped object within a 
bounding box that had moved into a forbidden space or been recorded 
moving the wrong way, was limited in its ability to take part in making 
sense of the scene. The algorithms’ ability to take part in everyday life 
by participating in holding everyday life to account was questioned. As 
such, the emerging account-able order of the algorithmic system and the 
design decisions which acted as both a response to, and gave form to the 
project’s ethical aims, were subject to ongoing development, particularly 
in relation to operatives’ everyday competences.
This led to discussion among project participants, the computer sci-
entists and StateTrack and SkyPort in particular, about how surveillance 
Fig. 3.1 Text alerts on the user interface
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operatives went about making sense of, for example, abandoned lug-
gage. Everyday competences that might otherwise never be articulated 
needed to be drawn to the fore here. Operatives talked of the need to 
know the history around an image, what happened after an item had 
been left, and with whom people had been associating. Computer sci-
entists thus looked to develop the Route Reconstruction component of 
the system. This was a later addition to the system architecture as we saw 
in Chapter 2. The University 1 team of computer scientists presented a 
digital surveillance Route Reconstruction system they had been working 
on in a prior project (using a learning algorithm to generate probabilis-
tic routes). Any person or object once tagged relevant, they suggested, 
could be followed backwards through the stream of video data (e.g. 
where had a bag come from prior to being abandoned, which human 
had held the bag) and forwards (e.g. once someone had dropped a bag, 
where did they go next). This held out the potential for the algorithms 
and operatives to take part in successively and account-ably building a 
sense for a scene. From a single image of, say, an abandoned item of 
luggage, the algorithm would put together histories of movements of 
human-shaped objects and luggage-shaped objects and future move-
ments that occurred after an item had been left. As operatives clicked 
on these histories and futures around the image of abandoned luggage, 
both operatives and algorithms became active participants in successively 
building shared relevance around the image. Histories and futures could 
become a part of the constitutive expectancies of relations between algo-
rithms and operatives.
Route Reconstruction would work by using the background maps 
of fixed attributes in the train station and airport and the ability of the 
system to classify human-shaped objects and place bounding boxes 
around them. Recording and studying the movement of human-shaped 
bounding boxes could be used to establish a database of popular routes 
human-shaped objects took through a space and the average time it took 
a human-shaped object to walk from one camera to another. The sys-
tem would use the bounding boxes to note the dimensions, direction 
and speed of human-shaped objects. The Route Reconstruction system 
would then sift through the digital stream of video images to locate, 
for example, a person who had been subject to an alert and trace the 
route from which they were most likely to have arrived (using the data-
base of most popular routes), how long it should have taken them to 
appear on a previous camera (based on their speed) and search for any 
3 ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE ALGORITHM  59
human-shaped objects that matched their bounding box dimensions. 
If unsuccessful, the system would continue to search other poten-
tial routes and sift through possible matches to send to the operatives, 
who could then tag those images as also relevant or irrelevant. The idea 
was to create what the computer scientists termed a small ‘sausage’ of 
data from among the mass of digital images. The Route Reconstruction 
system used probabilistic trees (Fig. 3.2), which took an initial image 
(of, e.g., an abandoned item of luggage and its human-shaped owner) 
and then presented possible ‘children’ of that image (based on dimen-
sions, speed and most popular routes) until operatives were happy that 
they had established the route of the person and/or object in question. 
Probability, background maps, object classification and tracking became a 
technical means for the algorithms to participate in holding everyday life 
to account.
As a result of operatives’ articulation of a potential clash between an 
ethical aim of the project (to reduce visibility) and the everyday com-
petences of surveillance operatives (to secure a train station or air-
port space through comprehensive visibility), the account-able order 
Fig. 3.2 A probabilistic tree and children (B0 and F0 are the same images)
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of work between computer scientists, end-users, their working prac-
tices and the User Interface shifted somewhat to incorporate the new 
Route Reconstruction component. Route Reconstruction became a 
basis for account-ably acknowledging the existing competences of oper-
atives in securing a space. The small ‘sausages’ of data and probabilistic 
‘children’ became a means of broadening the number of participants in 
account-ably accomplishing a sense of the everyday life of the train sta-
tion and airport. Yet having ‘sausages’ of data and new forms of metadata 
(used to produce ‘children’) might initially appear to move the project 
away from its stated ethical aim to reduce the amount of surveillance data 
made visible—this became an issue for questions of accountability asked 
on behalf of future subjects of algorithmic decision-making, as we will see.
At this point (at least for a time), it seemed that I was in a position 
to make an ethnographic sense of the account-able order of the algo-
rithmic system that would avoid an overly simplified snapshot. In place 
of a static audit of the system was an account of an emerging order in 
which terabytes of visual, video data would be sifted by relevance detec-
tion algorithms, using background subtraction models to select out pro-
to-relevant human-shaped and other objects. These would be further 
classified through specific action states (abandoning luggage, moving 
the wrong way, moving into a forbidden space) that could be the basis 
for an alert. Operatives would then have the responsibility to decide on 
future courses of action as a result of the alerts they were sent (e.g. alert-
ing airport security staff to items of luggage). The alerts were the first 
means through which the algorithmic system could participate in the 
account-able order of the scene placed under surveillance. Subsequent 
operative responses could also shift responsibility for a second form 
of account-able action back onto the algorithmic system if Route 
Reconstruction was deemed necessary, with probabilistic trees and chil-
dren designed to offer images of proto-past and subsequent actions 
(once again to be deemed relevant by operatives). Through this 
account-able order, the algorithmic system was involved in making sense 
of the everyday life of particular spaces, such as an airport or train station, 
and held out the possibility of contributing to changes in operatives’ every-
day competences in securing those spaces. The presence of the algorith-
mic system proposed notable changes in the operatives’ activities. Instead 
of engaging with large amounts of video data in order to make decisions, 
operatives would only be presented with a small amount of data to which 
their responses were also limited. Conversely, for the algorithmic system 
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to work, far greater amounts of data were required prior to the system 
operating (e.g. digitally mapping the fixed attributes of a setting such as 
an airport and fixing in place parameters for objects such as luggage and 
humans, producing bounding boxes, metadata, tracking movements, con-
stituting a database of popular routes). The introduction of the algorith-
mic system also seemed to require a much more precise definition of the 
account-able order of airport and train station surveillance activities. The 
form that the order took was both oriented to the project’s ethical aims 
and gave a specific form to those aims. Yet this emerging form was also 
a concern for questions of accountability being asked on behalf of future 
data subjects—those who might be held to account by the newly emerging 
algorithmic system.
The specific material forms that were given to the project’s ethical 
aims—such as the User Interface and Route Reconstruction system—
were beginning to intersect with accountability questions being raised by 
the ethics board. In particular, how could this mass of new data being 
produced ever meet the ethical aim to reduce data or the ethical aim 
to not develop new surveillance algorithms? In the next section, I will 
explore the challenges involved in this intersection of distinct registers of 
account by engaging with the work of the ethics board.
Account-Ability And AccountAbility  
through the ethics boArd
As I suggested in the opening to this chapter, formal means of accountability 
are not without their concerns. Unexpected consequences, rituals, the build-
ing of new assets are among an array of issues with which accountability 
can become entangled. In the algorithm project, the key entanglement 
was between the kinds of account-ability that we have seen develop-
ing in this chapter, through which the algorithms began to participate 
more thoroughly in everyday life, and accountability involving questions 
asked on behalf of future data subjects—those who might be subject to 
algorithmic decision-making. This latter approach to accountability 
derived from a series of expectations established in the initial project bid, 
among project partners and funders that somehow and in some way the 
ethical aims of the project required an organised form of assessment. 
This expectation derived partly from funding protocols that place a 
strong emphasis on research ethics, the promises of the original funding 
62  D. NEYLAND
proposal to develop an ethical system, and a growing sense among project 
participants that an ethical, accountable, algorithmic surveillance system 
might be a key selling point (see Chapter 6). This signalled a broadening in 
the register of accounts, from the algorithms participating in account-ability 
to the algorithms being subjected to accountability.
The ethics board became the key means for managing the accountable 
and the account-able. It was not the case that the project could simply 
switch from one form of account to another or that one took prec-
edence over the other. Instead, the project—and in particular me, as I 
was responsible for assessing the ethics of the emerging technology—had 
to find a way to bring the forms of account together. The ethics board 
was central to this as it provided a location where I could present the 
account-able order of the algorithmic surveillance system and provoke 
accountable questions of the algorithms. The ethics board comprised 
a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) working on redraft-
ing the EU Data Protection Regulation, two national Data Protection 
Authorities (DPAs), two privacy academics and two members of priva-
cy-focused civil liberty groups. The ethics board met three times during 
the course of the project, and during these meetings, I presented my 
developing study of the account-able order of the algorithmic system. I 
presented the ways in which the algorithmic system was involved in mak-
ing sense of spaces like an airport and a train station, how it was expected 
to work with operatives’ everyday competences for securing those spaces 
and how the system gave form to the project’s ethical aims. In place of 
buying into the claims made on behalf of algorithms by other members 
of the project team or in popular and academic discussions of algorithms, 
I could present the account-able order as a more or less enduring, but 
also at times precarious focus for action. In response, members of the 
ethics board used my presentations along with demonstrations of 
the technology to open up the algorithmic system to a different form 
of accountability by raising questions to be included in public project 
reports and fed back into the ongoing project.
Ethics board members drew on my presentations of the account-able 
order of the algorithmic system to orient their questions. In the first eth-
ics board meeting (held approximately ten months into the project), one 
of the privacy-focused academics pointed to the centrality of my pres-
entation for their considerations:
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From a social scientist perspective it is not enough to have just an abstract 
account for ethical consideration. A closer understanding can be brought 
about by [my presentation’s] further insight into how [the system] will 
work.
The way the system ‘will work’—its means of making sense of the space 
of the airport and train station—encouraged a number of questions from 
the ethics board, enabling the system to be held accountable. For exam-
ple, the Data Protection Officers involved in the board asked during the 
first meeting:
Is there a lot of prior data needed for this system? More so than before?
Are people profiled within the system?
How long will the system hold someone’s features as identifiable to them 
as a tagged suspect?
These questions drew attention to matters of concern that could be taken 
back to the project team and publicly reported (in the minutes of the 
ethics board) and subsequently formed the basis for response and fur-
ther discussion at the second ethics board meeting. The questions could 
provide a set of terms for making the algorithmic system accountable 
through being made available (in public reports) for broader consider-
ation. The questions could also be made part of the account-able order 
of the algorithmic system, with design decisions taken on the basis of 
questions raised. In this way, the computer scientists could ensure that 
there was no mechanism for loading prior data into the system (such as 
a person’s dimensions, which might lead to them being tracked), and to 
ensure that metadata (such as the dimensions of human-shaped objects) 
were deleted along with video data to stop individual profiles being cre-
ated or to stop ‘suspects’ from being tagged. Data Protection Officers 
sought to ‘use the committee meetings to clearly shape the project to 
these serious considerations.’ The ‘serious considerations’ here were the 
ethical aims. One of the representatives of the civil liberties groups also 
sought to utilise the access offered by the ethics board meetings but in a 
different way, noting that ‘As systems become more invisible it becomes 
more difficult to find legitimate forms of resistance.’
To ‘shape the project’ and ‘find legitimate forms of resistance’ 
through the project seemed to confirm the utility of intersecting 
account-ability and accountability, opening up distinct ways for the 
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system to be questioned and for that questioning to be communicated to 
further interested audiences. However, as the project progressed, a series 
of issues emerged that complicated my presentation of the account-able 
order of the algorithmic system to the ethics board and hence made the 
intersection of account-ability and accountability more difficult.
For example, I reported to the ethics board a series of issues involved 
in system development. This included a presentation of the challenges 
involved in ‘dropping in’ existing algorithms. Although one of the 
 project’s opening ethical aims was that no new algorithms would be 
developed and that existing algorithms could be ‘dropped into’ exist-
ing surveillance networks, these were also termed ‘learning’ algorithms. 
I presented to the ethics board an acknowledgement from both teams 
of computer scientists that the algorithms needed to ‘learn’ to operate 
in the end-user settings; that algorithms for relevancy detection and the 
Route Reconstruction component had to run through streams of video 
data; that problems in detecting objects and movements had to be con-
tinually reviewed; and that this took ‘10s of hours.’ When problems 
arose in relation to the lighting in some areas of end-user sites (where, 
e.g., the glare from shiny airport floors appeared to baffle our abandoned 
luggage algorithm which kept constituting the glare as abandoned lug-
gage), the code/software tied to the relevancy detection algorithm had 
to be developed—this I suggested to the ethics board is what constituted 
‘learning.’
These ongoing changes to the system through ‘learning’ empha-
sised the complexities of making sense of the algorithmic system’s 
account-able order; the way the system went about making sense 
changed frequently at times as it was experimented with and my report-
ing to the ethics board needed to manage and incorporate these changes. 
Alongside the continual development of ‘learning’ algorithms, other 
issues that emerged as the system developed included an initial phase 
of experimentation where none of the system components would inter-
act. In this instance, it turned out that one of the project members was 
using obsolete protocols (based on VAPIX), which other project mem-
bers could not use or did not want to use. Attempting to resolve this 
issue took 114 e-mails and four lengthy telephone conference calls in one 
month of the project. Other issues that emerged included: questions of 
data quality, frame rates, trade union concerns, pixilation and compres-
sion of video streams, which each led to changes in the ways in which 
the system would work. In particularly frenzied periods of project activity, 
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I found it more challenging to maintain a clear notion of what consti-
tuted the ‘order’ of the algorithmic system to report to the ethics board, 
as major features (e.g. which components of the system talked to each 
other) would be changed in quite fundamental ways. When the Route 
Reconstruction and Privacy Enhancement components of the system 
were also brought together with the relevancy detection algorithms, 
reporting became more difficult again.
The ongoing changes of system development emphasised the value of 
building an understanding of the system’s developing account-able order. 
Making sense of the way in which the algorithmic system (its compo-
nents, design decisions, designers, software, instructions and so on) was 
involved in making sense of the train station and airport, avoided providing 
a more or less certain account developed from a single or brief timeframe 
that simply captured and replayed moments of system activity, as if the 
system had a singular, essential characteristic. Instead, understanding the 
account-able order held out the promise of making sense of the ordering 
practices of the system under development, how algorithms went about 
making sense of and participating in everyday life. In the absence of such an 
approach to algorithms, the risk would be that multiple assumptions (that 
might be wrong or only correct for a short time) regarding the nature of 
algorithms were set in place and formed the basis for accountability.
Tracing system developments and the changing account-able order 
of the algorithmic system for presentation to the ethics board also 
became the principal means of intersecting the different registers of 
account-ability and accountability. In place of presenting a static picture 
of the algorithmic system, changes in the ordering activities of the system 
could be demonstrated and discussed in relation to the project’s ethical 
aims. This was particularly important in ethics board meetings as changes 
that emerged through system development appeared to change the spe-
cific form given to the project’s ethical aims. For example, as the project 
developed, a question for the ethics board was how far could an algo-
rithm ‘learn’ and be changed before it was considered sufficiently ‘new’ 
to challenge the ethical aim of the project to not introduce new algo-
rithms? Furthermore, how much new data from bounding boxes, object 
classification and action states could be produced before it challenged the 
ethical principle to reduce data? This intersection of account-ability and 
accountability was not resolved in any particular moment, but became a 
focal point for my ethics board presentations and ensuing discussions and 
public reporting.
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However, as the project and ethics board meetings progressed, my 
role in producing accounts became more difficult. I was involved in 
making available an analysis of the account-able order of the system 
partly as a means to open the system to questions of accountability, 
which I would then publicly report and feed back to project mem-
bers. At the same time, I was not just creating an intersection between 
account-ability and accountability, I risked being deeply involved in 
producing versions of the system’s account-able order which might 
steer ethics board members towards recognising that the system had 
achieved or failed to achieve its ethical aims and thus defuse or exacer-
bate accountability concerns. I was the algorithm’s proxy, mediating its 
ability to grasp everyday life through my ability to grasp the details of 
its abilities. As one of the Data Protection Officers on the ethics board 
asked, ‘What is Daniel’s role? How can he ensure he remains impartial?’
Rather than try to resolve this problem in a single ethics board meet-
ing, I sought instead to turn this issue of my own accountability into a 
productive tension by bringing as much as possible to the ethics board. 
My own developing account of the account-able order of the algorithmic 
system, the computer scientists, end-users and the technology as it devel-
oped could all be drawn together in ethics board meetings. The result 
was not a single, agreed upon expert view on the system. In place of a 
single account, the meetings became moments for different views, evi-
dence, material practices and so on to be worked through. The effect 
was to intersect account-ability and accountability in a way that enabled 
questions and attributions of algorithmic responsibility and openness 
to be brought into the meetings and discussed with ethics board mem-
bers, computer scientists, the system and my own work and role in the 
project. Accountability was not accomplished in a single moment, by a 
single person, but instead was distributed among project members and 
the ethics board and across ongoing activities, with questions taken back 
to the project team between meetings and even to be carried forward 
into future projects after the final ethics board meeting. And the inter-
section of account-ability and accountability was not simply a bringing 
together of different registers of account, as if two different forms of 
account could, for example, sit comfortably together on the same page 
in a report to the ethics board. The intersecting of account-ability and 
accountability itself became a productive part of this activity, with ques-
tions of accountability (e.g. how much has changed in these algorithms?) 
challenging the account-able order of the algorithmic system and the 
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more or less orderly sense-making practices of the algorithmic system 
being used to draw up more precise questions of accountability. The 
algorithms’ means to participate in the account-ability of everyday life in 
the airport became the means to make the algorithms available to this 
different sense of accountability through the ethics board.
conclusion
In this chapter, we can see that our algorithms are beginning to par-
ticipate in everyday life in more detailed ways. They are not only clas-
sifying putative human-shaped and luggage-shaped objects. They are 
also taking part in the production of accounts that make sense of the 
actions in which those objects are also taking part: being abandoned, 
moving the wrong way, moving into a forbidden space. This participa-
tion in the account-able order of everyday life is an achievement based 
on years of work by the computer scientists and significant efforts in 
the project to work with operatives to figure out their competences and 
how a system might be built that respects and augments these compe-
tences while also accomplishing the project’s ethical aims. Such aims were 
also the key grounds for intersecting this increasing participation in the 
account-ability of everyday life with the sense of accountability pursued 
by the ethics board. Regular meetings, minutes, publicly available reports, 
the development of questions into design protocols for the emerging sys-
tem, creating new bases for experimentation, each formed ways in which 
accountability could take shape—as a series of questions asked on behalf 
of future data subjects. In a similar manner to the literature that opened 
this chapter, this more formal process of accountability came with its 
own issues. Unanticipated questions arose, the system being subjected to 
account kept changing, some things didn’t work for a time, and my own 
role in accountability came under scrutiny. In place of any counter expec-
tation that algorithms could be made accountable in any straightforward, 
routine manner, came this series of questions and challenges.
What, then, can be said about future considerations of algorithms 
and questions of accountability? First, it seemed useful in this project 
to engage in detail with the account-able order of the algorithmic sys-
tem. This displaced a formal approach to accountability, for example, 
carrying out an audit of algorithmic activity, with an in-depth account 
of the sense-making activities of the system. Second, however, this 
approach to account-ability did nothing on its own to address questions 
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of accountability—what the concerns might be of future data subjects. 
Intersecting different registers of account through the ethics board was 
itself a significant project task and required resources, time and effort. 
Third, the intersection of account-ability and accountability was pro-
ductive (raising new questions for the project to take on), but also chal-
lenging (requiring careful consideration of the means through which 
different views could be managed). With growing calls for algorithmic 
systems to be accountable, open to scrutiny and open to challenge, these 
three areas of activity set out one possible means for future engagement, 
intersecting the account-able and the accountable and managing the 
consequences.
But the challenges for our algorithms did not end here. Although 
we now finish this chapter with a sense that our algorithms are grasping 
everyday life in more detail, are more fully participating in everyday life 
through forms of account-ability and are even beginning to shape every-
day life by causing the operatives to reconsider their everyday compe-
tences, there is still some way to go. The algorithms have only reached 
an initial experimental stage. Next, they need to be tested in real time, in 
real places. They need to prove that they can become everyday. The sys-
tem components need to prove to the world that they can interact. The 
Privacy Enhancement System needs to show that it can select and delete 
relevant data. As we will see in the next chapter, deletion is not straight-
forward. And as we will see subsequently, real-time testing (Chapter 5) 
is so challenging, that the possibility of building a market value for the 
technology needs to be re-thought (Chapter 6). But then everyday life is 
never easy.
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Abstract  Deletion was a central component of the algorithmic system 
studied in this book. Deletion is also a key motif of contemporary data 
management: concepts such as proportionality, necessity, a shelf-life for 
data, right to be forgotten or right to erasure and specific definitions of 
privacy all relate to deletion. In this chapter, the calculative basis for dele-
tion will be used to provide insight into not just the content of an algo-
rithm, but its everyday composition, effects and associated expectations. 
However, the chapter suggests that deletion also poses a particular kind 
of problem: the creation of nothing (the deleted) needs to be continu-
ally proven. These focal points and the difficulties of providing proof are 
used to address suggestions in contemporary research that algorithms are 
powerful and agential, easily able to enact and execute orders. Instead, 
the chapter calls for more detailed analysis of what constitutes algorith-
mic success and failure.
Keywords  Deletion · Proof · Calculation · Success and failure
opening
In Chapter 3, I suggested that our algorithms had begun to par-
ticipate in everyday life by becoming involved in establishing the 
account-able order of life in the airport and train station. I also sug-
gested that this form of account-ability intersected with concerns of 
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accountability, in particular in relation to the project’s ethical aims and 
the possibility of future data subjects being able to question the algo-
rithm. You will recall that the project was funded in order to develop an 
algorithmic system that would reduce the amount of visual video data 
seen within a surveillance system and stored within such systems, with-
out developing new algorithms. As we saw in the last chapter, the extent 
to which these ethical aims were achieved was not straightforward to 
assess as the system went through various forms of experimentation and 
change, the ethics board set up to hold the system to account raised new 
questions as the system developed and my own understanding of the sys-
tem grew over time. One aspect of this unfolding experimentation and 
accountability that never disappeared even as the project moved towards 
more thorough system testing in the train station and airport was the 
focus on storing less data.
We have already seen that it took a great deal of effort to utilise algo-
rithms to select out such matters as human-shaped and luggage-shaped 
objects and then to deem these relevant as, for example, abandoned lug-
gage and issue an alert to operatives. What we have not seen yet is the 
struggle to delete the vast majority of data deemed irrelevant. Computer 
scientists from Universities 1 and 2 spent some time in meetings taking 
project members through conventions for deletion. Most forms of dele-
tion, it turned out, either left a trace of the original from which data might 
be extracted or simply changed the route through which a user might 
connect to data (meaning the data itself would potentially be retrieva-
ble). The computer scientists, the consulting firm coordinating the pro-
ject, the ethics board, StateTrack and SkyPort entered into discussion 
of what might provide an adequate form of deletion. For the computer 
scientists, changing the route for accessing information was an elegant 
solution (see Chapter 2 for more on elegance): it was an available, stand-
ard practice, and it would satisfy the project’s ethical aims to the extent 
that it would match most other forms of deletion. However, the pro-
ject coordinators sought a more thorough form of deletion—they were 
already looking to the potential market value (see Chapter 6) of a delet-
ing machine. Expunging data from the system, overwriting data and 
corrupting data were all suggested as more thorough forms of deletion. 
Hence the algorithms would not just participate in making sense of every-
day life, start to produce outputs that would subtly compose everyday life 
and become a feature of the everyday (on this, see Chapters 5 and 6): the 
algorithms would also start to delete, remove and reduce everyday life. 
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The elegant and accountable algorithms would be attuned to this nega-
tion of the everyday. The chapter begins by considering a means for 
grasping the everyday life of algorithmic deletion. It then looks at the 
deletion system in action to consider what it takes for our algorithms to 
be successful in not just identifying relevance but deleting irrelevance. 
The chapter concludes with some of the concerns that began to arise with 
deletion in the project and the future this portends.
deletion And the Algorithm
Deletion and accountability are not only ethical aims of this project. 
Within the European Union, there has been a twin policy response to 
issues of algorithms and privacy through the right to be forgotten com-
bined with a right to accountability. Current policy developments in 
Brussels anticipate that algorithms will be prevented from amassing and 
analysing data at will, through clear limitations on what data can be col-
lected, how it can be used, how long it will be stored and the means 
of deletion. These principles will also be made accountable, even if it is 
not always clear what form that accountability will take. For the coordi-
nators of the project that features in this book, deletion, as one part of 
an ethical and accountable algorithmic system, might provide a means 
to respond to these policy demands. The ethical aims might have market 
value.
These policy moves emerged through the complex and lengthy polit-
ical developments that take place in the EU. The move to articulate and 
institute a ‘right to be forgotten’ or ‘right to erasure’ has been a feature 
of the revision of the EU Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/
EC) into the new EU General Data Protection Regulation. As Bernal 
highlights, the right has become defined as ‘the right of individuals to 
have their data no longer processed, and deleted when they are no longer 
needed for legitimate purposes’ (2011: n.p.). This sits alongside a move 
to establish a basis for accountability. The EU Article 29 Working Party 
on Data Protection has issued an Accountability Principle which sets out 
a provision: ‘to ensure that the principles and obligations set out in the 
[Data Protection] Directive [now a Regulation] are complied with and 
to demonstrate so to supervisory authorities upon request’ (2010: 2). In 
this way, the principle of accountability is designed to ensure a transition 
from Data Protection in theory to practice and to provide the means to 
assess that this shift has adequately taken place.
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Within the development of the new European General Data Protection 
Regulation, these two moves have become combined such that to 
delete, must also become an accountable feature of activities; organi-
sations must be able to demonstrably prove they have taken on respon-
sibility for deletion and removed ‘our’ data. Although discussions of 
the Article 29 Working Party Accountability Principle and the pro-
posed and critiqued revisions of the EU General Data Protection Act 
have been mostly focused on online data, these policy moves have also 
spurred broader concerns with data repositories and data analysis and 
the posited need for erasure. For example, erasure, forgetting and 
accountability have become key reference points in the development of 
what have become termed Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) and 
Privacy by Design projects (see Goold 2009). Here the remit for data 
storage and analysis is not restricted to online data but also incorporates 
concerns with the kinds of video-based data that our algorithms specialise 
in. The premise of these arguments for PETs is that all algorithmic tech-
nologies ought to take privacy concerns into account. In these discussions, 
privacy is often understood in more or less straightforward binary terms. 
For example, it is proposed that if one’s data no longer exists, there is no 
risk to one’s privacy. One type of emerging PET within this field is auto- 
deletion technologies (also see Mayer-Schonberger 2009). To delete and 
to accountably demonstrate that deletion has taken place appears to be an 
emerging benchmark for policy compliance. For the coordinators of the 
project, being able to set such a benchmark through the emerging system 
would be a step towards market launch (see Chapter 6). It was not only 
the ethical aims of the project that were at stake in developing a means to 
delete but the future market viability of the technology. Regulatory com-
pliance could be sold on the open market.
The coordinator’s search for a means to go beyond a conventional 
approach to deletion which involves simply changing the connections 
through which a user might access data was part of this preparatory 
market work. The conventional approach to deleting supported by the 
computer scientists, was unlikely to fulfil the proposed terms of policy 
mechanisms such as the revised EU General Data Protection Regulation 
or the concerns articulated in the literature on PETs and Privacy by 
Design. The concern articulated as prompting the right to be forgot-
ten/right to erasure is couched in terms of a need to expunge data from 
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a repository, making it impossible to link, scrape, share or make fur-
ther uses of that data; it is argued that to simply change the route via 
which information is retrieved can be overcome with little effort and 
reopens the data to all future uses. And the Article 29 Working Party 
accountability principle requires that compliance with such expung-
ing is made clearly and demonstrably available. Deletion then sits cen-
trally within the development of our algorithms. To be able to select out 
images and send them to operatives as alerts was a technical achievement, 
but to competently delete would require selecting out all data that did 
not need to be sent to operatives and developing a system for its removal.
This is a challenging basis for research for an ethnographic social sci-
entist. The very thing being studied is always and already in the processes 
of becoming nothing. It is a double negation: data that has been deemed 
irrelevant is the thing that we need to study in this chapter and data that 
has been deemed irrelevant needs to be studied because it will be deleted. 
Studying irrelevance heading towards digital oblivion seems a challenge. 
In practice both data and deletion can be traced up to a point, but then 
(at least in theory) it should be gone. How can we grasp this partial and 
momentary thing—the action of deletion—along with this stuff that is 
here for a time and then goes—the irrelevant data?
One way forward is to return to the detail of the algorithms. If we can 
make sense of how the algorithms participate in the selection of things 
that are irrelevant and to be deleted and we can then figure out how 
those things are deleted (or as it turns out, not very well deleted), that 
might be a start. One way to work through the complexities of deletion 
is to make sense of what it is: a system for turning the complexities and 
uncertainties of the everyday into a basis for calculating and dividing 
relevance from irrelevance. As Callon and Muniesa (2005) suggest on 
calculating:
A calculative agency will be all the more powerful when it is able to: a) 
establish a long, yet finite list of diverse entities; b) allow rich and varied 
relations between the entities thus selected, so that the space of possible 
classifications and reclassifications is largely open; c) formalize procedures 
and algorithms likely to multiply the possible hierarchies and classifications 
between these entities. As this calculative power depends on the equip-
ments that agencies can rely upon, we can easily understand why it is une-
venly distributed among them. (1238)
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We can think of our algorithms on these terms: they establish a finite list 
of entities (human-shaped objects, luggage-shaped objects, bounding 
boxes and close-cropped images), entered into varied relations (object 
action states such as moving the wrong way or abandoned), of possible 
hierarchies (particularly with the coordinators’ interest in selling the tech-
nology in the future, see Chapter 6). That the algorithms will be the enti-
ties responsible for imposing this hierarchy of relevance on everyday life, 
suggests they will play a key part in the formulation of this initial step 
towards deletion, among a complex array of relations also involving other 
system components, the spaces in which the system operates and so on.
This notion of calculative agency builds on a history of STS work 
on calculation. This includes studies of how accuracy is constructed 
(MacKenzie 1993), the accomplishment of numeric objectivity (Porter 
1995), trading, exchange and notions of equivalence (Espeland and 
Sauder 2007; MacKenzie 2009), among many other areas. The kinds of 
concern articulated in these works is not focused on numbers as an iso-
lated output of calculation. Instead, numbers are considered as part of 
a series of practical actions involved in, for example, solving a problem 
(Livingston 2006), distributing resources, accountabilities or responsibil-
ities for action (Strathern 2002), governing a country (Mitchell 2002) 
and ascertaining a value for some matter (Espeland and Sauder 2007; 
MacKenzie 2009). Taking on these ideas, we can say that our algorithms 
are not only involved in classifying human-shaped and other objects and 
their action states, but also their relevance and irrelevance. The algorithms 
are involved in producing both quantities (a number of alerts, a com-
plex means to parameterise visual data, the production of metadata and 
bounding boxes) and qualities (issuing or not issuing an alert, deciding 
between relevance and irrelevance). This is the starting point for the neol-
ogism of qualculation (Cochoy 2002; Thrift 2004). For Callon and Law:
Qualculation implies qualification. Things have to qualify before they can 
enter a process of qualculation … this can be … done in an endless number 
of ways. With an endless range of mechanisms and devices. (2005: 715)
The work of qualculation, they suggest, operates in three parts:
First, the relevant entities are sorted out, detached, and displayed within 
a single space. Note that the space may come in a wide variety of forms 
or shapes: a sheet of paper, a spreadsheet, a supermarket shelf, or a court 
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of law – all of these and many more are possibilities. Second, those enti-
ties are manipulated and transformed. Relations are created between them, 
again in a range of forms and shapes: movements up and down lines; from 
one place to another; scrolling; pushing a trolley; summing up the evi-
dence. And, third, a result is extracted. A new entity is produced. A rank-
ing, a sum, a decision. A judgment. … And this new entity corresponds 
precisely to – is nothing other than – the relations and manipulations that 
have been performed along the way. (2005: 715)
Detachment, forging of new relations and the production of a judged 
result provides an initial analytic focus for studying the combined prac-
tices of quantification and qualification. These forms of qualculation can 
be seen at work in recent discussions of algorithms in academic work. 
Google search engines (Gillespie 2013) and academic plagiarism soft-
ware (Introna 2013) suggest that algorithms are involved in the produc-
tion of combined qualities and quantities in producing results. Taking 
plagiarism software as an example, we can see that such software would 
produce an algorithmic qualculation by detaching strings of characters 
(words, sentences and so on), forging new relations between those char-
acters and other entities (by searching for similar or identical strings of 
characters in the world of published texts beyond the string) and pro-
ducing a qualculative result; a basis for judging the similarity and dis-
tinctiveness of, for example, a student essay and already published texts. 
The algorithmic qualculation studied by Introna is a commercial product 
sold to Universities, which uses detachment, forging of new relations and 
the production of a result to generate a judgement of the students most 
likely to have plagiarised their essays.
This provides some starting points for thinking through the ways in 
which our algorithms are involved in the production of outputs—decid-
ing relevance and irrelevance and sending alerts to operatives—that 
are qualculative. They set out a means to detach data, forge new rela-
tions and produce a judged result. This gives us a means to move on 
from our concerns in Chapters 2 and 3, focused on the means to clas-
sify and render those classifications accountable. But it is only one step 
forward: it alerts us to the importance of the algorithmic output (rel-
evance or irrelevance), not yet what happens to that output. We need 
to discover a means to move from qualculation and the production of 
something—a judgement, a demarcation of relevance, an alert—to 
nothing—the deletion of irrelevance.
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One starting point for augmenting the notion of qualculation by 
taking something and nothing into account is provided by the work 
of Hetherington and Lee (2000) on zero. They suggest that zero was 
introduced into western European mathematics and economics in 
approximately the fourteenth century. Zero provided the basis for a 
numeric logic of order at the same time as disrupting conventions for 
ordering, disrupting by connecting otherwise unconnected entities 
(nothing and the progressive accumulation of something from the num-
ber one upwards; as well as at a later date, providing the basis for count-
ing downwards with the introduction of negative numbers to Europe 
from around the seventeenth century) and came to be seen as generating 
a new order. This despite zero itself being an underdetermined figure, 
both a sign on its own (signifying something of no value) and a meta-
sign of order (providing for the significance of subsequent numbers or 
indicating rank in the decimal system). Hetherington and Lee suggest 
that: ‘What [zero] reveals… is that very basic mathematical ordering 
practices are themselves dependent on a figure that refuses to adopt a 
singular position in their semiotic order’ (177). Following on from 
this, we might think of our emerging algorithmic system for deletion 
not just as a focus for qualculation (doing something), but as a system 
that refuses to occupy a singular position (both something and nothing, 
doing and undoing data and its relations).
However, Hetherington and Lee (2000) go further and suggest that 
zero, as something and nothing, can also be considered a blank figure, 
something that: ‘hybridises presence and absence rather than two forms 
of different presence’ (175). Following from this, an intervention in an 
order—such as the introduction of zero—can be considered a blank fig-
ure when its nature is underdetermined, uncertain, unclear, troubling, 
provokes tension and generates not just a connection between pre- 
existing entities, but provides a basis for further investigation of those 
entities now connected. In this way, an algorithmic system might intro-
duce an accountable nothing (the deletion of data) that would not just 
create (or remove) connections between entities, but also create new trou-
bling questions (e.g. regarding the extent or adequacy or consequences of 
deletion). Whereas studies of qualculation appear to depend on the emer-
gence of a result from a singular order (‘a result is extracted’), the blank 
figure suggests a more persistent instability or multiplicity of order.
In this way, the work of Hetherington and Lee sensitises us to the 
possibility of disruptions to conventions of order through simultane-
ous somethings and nothings; zero which provides a basis for reordering 
4 THE DELETING MACHINE AND ITS DISCONTENTS  81
something (the rules and conventions for order such as negative numbers) 
and for considering nothing (a more literal zero). Following this argu-
ment, to introduce accountable deletion might be to generate instability 
and questions as much as order. The nature of data, of algorithms and 
their associations might be called into question, and so might the rela-
tions that generated the call for accountability in the first place. Instead 
of the algorithmic drama in current academic research that I noted in 
the Introduction and Chapter 2, we might have nothing (deletion), but 
we might also have a generative something (new accountability relations 
through which the deletion is demonstrated alongside difficult questions 
regarding what constitutes adequate deletion). The generative dissonance 
or profound change in ordering provoked by the blank figure—the some-
thing and nothing—as we shall see, attains a brutish presence: its adequacy 
as both something and nothing is difficult to pin down and yet vital to the 
marketable future of the technology under development.
The suggestion in policy discussions around deletion and accountably 
accomplishing deletion are that in some way an algorithm can be lim-
ited (even through another algorithm). Yet taking on board the work 
of Cochoy, Callon, Law, Hetherington and Lee suggests that when a 
new qualculative form is constituted and inserted into sociomaterial rela-
tions, it can constitute a something and nothing, a disruption and form 
of disorder, a set of questions and not only a limitation. The production 
of something and nothing and its accountable accomplishment clearly 
requires detailed investigation. This chapter will now begin this inves-
tigation particularly attuned to the possibility that deletion might gen-
erate blank figures, disorder as well as order. Attempts to accountably 
demonstrate that nothing has been created from something will be pur-
sued, wherein I will suggest that the certainties of qualculation become 
overwhelmed by the disruptive figure of what might constitute deletion.
deletion And the chAllenges of nothing
Deletion had become a notable cause for concern in policy debates in 
the European Union (set out above) and in academic literature that 
describes deletion as a solution to the ‘pernicious’ features of ‘compre-
hensive digital memory’ (Mayer-Schonberger 2009: 11). For the project 
coordinators, deletion was a means to respond to these concerns and 
maybe corner the market for accountably, ethically and algorithmically 
deleting data. Firms that needed to respond to new policy requirements 
might after all need a deletion system. But deletion had also become a 
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cause for concern within the project. The computer scientists’ interest in 
a conventional form of deletion that was not particularly secure or com-
plete, but was straightforward, stood in contrast to the views expressed 
by the project coordinators and the ethics board who for different rea-
sons wanted a more thorough-going form of deletion. Should deletion 
simply involve changing the route by which data was accessed, should it 
involve expunging data from the system, corrupting or overwriting data?
These questions responded to the project’s ethical aims in different 
ways, required different amounts of effort, budget and expertise and 
might provide different ways to make sense of the technology’s market 
potential (see Chapter 6). These concerns were not easy to separate. 
As the project moved beyond the experimental phase that we saw in 
Chapters 2 and 3, towards a more fully operational system that would 
be tested live in the train station and airport, a decision was required 
on what ought to constitute deletion. The consultancy firm that coor-
dinated the project decided, with ethics board support, to pursue 
the development of a comprehensive, but complex deletion system. 
Eventually, this would involve using solid-state drives for data storage 
with data then overwritten by an automated system, making it more or 
less irretrievable. To begin with, however, solid-state technology was not 
available to the project and the means to automatically overwrite data 
was not yet developed in a way that would work on the project’s sys-
tem architecture. Moreover, the system had to also demonstrate that it 
could successfully demarcate relevant from irrelevant data in order that 
the irrelevant data could be overwritten. And other data which had been 
tagged ‘relevant’ once it was no longer needed and metadata (such as 
timestamps and bounding box dimensions) would also need to be 
deleted. And not just deleted, but demonstrably and accountably deleted 
so that various audiences could be shown that deletion had taken place 
and that the system worked. TechFirm, a large IT network provider who 
were a partner in the project, had taken on the task of ensuring that the 
deletion system would be accountable. The complexity of deletion did 
not end here: discussions continued around how quickly data should be 
deleted. Just how long should data be stored, what was the correct ethi-
cal and practical duration for data storage? Operatives might need to do 
Route Reconstruction sometime after an alert had been issued, but ethi-
cal demands suggested such storage times should be limited. As a feature 
of the emerging technology under test conditions, 24 hours was initially 
set as a data storage period that responded to ethical and emerging pol-
icy imperatives and the practical requirements of operatives.
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These were each significant challenges in software and hardware, but 
also conceptually and ethically. This was not simply about producing 
nothing—the deleted. Instead it involved the continual and simultane-
ous production of nothing and something—the deleted, an account that 
could demonstrably attest that deletion had taken place, a new bench-
mark for deletion, a new system that could take on all the requirements 
of end-users oriented towards data retention at the same time as satis-
fying the ethics board and newly emerging regulations that data would 
not be stored. It was through this array of questions and concerns that 
deletion became a blank figure, both something and nothing, a troubling 
and disruptive figure within the project.
As the project moved out of its experimental phase, our algorithms 
and their IF-THEN rules would need to provide the basis for demar-
cating relevance from irrelevance with a level of confidence that would 
enable deletion to take place (although as we will see in Chapter 5, this 
was in itself a challenge). As I suggested in previous chapters, the Event 
Detection algorithms for moving the wrong way, moving into a forbid-
den space and abandoned luggage were also termed relevancy detec-
tion algorithms. In order to decide what ought to be deleted, these 
algorithms would need to sift through streams of digital video data 
streamed from the airport and train station video surveillance system, 
via the system’s Media Proxy that we noted in Chapter 2 (to smooth 
out any inconsistencies). This should make available somewhere between 
1 and 5% of data to operatives of the surveillance system through the 
User Interface as images that they might need to look at more closely. 
The Route Reconstruction system we saw in Chapter 3 might expand 
on these amounts of relevant data a little by creating ‘sausages’ of data 
around an image, constructing the history and future around a specific 
image selected by the algorithms. Still the technology ought to be able 
to select out huge amounts of irrelevant data for deletion. Even data that 
appeared to be initially relevant and was shown on the User Interface 
to operatives of the surveillance system and Route Reconstruction data 
would only be kept for a short time until reviewed by operatives who 
could also declare the images irrelevant and send them for deletion.
At the end of the experimental phase of the project, it might seem far-
fetched to describe deletion as a disorderly and disruptive blank figure 
based on complex qualculations of quantities and qualities. Relevant data 
could be checked and then deleted. Irrelevant data, by default, would 
be all the other data. This apparent certainty, at least at this stage of the 
project, extended through the algorithmic system. The IF-THEN rules 
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were clear, the maps of the fixed attributes of the experimental settings 
were clear, the models for object classification and the action states of 
objects as worthy of further scrutiny all seemed clear. The quantities 
involved were significant—terabytes of digital video data—but the quali-
ties—mostly operatives clicking on text alerts and watching short videos, 
were neatly contained. Following Callon and Law (2005), we could say 
that this was the first step towards a straightforward form of qualcula-
tion. Things were separated out and disentangled such that they might 
be recombined in a single space (within the algorithmic system). The 
background subtraction technique that we saw in Chapter 2 provided 
this seemingly straightforward basis for beginning demarcations of rele-
vant data (to be kept) and irrelevant data (to be deleted). A result could 
be extracted.
However, the project was now moving beyond its initial experimental 
phase. In the airport and train station as the technology moved towards 
system testing, the computer scientists from University 1 and 2 began 
to engage with the complexities of relevance detection in real time and 
real space. They started to look for ways to tidy up the initial steps of 
object classifications (which provided approximate shapes for back-
ground subtraction) in the airport and train station, through ever more 
closely cropped pixel masks for objects, with any single, isolated pixels 
erased and any holes between pixels filled. They suggested masks could 
be further tidied by removing shadow, just leaving the new entity. And 
these tidied up entities could now be subjected to object classification 
with what the computer scientists hoped was greater certainty. They 
were cleaned and tidied objects. Object classification would now define 
with confidence the objects in view as, for example, human-shaped or 
luggage-shaped. Cleaning the images, removing shadow, removing gaps 
in pixel masks was more processor intensive than the initial quick and 
dirty technique we noted in the earlier experimental phase of the project, 
but it was still computationally elegant for the computer scientists. It was 
a reasonably quick technique for ascertaining a classification of putative 
objects and it was a classification in which they (and other project partici-
pants) could have confidence.
Object classification required this more developed form of qualcula-
tion, drawing entities together into new relations such that they might 
be qualified for judging as relevant or irrelevant because the system 
faced new challenges in working in real spaces in real time. Classifying 
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something as a human-shaped object in object classification still involved 
algorithmic analysis of video streams in order to draw the parame-
ters (size and shape) of human-shaped or other shaped objects, it still 
required background subtraction and each object was still identified 
through a vector of around 200 features, so each object in itself was 
complicated. But the airport and train station involved far more cameras 
than initial experimentation, data in a wider array of formats and frame-
rates, a far greater number of human-shaped and other objects.
Confidence in the system’s ability to demarcate relevant from irrele-
vant data had to remain high as the algorithmic system required further 
development in order to work in the airport and train station. In particu-
lar, object tracking in the airport and train station needed to be attuned 
to the specificities of the spaces in which it would work. Object tracking 
just like our abandoned luggage algorithm had to be able to grasp every-
day life. Object tracking was vital for the Route Reconstruction system to 
work and follow a human-shaped object across multiple cameras, and for 
the system to know if human-shaped and luggage-shaped objects were 
moving apart, to know if human-shaped objects were moving the wrong 
way or into a forbidden space.
Once an object was given a bounding box and metadata had started 
to be produced on its dimensions, and the speed and direction of the 
box was noted in its movement across the screen, then object tracking 
needed to take on the complexities of the train station and airport. The 
bounding box had to be tracked across one camera’s visible range, but 
also between cameras in the train station and airport where the system 
searched for other bounding boxes of the same dimensions, relative to 
camera position, angle and zoom. To know that a human-shaped object 
on camera 17 was then the same human-shaped object that appeared on 
camera 18 and was the same human-shaped object that had previously 
appeared on cameras 11, 7, and 6, required a sophisticated form of track-
ing. Calculating objects in this way involved what the computer scientists 
termed Tsai calibrations. These did not operate using pixels alone, but 
rather by working out the position of an object relative to a camera, its 
position, angle and zoom, and then counting the number of pixels to 
figure out the dimensions of that object in centimetres relative to its dis-
tance and angle from a camera. Knowing the size in centimetres of an 
object in the space of the train station and airport would enable object 
tracking to happen. But to calculate the size of an object in centimetres 
(rather than just its size on a screen), the world of the video stream had 
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to be connected to the world of measurement in the space where the 
camera was located (the airport or train station) and the world of the 
objects within the video stream had to be connected to the world out 
there of people, luggage, etc. This was accomplished by measuring the 
space seen by a camera and then incorporating those measurements into 
a topological database drawn on by the Event Detection component of 
the algorithmic system. Eleven conversion coefficients including angle 
and zoom of the camera in relation to the world-out-there measure-
ments were now involved in producing an object’s size and initiating 
object tracking.
In this way, demarcating relevant from irrelevant data in the every-
day space of the train station and airport, in contrast to the experi-
mental space where all measurements were more or less already fixed 
and known, required more qualculative work. Judgements had to be 
made on what might work as a basis for connecting the images on the 
video stream to the objects that they referenced in the airport or train 
station. Accurate measurements of the space had to be compiled in a 
database. And this database had to be combined with the database of 
popular routes, the metadata on size, speed and direction of bounding 
boxes, and the algorithmic IF-THEN rules in order to build the sau-
sage of data around an image that we looked at in Chapter 3. Without 
these efforts, all data except for the single images of luggage once it was 
abandoned or a human-shaped object moving the wrong way or into a 
forbidden space would be deemed irrelevant and deleted. Qualculative 
work to connect the airport and train station space to the video data 
flowing through the algorithmic system was needed to prepare data for 
deletion or salvation.
This qualifying work, separating things out, drawing them together 
into classifications, working through IF-THEN rules to further qualify 
whether an image needed to be seen by operatives, was directed towards 
reducing the amount of video-based data made visible and the amount 
of data stored and achieving the project’s ethical aims. Qualculative work 
was complex in that it involved detailed efforts to know the everyday 
space in which the surveillance system operated, build that space into 
the algorithmic system, and come up with a means to identify and qual-
ify relevant objects. However, this was merely a first step in the move 
towards deletion.
Achieving the project’s ethical aims required a combination of this 
notable something—a potentially relevant event from which to issue 
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an alert—and a broad aggregate category of nothing—the irrelevant 
data to be deleted. This also required that the nothing itself became 
accountable. What was deleted had to be demonstrably seen to be 
deleted. In part this involved gathering all the data not seen by opera-
tives along with those clips deemed irrelevant by operatives and delet-
ing that data. However, it also involved retaining the orderly integrity 
of the accountability process imagined in relation to the initial qual-
culation process. Deletion needed to follow a similar logic to that of 
background subtraction and object classification which were expected 
to be appropriately qualified and made available for accountable 
judgement.
In this project, to generate accountable certainty, the system was 
designed to work in the following ways. A secure erase module (SEM) 
would be built of three sub-modules: a secure erasure scheduler (SES); a 
secure erase agent (SEEA); and a log generator (SELG). The SES would 
work with the other system components to retrieve data to be deleted 
(this would operate using a FIFO queuing system). The SES would 
send a series of requests for data to the other system components. These 
requests would include the full path to the file to be deleted; the start 
point of deletion (this was based on temporal parameters); and the end 
point of deletion (using temporal parameters to calculate the final block 
of video data to be erased in each session).
The SEEA would then work on the data to ensure it was overwrit-
ten and completely irretrievable from within the system. Overwriting 
was designed to try and ensure that data could not be retrieved from 
within the system and provide accountable certainty for its non-status. 
The project participants hoped that they could demonstrate that over-
writing had taken place and that the data had become irretrievable. In 
place of conventional deletion whereby data access routes would be 
cut, overwriting became the basis for expunging data from the system 
(although in practice this turned into something closer to corrupting 
than expunging the data as expunging proved technically difficult to 
automate). The SEEA would then check that deletion was successful 
by matching the content deleted with that selected by the SES. After 
deletion, the SELG would then produce a log of data deleted. The 
log would include the file names of deleted objects, the time taken to 
delete and the form of overwriting that had been applied. The SELG 
would act as the key component for producing accountable certainty 
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of nothing—that the data to be deleted was now deleted—as well as 
something—the account of nothing.
To make an accountable something from nothing, an external viewer 
component would parse the log to make it readable by humans and then a 
human system administrator could audit the log and check it against expec-
tations of how much data should have been deleted (e.g. by comparing 
how much data had been deleted against how much data passed through 
the system on average every 24 hours) and whether any traces had been 
left (of either video streams or metadata relating to, for example, object 
classification or bounding boxes). Events which had been the subject of an 
alert to operatives would be reviewed manually on a regular basis and then 
also moved into the SEM for deletion as necessary. The audit log provided 
a basis for demonstrating within the project that deletion was working. As 
an internal accountability mechanism it could become a means to see that 
the algorithm was limited, that further judgements could not be made on 
the corpus of video-based data that would now be unavailable.
In this sense, accountability (in the form of a data log) ought to 
provide the means to transform nothing (the deleted) into something 
(proof of deletion) and to do so in an orderly and certain manner. The 
log bore the responsibility for accountable action and for achieving the 
project’s ethical aims. However, the results derived from system test-
ing suggested deletion would be anything but straightforward. In tests 
carried out ‘live’ in the airport, designed to act as a demonstration of 
system capabilities for potential users (airport security operatives), video 
frames and metadata were not gathered in their entirety, orphan frames 
were left behind on the system, and the reporting tool merely produced 
a continual accountable output of partial failure. Problems particularly 
appeared during secure auto-deletion; it was in the moment that data 
should be corrupted and made irretrievable that some data evaded the 
system’s grasp. The computer scientists involved in the project could 
get the system to auto-delete the system files in their entirety by using 
an insecure deletion protocol (which effectively involved a conven-
tional approach to deletion, changing the routes via which data could 
be accessed) or by dropping auto-deletion and carrying out a manual 
corruption process (which might prove more complete but also require 
more work). The elegant solution of automatic, accountable deletion 
remained out of reach. This would prove important in efforts to estab-
lish the market value of the technology (see Chapter 6), but also some-
what pre-empted the chaotic scenes of demonstration that the entire 
system began to experience as it moved outside its initial experimental 
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phase (see Chapter 5). Everyday life and the algorithmic system did not 
see eye to eye.
Work to build the algorithmic deleting machine and constitute an 
ordered and certain accountable nothing, a notable absence, instead 
became the basis for establishing a precarious kind of uncertain presence. 
Orphan frames and the audit log continually generated a disorderly account 
of something instead of nothing, a blank figure (Hetherington and Lee 
2000) that paid recognition to the terms of its own order (that it should 
find and prove the existence of nothing), but also questioned that order (by 
finding orphan frames that then required explanation). The system threat-
ened to overwhelm the qualculations that had tried to establish a demarca-
tion between relevant data to be kept and irrelevant data to be deleted.
The audit log generated a notable question for the project partic-
ipants: could the technology still be sold primarily on the basis of its 
technical efficacy in deleting? The clear and negative answer to this 
question for the coordinators required a significant switch in the con-
ditions under which parties might be invited to engage with the sys-
tem. Initially the project coordinators had sought to take the internal 
accountability mechanisms of deletion out into the world as a basis 
for bringing the world to the deleting machine. They sought to 
develop from nothing, a market-valued something. After these some-
what sketchy results, the project coordinators sought to leave aside 
the technical difficulties through which nothing (the deleted) failed 
to be effectively and accountably constituted, at the same time as they 
continued to embark on concerted market work. As we will see in 
Chapter 6, having one form of calculation overwhelmed by this blank 
figure, encouraged the coordinators to seek a different basis for order-
ing their calculations.
conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen that grasping everyday life and participat-
ing in everyday life became more challenging for our algorithms as they 
moved from experimentation to something closer to system testing in 
the train station and airport. What might be termed the real world con-
ditions of real time and real space operations proved difficult. Indeed the 
algorithmic system needed more development to cope with these new 
exigencies. Further measurements and a new database were required to 
build durable links between the space of the airport and train station and 
the video stream that flowed through the system.
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As our algorithms moved from experimentation towards testing in 
the train station and airport, its calculations changed, the system com-
ponents were further developed, a more complex and uncertain everyday 
life needed to be engaged. This was all oriented towards demarcating rel-
evant from irrelevant data in order to delete. Deletion was seen as crucial 
by the project coordinators to achieving the project’s ethical aims and in 
order to start building a market value for the technology under develop-
ment. The system, it was hoped, would become the first choice among 
firms looking for automated ways to manage their adherence to new data 
regulations.
Yet deletion could not only happen through demarcation. Decisions 
had to be taken on the form that deletion would take (changing the 
route to access data, expunging, overwriting, corrupting data) and 
the means to accountably demonstrate that deletion had happened. 
Although decisions were made on all these matters, problems remained. 
The anticipated nothing—the deletion of irrelevant data—retained a 
troubling presence in orphan frames that inexplicably escaped the dele-
tion protocols. The anticipated something—a log that accountably 
demonstrated to audiences that deletion had taken place—was then 
undermined. In place of a pristine account of nothing (the deleted) was 
a continual demonstration of the presence of something (the orphan 
frames): the algorithmic machine had become an expert in accountably 
demonstrating its own failures. This disruptive blank figure, always atten-
tive to the order in which it was expected to work, was simultaneously 
managing to challenge that order, by placing significant questions next 
to the algorithmic system’s future viability. As we will see in Chapters 5 
and 6, these questions only become more pronounced over time.
In sum, we have seen in this chapter that doing deletion can be a form 
of active qualculative work. The members of the project team dedicated 
hours and effort to build a machine to algorithmically delete. The tech-
nical work was also preparatory market work and accountability work. It 
involved coordination, computer science, social science, the invocation 
of end-user needs, and different ways to understand a developing pol-
icy environment. Doing this work was neither singular nor straightfor-
ward, but involved somehow making something from this diverse array. 
And making something required qualculations to separate out and iden-
tify objects, then bring those objects together in object classifications in 
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order to be judged. Yet setting limits for our algorithmic system through 
deletion was not straightforward; for something to be convincingly lim-
ited, it needed to be demonstrably and accountably limited. The work 
to produce an accountable deleting machine was focused on producing 
a machine that could account for itself and the way it set limits, demon-
strating nothing (the product of deletion) as a prior step to something 
(the account of nothing, building a world of relations of value into the 
technology). However, accountability work was also uncertain and a lit-
tle precarious with the world of relations of people and things assembled 
to do accountability, shifting between certainty and uncertainty. The 
study of making deleting accountable, emphasised this precariousness—
to prove that nothing existed as a result of something being deleted, 
without resurrecting the thing deleted, proved an ongoing conceptual 
and practical challenge. As we will see in Chapter 5, this was only the 
start of a series of challenges for our algorithms.
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Abstract  This chapter explores the problems involved in demonstrating 
an algorithmic system to a variety of audiences. As the project reached 
its final deadlines and put on demonstrations of the technology-under- 
development to various audiences—including the project funders—it 
became ever more apparent that in a number of ways promises made to 
key audiences, may not be met. In project meetings, it became rapidly 
apparent that a number of ways of constituting a response to different 
audiences and their imagined demands could be offered. To manage this 
problem, the chapter shows that a range of different more or less ‘gen-
uine’ demonstrations with greater or lesser integrity were discursively 
assembled by the project team, and ways to locate and populate, witness 
and manage the assessment of these demonstrations were brought to the 
table. The notion of integrity is used to incorporate sight, materiality and 
morality into the growing literature on algorithms.
Keywords  Demonstration · Expectation · Integrity · Morality · 
Witnessing
opening
In this chapter, our algorithms will continue their journey into the every-
day. Beyond the initial expectation held by project participants (see 
Chapters 2 and 3) that in experimental settings the algorithms might 
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prove their ability to grasp features of everyday life, the algorithms 
must now through testing and demonstration, to express their ability to 
become the everyday. However, building on the portents of Chapter 4, 
wherein the deletion system ran into trouble with orphan frames, what 
we will see in this chapter is a broader and more calamitous collapse of 
the relation between the algorithms and the everyday. As the project team 
reached closer to its final deadlines and faced up to the task of putting 
on demonstrations of the technology under development to various audi-
ences—including the project funders—it became ever more apparent that 
the algorithms struggled to grasp the everyday, struggled to compose 
accounts of the everyday and would struggle to become the everyday of 
the train station and airport. Promises made to funders, to academics, to 
potential end-users, to ethical experts brought into assess the technology, 
may not be met. It became clear to the project team that a number of 
ways of constituting a response to different audiences and their imagined 
demands would need to be offered. This did not involve a simple binary 
divide between the algorithmic system working and not working. Instead 
a range of different demonstrations, with what we will describe (below) 
as greater or lesser integrity, were discursively assembled by the project 
team, ways to locate and populate, witness and manage the assessment of 
demonstrations were brought to the table. Several of the demonstrations 
that had already been carried out were now reconceptualised as showing 
that features of the algorithmic system could perhaps work. Agreements 
were rapidly made, tasks were distributed and imminent deadlines agreed; 
the demonstrations (with varying integrity) were only weeks away.
The growing science and technology studies (STS) literature on 
demonstrations hints at a number of ways in which the integrity of 
demonstrations might be engaged. For example, Smith (2004) sug-
gests demonstrations may involve elements of misrepresentation or par-
tial fabrication. Coopmans (2010) analyses moves to conceal and reveal 
in demonstrations of digital mammography which manage the activity of 
seeing. And Simakova (2010) relates tales from the field of demonstra-
tion in technology launches, where the absence of the technology to be 
launched/demonstrated is carefully managed. These feature as part of 
a broader set of concerns in the STS demonstration literature including 
notions of witnessing (Smith 2009), dramaturgical metaphors and staging 
(Suchman 2011), and questions regarding who is in a position to see what 
at the moment of visual display (Collins 1988). These studies each have a 
potential relevance for understanding the demonstrations in this chapter.
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The chapter will begin with a discussion of the ways in which recent 
STS literature has handled future orientations in studies of technology 
demonstrations, testing, expectations and prototyping. This will provide 
some analytic tools for considering the work of the algorithmic system 
in its move into forms of testing and demonstration. I will then suggest 
that notions of integrity provide a means to turn attention towards the 
practices of seeing, forms of morality and materiality made at stake in 
demonstrations of our algorithms. The chapter will conclude with a dis-
cussion of the problems now faced by our algorithms as a result of their 
demonstrable challenges.
future orientAtions of technology
STS scholars have provided several ways of engaging with potential 
futures of technology, expectations of science and technology, technol-
ogy under development and/or technologies that continue to raise con-
cerns regarding their future direction, development, use or consequence. 
Drawing these studies together, three analytic themes emerge which 
I will use as a starting point for discussion. First, studies of technology 
demonstration, testing, displays, launches, experiments, and the man-
agement of expectations frequently incorporate considerations regarding 
what to show and what to hide. Coopmans (2010) terms this the man-
agement of ‘revelation and concealment’ (2010: 155). Collins (1988) 
suggests that what might nominally be presented as a public experi-
ment (in his case in the strength and integrity of flasks designed to carry 
nuclear waste) is more akin to a display of virtuosity (727). In order to 
manage and maintain such virtuosity, only partial access is provided to 
the preparation of the ‘experiment’, rendering invisible: ‘the judgements 
and glosses, the failed rehearsals, the work of science – that provide 
the normal levers for criticism of disputed experimental results’ (728). 
Through this process of revelation (the public display) and concealment 
(hiding the preparation and practice), ‘the particular is seen as the gen-
eral’ (728). That is, a flask containing nuclear waste is not presented 
as simply surviving this particular train wreck, but a display is put on 
through which we can see that all future trouble that this flask, and other 
similar flasks, might face will be unproblematic. Through historical stud-
ies of scientific display and demonstration (Shapin 1988, cited by Collins 
1988; Shapin and Shaffer 1985) we can start to see the long-standing 
import of this movement between revelation and concealment for the 
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continued production and promotion of fields of scientific endeav-
our. Through contemporary studies of technology demonstration, sales 
pitches and product launches (Coopmans 2010; Simakova 2010), we can 
note the putative market value of concealment and revelation.
Second, technology demonstrations and the management of future 
technological expectations do not only involve a continual movement 
between revelation and concealment, but also a continual temporal 
oscillation. Future times, places and actions are made apparent in the 
here and now (Brown 2003; Brown and Michael 2003). For example, 
future concerns of safety, reliability, longevity and even ethics (Lucivero 
et al. 2011) are made demonstrably present in the current technology. 
Furthermore, work to prepare a prototype can act as a sociomaterial 
mediator of different times and work orientations, ‘an exploratory tech-
nology designed to effect alignment between the multiple interests and 
working practices of technology research and development, and sites of 
technologies-in-use’ (Suchman et al. 2002: 163). For example, the pos-
sibilities of future mundane technology support and supplies are made 
manifest as features of demonstrations and launches (Simakova 2010). 
Alternatively, the limitations of a technology as it is now, can be made 
clear as part of the work of emphasising the future developmental tra-
jectory of a technology or as a feature of attesting to the professional-
ism and honesty of the organisation doing the demonstration (that the 
organisation can and already has noted potential problems-to-be-re-
solved; Smith 2009).
Third, within these studies there is an emphasis on the importance 
of audiences as witness. Drawing on Wittgenstein, Pinch (1993) sug-
gests that audiences have to be persuaded of the close similarity between 
the demonstration and the future reality of a technology, they have to 
be persuaded to place in abeyance all the things that might make for a 
possible difference and instead agree to select the demonstrator’s criteria 
as the basis for judging sameness. However, this is not simply a case of 
the audience being dupes to the wily demonstrator. Smith (2004) con-
tends the audience, the potential customer, can be knowledgeable of 
the limits of a technology, seeking to gain in some way from their par-
ticipation in the demonstration and/or willing to ‘suspend disbelief’ in 
the artifice of the presentation (see also Coopmans [2010] on knowing 
audience members and their differential reaction). Through what means 
might audience members make their conclusions about a demonstra-
tion? Suchman (2011), in studying encounters with robots, looks at how 
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persuasion occurs through the staging and witnessing that is character-
istic of these scenes. Audiences, Suchman suggests, are captured by the 
story and its telling. Drawing on Haraway’s modest witness, Suchman 
outlines how the audience are positioned within, rather than outside 
the story; they are a part of the world that will come to be. Pollock and 
Williams (2010) provide a similar argument by looking at the indexical-
ity of demonstrations which, to have influence, must create the context/
world to which they point. Developing this kind of analytical position, 
Coopmans (2010) argues that audiences are integrated into the complex 
management of seeing and showing. Audiences are classified and selec-
tively invited to identify with a particular future being shown through 
the demonstration and attached to the technology being demonstrated. 
‘Efforts to position the technological object so as to make it “seeable” 
in certain ways are mirrored by efforts to configure an audience of wit-
nesses’ (2010: 156).
Smith’s (2004) utilisation of the dramaturgical metaphor for technol-
ogy demonstrations, suggests these three focal points, of concealment 
and revelation, temporal oscillation and witnessing, are entangled in par-
ticular ways in any moment of demonstration. I will suggest that these 
three themes are also prevalent in preparing our algorithms for demon-
strable success. But, first, I propose a detour through integrity as a basis 
for foregrounding the subsequent analysis of our algorithms and for 
developing these ideas on demonstration.
integrity And the Algorithm
Elements of the technology demonstration literature already appear to 
lend themselves to an analysis of integrity in, for example, studies of par-
tial fabrication, revelation and concealment. However, it is in the work 
of Clark and Pinch (1992) on the ‘mock auction con’ that we find a rich 
and detailed study of a type of demonstration tied to questions of integ-
rity. The central point of interest for us in this study is that those run-
ning the mock auction con build a routine and: ‘The various repetitive 
elements of the routine… provide local-historical precedents for under-
standing what occurs and for the audience determining what (appar-
ently) is likely to follow’ (Clark and Pinch 1992: 169). In this way, the 
audience to the mock auction are convinced into bidding for ‘bargain’ 
priced goods that are not what they appear through allusions to the ori-
gin of those goods (that perhaps they were stolen, must be sold quickly 
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and so on). Being able to point to a context which seems available—but 
is not—and could provide a reasonable account for buyers to make sense 
of the ‘bargains’ which seem available—but are not—is central to manag-
ing the con (getting people to pay over the odds for low-quality goods).
We notice similar themes of things appearing to be what they are not 
emerging in popular media stories of fakes, whether focused on an indi-
vidual person or object (such as a fake death,1 fake stamp,2 or fake sport-
sperson,3 a fake bomb detector4 or a fake doctor accounting for more5 
or fewer6 deaths) or a collective fake (where the number of fake docu-
ments,7 fossils,8 or the amount of money9 claimed to be fake, takes cen-
tre stage).10 In each case, the success of the fake in not being discovered 
for a time depends on a demonstrative ability to point towards a context 
which can successfully account for the claimed attributes of the person 
or object in focus. This is what Garfinkel (1963, 1967) would term the 
relation of undoubted correspondence between what something appears 
to be and what it is made to be through successive turns in interaction. 
We pay what turns out to be an amount that is over the odds for an item 
in the mock auction con, but what constitutes an amount that is over the 
odds is a later revelation. At the time of purchase, we have done no more 
than follow the ordinary routine of paying money for an item. We have 
done no more than trust the relation of undoubted correspondence. I 
would like to suggest that this kind of context work where we manage 
to index or point towards a sense of the scene that enables the relation 
of undoubted correspondence to hold, can be addressed in terms of 
integrity. A dictionary definition of integrity suggests: ‘1. the quality of 
having strong moral principles. 2. the state of being whole’.11 Thus con-
text work in situations of fakes or cons might be understood as directed 
towards demonstrating the moral and material integrity required for the 
relation of undoubted correspondence to hold (where what is required is 
a feature established within the setting where the interactions take place).
We can explore this notion of integrity further in the most developed 
field of fakery: fake art. Research in this area (see, for example, Alder 
et al. 2011) explores famous fakers12 and the shifting attribution of art-
works to artists.13 The integrity of artworks in these situations appears 
to depend on work to establish that a painting is able to demonstrate 
material properties that support a claim to be genuine.14 In order to 
convincingly account for the integral ‘whole’ of the painting, mate-
rial properties are articulated in such a way as to indexically15 point the 
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artwork towards a context (of previous ‘sales’, auction catalogues which 
definitively describe ‘this’ artwork as attributed to a particular artist, dust 
which clearly demonstrates its age). We might note that such indexing 
is crucial to constituting the context. However, the sometimes arduous 
efforts to accomplish a context must be split and inverted (Latour and 
Woolgar 1979) in such a way that the artwork appears to effortlessly 
point towards ‘its’ context in a way that suggests this context has always 
been tied to this artwork, enabling the artwork to seem to be what it 
is. The work to actively construct a context must disappear from view 
in order for an artwork to effortlessly index ‘its’ context and attest to 
the ‘whole’ material integrity of the artwork; that it has the necessary 
age and history of value, ownership and exchange to be the artwork that 
it is. Furthermore, artworks need to be seen for what they are, with for 
example, brushstrokes becoming a focal point for audiences of expert 
witnesses to attest that in the brushstrokes, they can see the style of a 
particular artist,16 with such witnesses then held in place as supporters 
of the see-able integrity of the artwork.17 Declarations of the nature 
of an artwork (its material and visual integrity), also appear to be mor-
ally oriented such that constituting the nature of a painting as correctly 
attributed to an artist, becomes a means to constitute the moral integrity 
of: the material properties and practices of seeing that have established 
the painting as what it is (as genuine or as fake and thereby morally cor-
rupt); its human supporters as what they are (as, for example, neutral 
art experts or morally dubious individuals who may be seeking financial 
gain from a painting’s material and visual integrity). The material, visual, 
moral question of integrity becomes: can the object to hand demonstrate 
the properties for which it ought to be able to account, indexically point-
ing towards a context for establishing the integrity of the material prop-
erties of the artwork and the practices through which it has been seen by 
its supporters? Can it maintain a relation of undoubted correspondence 
between what it appears to be and what it interactionally becomes?
In a similar manner to technology demonstrations, fakes appear to 
incorporate a concern for revelation and concealment (revealing a hus-
band’s method of suicide, concealing the fact he is still alive), temporal 
oscillation (authorities in buying a fake bomb detector, also buy a future 
into the present, imagined and indexically created through the technol-
ogy’s apparent capabilities) and the careful selection and positioning of 
audience within the narrative structure being deployed (particularly 
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when faking a marriage or other notable social ceremony). However, 
fakes (particularly fake artworks) alert us to the possibility of also con-
sidering questions of visual, material and moral integrity in forms of 
demonstration. Returning to our algorithms will allow us to explore 
these questions of integrity in greater detail.
demonstrAting Algorithms
From their initial discussions of system architecture and experimentation 
with grasping the human-shaped object (see Chapter 2), to the start of 
system testing, demarcating relevant from irrelevant data and building a 
deleting machine (see Chapter 4), the project team had retained a con-
fidence in the project’s premise. The aim was to develop an algorithmic 
surveillance system for use, initially, in a train station and airport that 
would sift through streams of digital video data and select out relevant 
images for human operatives. As I suggested in Chapter 2, the idea was 
to accomplish three ethical aims, to reduce the amount of visual video 
data that was seen by operatives, to reduce the amount of data that was 
stored by deleting irrelevant data and to not develop any new algorithms 
in the process. Up until the problems experienced with the deletion sys-
tem (see Chapter 4), achieving these aims had been a difficult and chal-
lenging task, but one in which the project team had mostly succeeded. 
Yet the project had never been just about the team’s own success: the 
project and in particular the algorithmic system needed to demonstrate 
its success (and even become a marketable good, see Chapter 6).
From the project proposal onwards, a commitment had always been 
present to put on three types of demonstration for three distinct kinds 
of audience. As the person responsible for ethics in the project, I would 
run a series of demonstrations for ethical experts, policy makers (mostly 
in the field of data protection) and academics who would be called upon 
to hold to account the ethical proposals made by the project. End-users 
from the train station and airport would also be given demonstrations of 
the technology as an opportunity to assess what they considered to be 
the potential strengths and weaknesses of the system. Finally, the pro-
ject funders would be given a demonstration of the technology ‘live’ in 
the airport at the end of the project, as an explicit opportunity to assess 
the merits, achievements, failures and future research that might emanate 
from the project. We will take each of these forms of demonstration in 
turn and look at the ways in which our algorithms now engage with the 
everyday and the questions of integrity these engagements provoke.
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Demonstrating Ethics
I invited a group of ethical experts (including academics, data protec-
tion officers, politicians and civil liberty organisations) to take part in a 
demonstration of the technology and also ran sponsored sessions at three 
conferences where academics could be invited along to demonstrations. 
The nature of these demonstrations at the time seemed partial (Strathern 
2004), and in some ways deferred and delegated (Rappert 2001) the 
responsibility for ethical questions from me to the demonstration audi-
ences. The demonstrations were partial in the sense that I could not use 
live footage as these events did not take place in the end-user sites and 
could only use footage of project participants acting out suspicious behav-
iour due to data protection concerns that would arise if footage were used 
of non-project participants (e.g. airport passengers) who had not con-
sented to take part in the demonstrations. Using recorded footage at this 
point seemed more like a compromise than an issue of integrity; footage 
could be played to audiences of the User Interface and our algorithms 
selecting out human-shaped objects, action states (such as abandoned lug-
gage) and even use footage of the Route Reconstruction system to replay 
those objects deemed responsible for the events. Audience members were 
invited to discuss the ethical advantages and disadvantages they perceived 
in the footage. If it raised questions of integrity to any extent, it was per-
haps in the use of recorded footage. But audiences were made aware of 
the recorded nature of the footage and the project participants’ roles as 
actors. In place of a display of virtuosity (Collins 1988) or an attempt 
to manage revelation and concealment (Coopmans 2010) I (somewhat 
naively it turned out) aimed to put on demonstrations as moments where 
audiences could raise questions of the technology, free from a dedicated 
move by any wily demonstrator to manage their experience of seeing.
Along with recorded footage, the audience were shown recordings 
of system responses; videos incorporated the technicalities of the Event 
Detection component of the system architecture, its selection proce-
dures and provision of alerts. I took audiences through the ways in which 
the system put bounding boxes around relevant human-shaped and other 
objects deemed responsible for an action and showed a few seconds of 
footage leading up to and following an alert. At this moment, I thought 
I was giving audiences a genuine recording of the system at work for them 
to discuss. However, it later transpired that the recorded footage and sys-
tem response, and my attestation that these were more or less realistic rep-
resentations of system capabilities, each spoke of an integrity belied by later 
demonstrations.
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End-User Demonstrations
The limitations of these initial demonstrations became clear during a 
second form of demonstration, to surveillance operatives in the airport. 
Several members of the project team had assembled in an office in the air-
port in order to give operatives an opportunity to see the more developed 
version of the technology in action. Unlike initial discussions around the 
system architecture or initial experimentation with grasping the human-
shaped object (see Chapter 2), our algorithms were now expected to 
deliver a full range of competences in real time and real space.18 These 
demonstrations also provided an opportunity for operatives to raise issues 
regarding the system’s latest design (the User Interface, for example, 
had been changed somewhat), its strengths and limitations, and to ask 
any questions. This was to be the first ‘live’ demonstration of the tech-
nology using a live feed from the airport’s surveillance system. Although 
Simakova (2010) talks of the careful preparations necessary for launching 
a new technology into the world and various scholars cite the importance 
of revelation and concealment to moments of demonstration (Smith 
2009; Coopmans 2010; Collins 1988), this attempt at a ‘demonstration’ 
to end-users came to seem confident, bordering on reckless in its appar-
ent disregard of care and concealment. Furthermore, although there was 
little opportunity to select the audience for the test (it was made up from 
operatives who were available and their manager), there was also little 
done to position the audience, manage their experience of seeing, incor-
porate them into a compelling narrative or perform any temporal oscil-
lation (between the technology now and how it might be in the future; 
Suchman 2011; Brown 2003; Brown and Michael 2003; Simakova 2010; 
Smith 2009). The users remained as unconfigured witnesses (Coopmans 
2010; Woolgar 1991).
Prior to the demonstration to end-users, the limited preparatory work 
of the project team had focused on compiling a set of metrics to be used 
for comparing the new algorithmic system with the existing conventional 
video-based surveillance system. An idea shared among the computer sci-
entists in the project was that end-users could raise questions regarding the 
technology during a demonstration, but also be given the metric results as 
indicative of its effectiveness in aiding detection of suspicious events. The 
algorithmic and the conventional surveillance system would operate within 
the same temporal and spatial location of the airport and the operatives 
would be offered the demonstrators’ metric criteria as the basis for judging 
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sameness (Pinch 1993). The metrics would show that the new technology, 
with its move to limit visibility and storage, was still at least as effective as 
the current system in detecting events, but with added ethics.
This demonstration was designed to work as follows. The operatives of 
the conventional surveillance system suggested that over a 6 hour period, 
approximately 6 suspicious items that might turn out to be lost or aban-
doned luggage, would be flagged by the operatives and sent to security 
operatives on the ground for further scrutiny. On this basis, our aban-
doned luggage algorithm and its IF-THEN rules (see Introduction and 
Chapter 2) needed to perform at least to this level for the comparative 
measure to do its work and demonstrate that the future would be as effec-
tive as the present, but with added ethics. The system was set to run for 
6 hour prior to the arrival in the office of the surveillance operatives so 
they could be given the results of the comparative metric. I had also taken 
an interest in these comparative metrics. I wanted to know how the effec-
tiveness of our algorithms could be made calculable, what kinds of devices 
this might involve, how entities like false positives (seeing things that were 
not there) and false negatives (not seeing things that were there) might be 
constituted. I wanted to relay these results to the ethical experts who had 
taken part in the previous demonstrations on the basis that a clear division 
between technical efficacy and ethical achievement was not possible (see 
Chapter 3 for more on ethics). If the system worked or did not on this 
criteria, would provide a further basis for ethical scrutiny.
In the 6 hour that the system ran, when the conventional surveillance 
system would detect 6 items of potentially lost or abandoned luggage, 
the algorithmic system detected 2654 potentially suspicious items. This 
result went so far off the scale of predicted events, that the accuracy of 
the system could not even be measured. That is, there were just too 
many alerts for anyone to go through and check the number of false pos-
itives. The working assumption of the computer scientists was that there 
were likely to be around 2648 incorrect classifications of human-shaped 
and luggage-shaped objects that had for a time stayed together and then 
separated. In later checking of a random sample of alerts, it turned out 
the system was detecting as abandoned luggage such things as reflective 
surfaces, sections of wall, a couple embracing and a person studying a 
departure board. Some of these were not fixed attributes of the airport 
and so did not feature in the digital maps that were used for background 
subtraction. However, object parameterisation should have been able to 
calculate that these were not luggage-shaped objects, and the flooring 
and walls should have been considered fixed attributes.
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However, in the immediate situation of the demonstration, there was 
not even time for this random sampling and its hastily developed expla-
nations—these all came later. The airport surveillance operatives turned 
up just as the 2654 results were gathered together and the project team 
had to meekly hand these results to the operatives’ manager as evidence 
of system (in)efficacy.
The results of these tests also highlighted the limitations of my ini-
tial ethical demonstrations (described previously). The ‘recorded’ foot-
age of the system in operation that I had (apparently) simply replayed 
to audiences, began to seem distinctly at odds with the results from the 
live testing. What was the nature of the videos that I had been showing 
in these demonstrations? On further discussion with the computer scien-
tists in the project, it turned out that system accuracy could be managed 
to the extent that the parameters of the footage feeding into the system 
could be controlled. For example, the computer scientists had worked 
out that a frame rate of 15 frames per second was ideal for providing 
enough detail without overloading the system with irrelevant footage. 
This frame rate enabled the system to work elegantly (see Chapter 2); 
using just enough processing power to produce results, in real time. 
They also suggested that certain types of camera location (particularly 
those with a reasonably high camera angle, no shiny floors and consist-
ent lighting) led to better results for the system. And the conditions of 
filming were also a pertinent matter; crowds of people, sunshine and too 
much luggage might confuse the system. As we can see in the following 
images (Figs. 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3), the system often became ‘confounded’ 
(to use a term from the computer scientists).
Collins (1988) and Coopmans (2010) suggest that central to demon-
strations are questions of who is in a position to see what. However, 
the demonstrations considered here suggest that seeing is not straight-
forwardly a matter of what is revealed and what is concealed. In the 
development and demonstration of the algorithmic system, the straight-
forward division is made more complex between the seeing demonstra-
tor and the audience whose vision is heavily managed. As a researcher 
and demonstrator, I was continually developing my vision of the algo-
rithms and, in different ways, the end-users as audience were presented 
with stark (in)efficacy data to help shape how they might see the algo-
rithms. The computer scientists also had a developing understanding of 
algorithmic vision (learning more about the precise ways that the sys-
tem could not straightforwardly see different floor coverings or lighting 
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conditions or manage different frame rates across different cameras). 
And some features of how our algorithms grasped everyday life were 
never resolved in the project. In the following image (Fig. 5.4), the 
algorithm has selected out a feature of the fixed attributes of the airport 
(a wall) as a luggage-shaped object, something that ought to be impos-
sible using background subtraction as the wall ought to be part of the 
background map:
Further, those involved in seeing in these demonstrations needs to 
be extended to incorporate our algorithms too. In the ethical demon-
strations, to reveal to the audience but not the algorithm, that the 
data was recorded involved some integrity (those invited to hold the 
Fig. 5.1 A human-
shaped object and 
luggage-shaped object 
incorrectly aggregated  
as luggage
Fig. 5.2 A lug-
gage-shaped object 
incorrectly classified as 
separate from its  
human-shaped object
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technology to account were at least apparently informed of the nature 
of the data being used and if the recorded nature of the data was 
concealed from the algorithm, then the demonstration could be pre-
sented as sufficiently similar to using live data to maintain its integrity). 
However, following the disappointing results of the user demonstra-
tion and further discussions with the computer scientists regarding 
the recorded data used in the ethical demonstrations, it transpired that 
Fig. 5.3 A human-
shaped object’s head 
that has been incorrectly 
classified as a human in 
its own right, measured 
by the system as small 
and therefore in the 
distance and hence in a 
forbidden area, set up 
for the demonstration
Fig. 5.4 Wall as a 
 luggage-shaped object
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the algorithms were not entirely in the dark about the nature of the 
footage. The computer scientists had a developing awareness that the 
algorithms could see a space with greater or lesser confidence according 
to camera angles, lights, the material floor covering, how busy a space 
happened to be and so on. Using recorded data that only included 
‘unproblematic’ footage enabled the algorithms to have the best chance 
of seeing the space and to be recorded seeing that space successfully. 
To replay these recordings as the same as live data, was to conceal the 
partially seeing algorithm (the algorithm that sees well in certain con-
trolled conditions). Algorithmic vision (how the algorithm goes about 
seeing everyday life) and the constitution of the spaces in which the 
algorithms operate (including how the algorithms compose the nature 
of people and things) were entangled with questions of material, visual 
and moral integrity which we will return to below. However, first and 
most pressing for the project team was the question of what to do 
about demonstrating the ethical surveillance system to project funders 
given the disastrous efficacy results.
Demonstration for Project Funders
A meeting was called among project participants following the end-user 
demonstration. The dominant theme of the discussion was what to do 
about the rapidly approaching demonstration to project funders given 
the results of the end-user demonstrations. This discussion was made 
particularly tense when one of the computer scientists pointed out that 
in the original project description, a promise had been made to do a 
demonstration to the project funders not only of the airport, but also of 
the other end-user location—the train station. Much of the discussion 
during the meeting was of the technical challenges that were becoming 
apparent of digitally mapping the fixed attributes of a space as complex 
as an airport in order for the algorithms to classify objects as human-
shaped or not. And the further complexities of then mapping a train sta-
tion too, of how both locations had camera angles not favoured by the 
algorithms (e.g. being too low), were both subject to changing light-
ing conditions and frame rates, multiple flooring material and were both 
busy with people and objects.
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The following excerpts have been produced from fieldnotes taken 
during the meeting. The first option presented during the meeting was 
to use recorded data:
Computer Scientist1: it doesn’t work well enough. We should use recorded 
data.
[no response]
The silence that followed the computer scientist’s suggestion was typical 
of what seemed to be multiple awkward pauses during the meeting. One 
reason for this might have been an ongoing difference among members 
of the project team as to how responsibility ought to be distributed for 
the disappointing end-user demonstration results. Another reason might 
also be a concern that to use recorded data was to effectively undermine 
the integrity of the final project demonstration. The computer scientist 
went on to make a further suggestion to the project coordinator:
Computer Scientist1: do you want to tell the truth?
[no response]
The pause in the meeting following this second suggestion was slightly 
shorter than the first and was breached by the project coordinator who 
began to set out a fairly detailed response to the situation, giving the 
impression that he had been gathering his thoughts for some time. In his 
view a live test in the airport, using live video streams was the only possi-
bility for the demonstration to funders. For the train station, his view was 
different:
Project Coordinator: We should record an idealised version of the system, 
using recorded data. We can just tell the reviewers there’s not enough 
time to switch [configurations from airport to train station]. What we 
are saying matches the [original project description]. We will say that a 
huge integration was required to get two installations.
In this excerpt the project coordinator suggests that for the train sta-
tion, not only will recorded footage be used, but the demonstration will 
be ‘idealised’. That is, a segment of recorded data will be used that fits 
computer scientists’ expectations of what the algorithms are most likely 
to correctly see and correctly respond to (where ‘correct’ in both cases 
would be in line with the expectations of the project team). Idealising 
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the demonstration is closer to a laboratory experiment than the initial 
system experimentation we saw in Chapter 2. It involved controlling 
conditions in such a way as to extend the clean and pure, controlled 
boundaries of the laboratory into the everyday life of the train station 
(drawing parallels with Muniesa and Callon’s (2007) approach to the 
economist’s laboratory) to manage a display of virtuosity (Collins 1988). 
This is the first way in which questions of integrity were opened: only 
footage from the best-positioned cameras, featuring people and things 
on one kind of floor surface, in one lighting condition, at times when the 
station was not busy, would be used. However, there was also a second 
question of integrity at stake here: the demonstration would also fea-
ture recorded system responses. This meant that the computer scientists 
could keep recording responses the system made—how our algorithms 
went about showing they had seen, grasped, classified and responded 
to everyday life correctly—until the computer scientists had a series of 
system responses that matched what the computer scientists expected 
the algorithms to see and show. Any ‘errors’ by the algorithms could be 
removed from the recording.
At this moment, several meeting participants looked as if they wanted 
to offer a response. However, the project coordinator cut off any further 
discussion:
Project Coordinator: I don’t think there’s any need to say anything on any 
subject that was not what I just said.
The immediate practical outcome of this meeting was to distribute tasks 
for the idealised, recorded train station demonstration (project mem-
bers from StateTrack, the train operator, were to start recording video 
streams and provide computer scientists with more detail on their sur-
veillance camera layouts, computer scientists were to start figuring out 
which cameras to use in the recordings, and so on). The distribution of 
tasks was seemingly swift and efficient and unlike the initial sections of 
the meeting which were characterised by what appeared to be awkward 
pauses. For the train station demonstration, revelation and concealment 
(Coopmans 2010) would be carefully managed, through the positioning 
of witnesses (Smith 2009). The ethical future to be brought into being 
would be staged with a naturalistic certainty—as if the images were just 
those that one would see on entering the train station, rather than a nar-
row selection of images from certain cameras, at certain angles, at certain 
times, of certain people and certain objects.
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However, this focus on an idealised, recorded demonstration for 
the train station, left the demonstration for the airport under-specified, 
aside from needing to be ‘live’. Two follow-up meetings were held in 
the airport to ascertain how a ‘live’ demonstration of the technology 
could be given to the project funders. Allowing the algorithms to run 
on their own and pick out events as they occurred in the airport con-
tinued to provide disappointing results. The project coordinator main-
tained the need for a ‘live’ demonstration and in particular wanted to 
put on a live demonstration of the system detecting abandoned luggage, 
describing this as the ‘king’ of Event Detection (on the basis that it was 
perceived by the computer scientists and funders as the most complex 
event type to detect). In a second airport meeting, a month before the 
final demonstration, the project team and particularly the project coordi-
nator became more concerned that the algorithms would not work ‘live’. 
In response to these problems, the project team began to move towards 
idealising the ‘live’ demonstration as a means to increase the chance that 
the algorithms would successfully pick out abandoned luggage. To begin 
with the airport operators and computer scientists discussed times when 
the airport would be quietest, on the basis that the number of people 
passing between a camera and an item of abandoned luggage might con-
fuse the algorithm:
Computer Scientist2: Do we need to test the busy period, or quiet time like 
now?
Project Coordinator: Now I think is good.
Computer Scientist1: We need to find the best time to test… it cannot be 
too busy. We need to avoid the busy period because of crowding.
Once the ideal timing for a demonstration had been established (late 
morning or early afternoon, avoiding the early morning, lunchtime or 
early evening busy periods where multiple flights arrived and departed), 
other areas of activity that could be idealised were quickly drawn into 
discussion. It had become apparent in testing the technology that an 
item of abandoned luggage was identified by airport staff using the con-
ventional surveillance system on average once an hour. To ensure that 
an item of luggage was ‘abandoned’ in the quiet period would require 
that someone known to the project (e.g. an airport employee in plain 
clothes) ‘abandoned’ an item of luggage. However, if the luggage was to 
be abandoned by someone known to the project, this opened up further 
opportunities for idealising the ‘live’ demonstration:
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Project Coordinator: Is there a set of luggage which will prove better?
Computer Scientist1: In general some more colourful will be better.
The computer scientist explained that the background subtraction 
method for Event Detection might work more effectively if objects were 
in strong contrast to the background (note Fig. 5.3, where the system 
seems to have ‘lost’ the body of the human-shaped object as it does 
not contrast with the background and focused on the head as a human-
shaped object in its own right). The system could not detect colour as 
such (it did not recognise yellow, green, brown, etc.), but the computer 
scientist reasoned that a very colourful bag would stand in contrast to 
any airport wall, even in shadow, and so might be more straightforward 
for the algorithms to classify:
Computer Scientist2: We could wrap it [the luggage] in the orange [high 
visibility vest].
Project Coordinator: Not for the final review, that will be suspicious.
Computer Scientist2: We could use that [pointing at the yellow recycle 
bin].
Computer Scientist1: That is the right size I think, from a distance it will 
look practically like luggage. We will check detection accuracy with 
colour … of the luggage. Maybe black is worst, or worse than oth-
ers, we would like to check with a different colour. We should test the 
hypothesis.
Computer Scientist2: What if we wrap the luggage in this [yellow printed 
paper].
Computer Scientist1: I think yes.
Computer Scientist2: Would you like to experiment with both bags?
Computer Scientist1: Yes, we can check the hypothesis.
For the next run through of the test, one of the project team mem-
bers’ luggage was wrapped in paper to test the hypothesis that this 
would increase the likelihood of the object being detected by the 
algorithm (Fig. 5.5).
The hypothesis proved to be incorrect as the results for both items 
of luggage were broadly similar and continued to be disappointing. 
However, it seemed that the algorithms could always successfully accom-
plish background subtraction, classify objects as human-shaped and 
luggage-shaped and create an alert based on their action state as sepa-
rate for a certain time and over a certain distance in one, very tightly 
112  D. NEYLAND
delineated location in the airport. Here the IF-THEN rules of the algo-
rithm seemed to work. The location provided a further basis to idealise 
the ‘live’ demonstration, except that the person ‘abandoning’ the lug-
gage had to be very precise. In initial tests the computer scientists and 
the person dropping the luggage had to remain on their phones, pre-
cisely coordinating and adjusting where the luggage should be posi-
tioned. It seemed likely that a lengthy phone conversation in the middle 
of a demonstration and continual adjustment of the position of luggage 
would be noticed by project funders. The project team discussed alterna-
tives to telephone directions:
Project Coordinator: We should make a list of exact points where it works 
perfectly, I can go with a marker and mark them.
Computer Scientist1: Like Xs, X marks the spot.
Project Coordinator: But with cleaning, in one month it will be erased. We 
want a precise place, the reviewers will stay in the room to observe so 
they won’t see if it’s marked.
Computer Scientist1: We can put some tape on the floor, not visible from 
the camera.
Fig. 5.5 Luggage is 
idealised
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After two days of rehearsal, the project coordinator was satisfied that the 
airport employee was leaving the luggage in the precisely defined loca-
tion on a consistent basis, that the luggage selected was appropriate, 
that it was being left in a natural way (its position was not continually 
adjusted following telephone instructions) and the algorithm was suc-
cessfully classifying the luggage-shaped object and issuing an alert that 
funders would be able to see in the demonstration.
At this moment it appeared that the demonstration would be ‘live’ 
and ‘idealised’, but what of its integrity? I was still present to report on 
the ethics of the technology under development and the project itself. 
In the final preparation meeting prior to the demonstration for research 
funders, I suggested that a common motif of contemporary ethics was 
accountability and transparency (Neyland 2007; Neyland and Simakova 
2009; also see Chapter 3) and this sat awkwardly with the proposed reve-
lation and concealment and positioning of witnesses being proposed. On 
the whole, the project team supported the idea of making the demon-
stration more accountable and transparent—this was, after all, a research 
project. The project team collectively decided that the demonstration 
would go ahead, but the research funders would be told of the actor’s 
status as an employee of the airport, that the abandonment itself was 
staged, that instructions would be given to the actor in plain sight of 
the funders. Revelation and concealment were re-balanced and perhaps a 
degree of integrity was accomplished.
integrity, everydAy life And the Algorithm
In this chapter, the complexity of the everyday life of our algorithms 
appeared to escalate. Moving from initial experimentation, in which the 
aim was to grasp the human-shaped and other shaped objects, towards 
testing and demonstrations in which the everyday life of the airport and 
train station had to be accounted for, proved challenging. Building on 
the partial failures of the deleting machine in Chapter 4 that pointed 
towards emerging problems with the system, here demonstrations for 
end-users of the full system highlighted significant problems. But these 
were only one of three types of demonstration (to generate ethical dis-
cussion, for end-user operatives and for project funders).
The complexities of these demonstrations can be analysed through the 
three themes we initially marked out in the STS literature on future ori-
entations of technology. Each of the forms of demonstration intersects 
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these themes in distinct ways. For example, the demonstrations for eth-
ical audiences were initially conceived as free from many of the con-
cerns of revelation and concealment, temporal oscillation and carefully 
scripted witnessing. I had (naively) imagined these demonstrations were 
occasions in which the technology would be demonstrated in an open 
manner, inspiring free discussion of its potential ethical implications. 
Yet the demonstration to end-users and prior attempt to collect efficacy 
data to render the algorithmic system comparable with the conventional 
surveillance system (but with added ethics), revealed the extent of con-
cealment, temporal oscillation and carefully scripted witnessing that had 
been required to put together the videos of the system for the ethical 
demonstrations. I could now see these videos as demonstrably account-
ing for an algorithmic technology with capabilities far beyond those dis-
played to end-users. We could characterise the ethical demonstration as a 
kind of idealised display of virtuosity (Collins 1988), but one which no 
project member had confidence in, following the search for efficacy data 
for end-users.
Subsequent discussions of the form and content of the demonstra-
tions for project funders suggests that a compromise on integrity was 
required. The project coordinator looked to carefully manage revela-
tion and concealment (for the train station only using recorded foot-
age, within conditions that algorithms could see, only using recorded 
system responses and only using those responses when the system had 
responded correctly; or in the airport controlling the type of luggage, its 
location, its careful ‘abandonment’), temporal oscillation (using the foot-
age to conjure an ethical surveillance future to be made available now) 
and the elaboration of a world into which witnesses could be scripted 
(with the computer scientists, project manager, algorithms and myself 
initially in a different position from which to see the world being offered 
to project funders).
Yet discussion of demonstrations and their integrity should not lead us 
to conclude that this is simply and only a matter of deception. Attending 
to the distinct features of integrity through notions of morality, materiality 
and vision can help us to explore what kind of everyday life our algorithms 
were now entering into. Firstly, our algorithms have been consistently 
oriented towards three ethical aims (to see less and address privacy con-
cerns, store less and address surveillance concerns, and only use existing 
algorithms as a means to address concerns regarding the expansion of 
algorithmic surveillance). Articulating the aims in ethical demonstrations 
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constituted the grounds for a form of material-moral integrity—that the 
likelihood of a specific materially mediated future emerging through the 
algorithmic system could be adjudged through the demonstrations. The 
demonstrations thus involved bringing a material-moral world into being 
by clearly indexing the certainty and achievability of that world, creating 
a relation of undoubted correspondence between the everyday life of the 
demonstration and the future everyday that it pointed towards. Ethical 
experts were drawn into this process of bringing the world into being 
so that they might attest to the strength, veracity and reliability of the 
demonstrated world to which they had been witness. In demonstrations to 
funders, the latter were also inscribed into the material-moral world being 
indexed so that they might attest to the project funding being money well 
spent. The pressure towards moral-material integrity is evidenced through: 
the project’s own ethical claims positioning the tasks of the project as 
achieving a recognisably moral improvement to the world; the project par-
ticipants’ discussion of the demonstrations which appears to be an attempt 
to hold onto some moral integrity; recognition by project members of the 
impending demonstration to project funders and attempts to understand 
and pre-empt funders’ concerns and questions by designing a suitable 
demonstration with apparent integrity.
For this material and moral integrity to hold together, the demonstra-
tion must operate in a similar manner to a fake artwork. Fake artworks 
must be able to convincingly index and thus constitute a context (e.g. 
a history of sales, appearances in auction catalogues). And the work of 
indexing must appear effortless, as if the artwork and its context have 
always been what they are; that those called upon to witness the index-
ing can be confident that if they were to go to the context (an auction 
catalogue), it would definitively point back to the artwork. Our algo-
rithms must similarly index or point to (and thus constitute) a context 
(the everyday life of a train station and airport, of human-shaped objects 
and abandoned luggage) in a manner that is sufficiently convincing and 
seemingly effortless that if those called upon to witness the demonstra-
tion—such as project funders and ethical experts—went to the context 
(the train station or airport), they would be pointed back towards the 
images displayed through the technology (the footage selected by the 
algorithm showing events). The alerts shown need to be convincingly of 
the everyday life of the train station or airport (rather than just a few 
carefully selected cameras) and any and all events that happen to be 
occurring (rather than just a few select events, from certain angles, in 
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certain lighting conditions, with carefully resourced and placed luggage). 
This is required for the system to be able to hold together its material 
and moral integrity and convince the witnesses they don’t need to go 
to the train station or airport and assess the extent to which the footage 
they have been shown is a complete and natural representation of those 
spaces. In other words, the technology must be able to show that it can 
alert us to (index) features of everyday life out there (context) and every-
day life out there (context) must be prepared in such a way that it con-
vincingly acts as a material whole with integrity from which alerts (index) 
have been drawn. The relation of undoubted correspondence must oper-
ate thus.
The moral-material integrity holds together for as long as movement 
from index to context and back is not questioned and the ethical premise 
of the technology is maintained; if there is a failure in the index-con-
text relation—if it becomes a relation of doubtful correspondence—this 
would not only question the ethical premise of the project, but also the 
broader motives of project members in putting on the demonstration. 
The move—albeit late in the project—to make the demonstration at 
least partially transparent and accountable, reflects this pre-empting of 
possible concerns that research funders might have held. Idealising the 
messiness of multiple floor coverings, lighting conditions, ill-disciplined 
passengers and luggage was relatively easily managed in the train station 
demonstration as it was displayed through recorded footage. However, 
idealising the ‘live’ airport demonstration and maintaining a natural and 
effortless relation of undoubted correspondence between index and con-
text was much more challenging. Rehearsals, tests (of luggage and those 
doing abandonment) and off-screen control of the space (e.g. by mark-
ing the space where luggage must be dropped) were each likely to com-
promise the material-moral integrity of the demonstrations. Revealing 
their idealised features was perhaps unavoidable.
Secondly, the work of our algorithms provides us with an opportunity 
to review the complexities of morality and vision in demonstrations in 
new ways. Previously, Smith (2009) has suggested a complex relation-
ship between originals, fabrications and partial fabrications in viewing 
the staged drama of a demonstration and Coopmans (2010) has argued 
that revelation and concealment are central to the practices of seeing 
in demonstrations. These are important contributions, and through 
our algorithms we can start to note that what the technology sees (e.g. 
the algorithms turn out to be able to see certain types of non-reflective 
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flooring better than others) and the distribution of vision (who and what 
sees) and the organisation of vision (who and what is in a position to 
produce an account of who and what), are important issues in the integ-
rity of demonstrations. The train station demonstration can have more 
or less integrity according to this distribution and organisation of vision. 
If recorded footage is used but the algorithms do not know what it is 
they will see, this is noted by project participants as having more integ-
rity than if recorded decision-making by the algorithms is also used. 
In the event both types of recording were used. Discussions in project 
meetings around the demonstration for project funders, led to similar 
questions The algorithms need to see correctly (in classifying luggage as 
luggage-shaped objects) and to be seen correctly seeing (in producing 
system results) by, for example, project funders and ethical experts, in 
order to accomplish the visual-moral integrity to which the project has 
made claim: that the algorithms can grasp everyday life.
conclusion
In this chapter, the focus on demonstrating our algorithms’ ability to 
grasp everyday life, compose accounts of everyday life and become the 
everyday of the airport and train station, has drawn attention to notions 
of integrity. Given the project’s ethical aims, work to bring a world into 
being through demonstration can be considered as concerted activities 
for bringing about a morally approved or better world. The moral terms 
of demonstrations can thus go towards establishing a basis from which 
to judge their integrity. Close scrutiny of demonstration work can then 
open up for analysis two ways of questioning the integrity of the moral 
world on show. Through material integrity, questions can be asked of 
the properties of demonstrations, what they seem to be and how they 
indexically provide for a means to constitute the moral order to which 
the demonstration attests. Through visual-integrity questions can be 
posed of who and what is seeing, the management of seeing, what it 
means to see correctly, and be seen correctly. Material and visual integrity 
is managed in such a way as to allow for the demonstrations to produce 
a relation of undoubted correspondence between index and context, 
establishing the integrity of the material and visual features of the tech-
nology: that it sees and has been seen correctly, and that the acts of see-
ing and those doing the seeing can be noted as having sufficient moral 
integrity for those acts of seeing to suffice.
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The problems our algorithms have with grasping and composing 
an account of the everyday life of the airport and train station require 
that this integrity is compromised. Just taking Fig. 5.3 as an example, 
the human-shaped object composed by the algorithm does not match 
the human in the real time and real space of the airport (the system has 
placed a bounding box only around the human’s head). Algorithmic 
time and space has produced a mismatch with airport time and space; the 
everyday life of the algorithm and the airport are at odds and the relation 
of undoubted correspondence between algorithmic index and airport 
context does not have integrity; the algorithm’s composition of, rather 
than grasping of, the human is laid bare. A compromise is required to 
overcome this mismatch. Years of work to grasp the human-shaped 
object (Chapter 2), to make that grasping accountable (Chapter 3) and 
to demarcate relevance from irrelevance (Chapter 4) are all now at stake. 
In the next Chapter, we will see that our algorithms’ problems in seeing 
and the need to adopt these compromises, poses questions for compos-
ing and managing the market value of the technology.
notes
 1.  See, for example: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jul/23/
canoe.ukcrime and http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7133059.stm.
 2.  See: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2478877/Man-sends-
letters-using-DIY-stamps-Royal-Mail-failed-notice.html and http://metro. 
co.uk/2013/10/29/royal-fail-anarchist-creates-freepost-system-with-his-
own-stamps-4165420/.
 3.  See: http://www.thefootballsupernova.com/2012/04/ali-dia-greatest-
scam-premier-league.html and http://www.espncricinfo.com/coun-
ty-cricket-2011/content/story/516800.html.
 4.  See: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/20/government- 
fake-bomb-detectors-bolton.
 5.  See, for example: http://www.news.com.au/lifestyle/health/fake-ni-
gerian-doctors-arrested-over-womens-deaths/stor y-fneuz9ev- 
1226700223105.
 6.  See, for example: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2408159/
Fake-plastic-surgeon-did-treatments-kitchen-left-woman-needing-
hospital-treatment.html.
 7.  See, for example: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-tyne-24716257; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1310374.stm; 
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/03/14/sprj.irq.documents/; 
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http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/may/05/nationalarchives.second-
worldwar http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/1039562.stm; http:// 
www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/fake-verifiable-degrees-offered-on-in-
ternet/167361.article; and http://www.badscience.net/2008/11/hot-foul- 
air/#more-824.
 8.  See Stone (2010) and for example: http://www.science20.com/
between_death_and_data/5_greatest_palaeontology_hoaxes_all_time_3_
archaeoraptor-79473.
 9.  With around 2.8% of UK pound coins estimated to be fake. See: http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12578952.
 10.  We also find Sokal’s fake social science paper sitting alongside a greater 
number of fake natural science discoveries (e.g. in cloning: http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4554422.stm and http://
www.newscientist.com/article/dn8515-cloning-pioneer-did-fake-re-
sults-probe-finds.html#.UoON3YlFBjp) and fakes in other fields such 
as psychology (see faked data in claims that white people fear black peo-
ple more in areas that are dirty or that people act in a more selfish man-
ner when hungry: http://news.sciencemag.org/education/2011/09/
dutch-university-sacks-social-psychologist-over-faked-data).
 11.  Concise Oxford Dictionary (1999).
 12.  Such as van Meegreen, Elmyr deHory, Tom Keating, John Drewe and 
John Myatt and the Greenhalgh family.
 13.  Alder et al. (2011) cite the example of the portrait of the Doge Pietro 
Loredano which was and then wasn’t and now is again considered a 
painting by Tintoretto.
 14.  I use the term integrity here rather than provenance or an evidential focus 
on “chain of custody” (Lynch 1998: 848) as a first step towards explor-
ing index-context relations (taken up further in the next section).
 15.  Indexical is used in the ethnomethodological sense here, see Garfinkel 
(1967).
 16.  For more on the complexities of seeing, see, for example: Daston and Galison 
(1992), Fyfe and Law (1988), Goodwin (1994, 1995), Goodwin and 
Goodwin (1996), Hindmarsh (2009), Jasanoff (1998), and Suchman (1993).
 17.  In a similar manner to Latour’s allies of scientific experiments sent out 
into the world to attest to the strength of a scientific fact or discovery.
 18.  Real time and real space here refer to the naturally occurring unfolding 
of events in the train station and airport in contrast to the experimental 
stage of the project where spaces and the timing of events might be more 
controlled. Here, our algorithms would have to make their first steps 
into a less controlled environment, causing anxiety for the computer 
scientists.
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Abstract  The final chapter explores how a market can be built for an 
algorithmic system. It draws together studies of algorithms with the 
growing literature in science and technology studies (STS) on markets 
and the composition of financial value. It uses performativity to explore 
market making for algorithms. To accomplish market work and build a 
value for the algorithm, the chapter suggests, the project coordinators 
had to build a market of willing customers who were then constituted 
as a means to attract others to (potentially) invest in the system. This 
final chapter will suggest that market work is an important facet of the 
everyday life of an algorithm, without which algorithmic systems such as 
the one featured in this book, would not endure. The chapter concludes 
with an analysis of the distinct and only occasionally integrated everyday 
lives of the algorithm.
Keywords  Market making · Market share · Investment · Value · 
Performativity
opening
In Chapter 5, the ability of our algorithms to grasp and compose every-
day life in the train station and airport came under significant scrutiny. 
Problems in classifying objects and their action states, issuing alerts and 
demarcating relevant from irrelevant footage were major concerns for the 
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project participants. This built on the problems experienced in Chapter 
4 with the deleting machine that seemed to always leave behind orphan 
frames. Taken together, this suggests that our algorithms might struggle 
to become the everyday of the airport and train station at least in their 
current form. The system architecture, the individual components, the 
relevancy detection algorithms, the IF-THEN rules might all need more 
work. And for the computer scientists from University 1 and 2, this was 
no more or less than they expected: their work in this project built on a 
decade of research carried out by themselves and colleagues that would 
extend beyond the fixed time frame of this project into future efforts. 
Our algorithms might live on in modified form in whatever the com-
puter scientists or other colleagues chose to do next.
The project coordinators faced a different question. For the coordina-
tors of the project—a European-based consulting firm—the possibilities 
of developing an ethical, algorithmic surveillance system to take to the 
market, had provided a compelling reason for their involvement in the 
project. Deletion, relevancy detection and algorithmic experimentation 
each had a partial orientation for the coordinators towards a future mar-
ket. Building a value for the technology following trouble with relevancy 
detection, object classification, object tracking, background subtrac-
tion, the issuing of alerts and the deletion system appeared challenging. 
The coordinators instead looked to switch the basis on which the future 
of the technology was settled. Recognising that the system’s results in 
demonstrations to end users (see Chapter 5) and the deletion system’s 
audit log (see Chapter 4) would generate a continuing output of demon-
strative partial failure, the coordinators instead sought to build an alter-
native basis for relations with the world beyond the technology. This set 
of relations would seek to map out a new market value for the technol-
ogy. In place of technical efficacy as a basis for selling the system, willing 
customers were constituted as a means to attract others to (potentially) 
invest in the system. In this chapter, I will suggest that building a world 
of (potential) customers to attract investors required a broad number of 
participants, with market trends, sizes and values separated out and made 
subject to calculation. To do market work and build an investment value 
required this careful plaiting of relations. I will suggest that the efforts 
required to shift the focus from technical efficacy to investment can be 
considered through ideas of performativity.
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The chapter will begin with a brief digression through recent writ-
ing on performativity, before looking at the coordinators’ work to draw 
investors into new relations with the algorithmic system. I will suggest 
that these relations operated in a similar manner to the object classifica-
tion of our algorithms: investors, territories, future sales and market size 
had to be separated out and qualified, calculated and pacified in order 
that these new relations of investment might be developed. The chapter 
will end with a discussion of where we have reached in the everyday life 
of our algorithms.
performAtivity
Performativity has played an important part in the recent science 
and technology studies (STS) turn towards markets and market-
ing (see, for example, MacKenzie et al. 2007; MacKenzie 2008). 
The argument draws on the work of Austin (1962) and his notion 
of a performative utterance or speech act. Cochoy (1998) suggests 
a performative utterance can be understood as a statement ‘that says 
and does what it says simultaneously’ (p. 218). MacKenzie suggests 
a distinction can be made between utterances that do something 
and those that report on an already existing state of affairs (2008: 
16). The most frequently quoted example, drawing on the work of 
Austin (1962), is the utterance ‘I declare this meeting open’. Such 
an utterance is said to describe and bring into being the state that it 
describes—it is a speech act.
Developing this further, Cochoy (1998) suggests: ‘a performative sci-
ence is a science that simultaneously describes and constructs its subject 
matter. In this respect, the ‘performation’ of the economy by marketing 
directly refers to the double aspect of marketing action: conceptualis-
ing and enacting the economy at the same time’ (p. 218). From this, we 
could understand that marketing brings the matter it describes into being. 
For other STS scholars, the focus is attuned to markets rather than mar-
keting. For example, Callon suggests: ‘economics in the broadest sense of 
the term performs, shapes and formats the economy’ (1998: 2). Araujo 
thus suggests that performativity involves market and marketing type 
statements making themselves true by bringing into being the subject of 
the statement (2007: 218).
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In relation to financial markets, MacKenzie looks at the ways in which 
the work of economists brings markets into being. MacKenzie (2003) 
suggests that traders use market models to inform their trades, creating 
market outcomes that match the models. Furthermore, economists’ mar-
ket equations embody a world of relations, prices and outcomes that the 
use of an equation effectively constitutes. The work of economists can be 
understood in a similar manner to a Kuhnian problem–solution exem-
plar; the complexity of the world can be rendered more or less coher-
ent through models and equations which appear to work (i.e. to bring 
a solution to a problem) and can thus be employed again in other simi-
lar situations. The models and equations become paradigmatic couplings 
of problems and solutions for others to use. As a result, the risks faced 
by market actors in an otherwise complex, messy and uncertain world 
become reconceptualised as more or less manageable.
However, MacKenzie suggests that performativity is not a uniform 
phenomenon; instead he presents three approaches to performativity. 
First, there is ‘generic’ performativity in which: ‘an aspect of economics (a 
theory, model, concept, procedure, data set, etc.) is used by participants 
in economic processes, regulations, etc’ (2008: 17). Second, there is 
‘effective’ performativity which involves: ‘the practical use of an aspect of 
economics that has an effect on economic processes’ (2008: 17). Third, 
drawing on the work of Barry Barnes, there is ‘Barnes-ian’ performativity 
in which: ‘Practical use of an aspect of economics makes economic pro-
cesses more like their depiction by economists’ (2008: 17), and actions 
change in order to ‘better correspond to the model’ proposed by econo-
mists (2008: 19). We can see these approaches to performativity as mov-
ing from weakly formulated to more thorough forms of performativity. 
However, MacKenzie is clear that such models of performativity do not 
only operate in one direction. MacKenzie also introduces ‘counter per-
formativity’ whereby: ‘practical use of an aspect of economics makes eco-
nomic processes less like their depiction by economists’ (2008: 17).
Although this provides a provocative set of ideas for thinking through 
how market value for the algorithmic system might be built, performativ-
ity has been critiqued for buying too readily into, or merely confirming, 
the terms of market participants (Riles 2010; Dorn 2012; Bryan et al. 
2012; Foucarde 2007; with a response from MacKenzie and Pardo-
Guerra 2013). For Lee and LiPuma: ‘The analytical problem is how to 
extend what has been a speech act-based notion of performativity to 
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other discursively mediated practices, including ritual, economic prac-
tices, and even reading’ (2002: 193). To switch attention to economic 
processes requires an expansion of the remit of performativity and a 
rethinking of the centrality of communication (such as Austin’s utter-
ances) and an incorporation of acting and doing. Incorporating this 
broader set of entities would move us towards an approach developed by 
Barad (2003) who suggests shifting performativity away from its starting 
point in studies of language use and questions of representation, towards 
action (a similar extension is proposed by Butler 1997, 2010).
Although Barad is not focused on markets and forms of economic 
exchange in her discussion of performativity, the questions she raises appear 
to resonate with concerns posed to the STS move to engage with markets, 
calculation and measurement; that performativity might problematically 
narrow the focus for analytical action. Callon’s (2006, 2010) response to 
the critiques of performativity is that they continue (what he suggests is) 
Austin’s (1962) mistake of assuming statements are in some way separable 
from their social, cultural or political context. Instead, Callon argues for a 
need to explore the worlds performed into market action. This will be the 
starting point for our exploration of the project coordinators’ market work: 
just how do they perform a world of investment into being and what does 
this tell us of the everyday life of our algorithms?
building A mArket vAlue for the Algorithms
In the absence of reliable evidence of technical efficacy and given the 
apparent difficulties of putting on a convincing demonstration of the algo-
rithms’ ability to grasp or compose everyday life, the coordinators drew 
together a variety of entities to participate in the building of a putative 
world into which investors could be invited. Building such a world was a 
complex task requiring calculative dexterity in order to render the emerg-
ing world convincing and legible in a document that could be sent to 
investors. It also required imagination to conjure the entities to be calcu-
lated and a compelling narrative into which they could be woven. Still this 
would be nothing more than a putative world of potential investment. For 
it to be given performative effect required buy-in from the investors.
First, complex, dextrous and imaginative preparation work took place. 
The project coordinators segmented the world into geographical regions 
to be accorded more value (Central and South America with strong 
128  D. NEYLAND
predicted growth rates in video-based surveillance), even more value 
(Canada and Europe with a growing interest in video-based surveillance 
and a burgeoning privacy-interested legislature and lobby) or less value 
(the USA with apparently less interest in privacy and a saturated market 
place for smart video analytics). These segmented geographies were not 
left as vaguely valued territories, but transformed into specific and precise 
calculations of Compound Annual Growth Rates (CAGRs) derived from 
a combination of expensive industry reports the coordinators had pur-
chased and online sources. In this way, the market for video-based sur-
veillance analysis was calculated to have a CAGR of 15.6% between 2010 
and 2016. This was then broken down into the more and less attractive 
geographical segments previously described.
This provided a very hesitant initial set of calculations on which to 
build an investment proposition: geographies were segmented and cal-
culated. However, this dextrous and imaginative work to separate and 
calculate did not end here. Customers were treated in much the same 
way. Hence governments were identified as a particular type of customer, 
tied to more or less attractive geographies. The more attractive govern-
ments were calculated as accounting for 17.59% of the video surveil-
lance market and as more likely to be compelled into buying a deletion 
technology in order to promote their own privacy sensitive credentials. 
Transport firms were another customer type segmented and calculated as 
accounting for a further 11% of the video surveillance market with a pre-
dicted CAGR of 13.39% between 2010 and 2016. Major transport-based 
terror attacks were invoked as a basis for this growth in investment, but 
transport organisations were also identified as another potentially priva-
cy-concerned customer (this despite the transport companies involved in 
this project seeming to lose interest in privacy as the project developed). 
Specific technological developments were also given the same treatment, 
with pixel numbers, high definition cameras and algorithmic forms of 
data analysis all separated and calculated as growth areas. Finally, vid-
eo-based surveillance processes such as data storage were also separated 
out and calculated as a growth area, but with a growing storage cost—
the kind of cost that could be reduced through deletion. Although this 
separation and calculation work was directed towards building a putative 
world into which investors might become enwrapped, the coordinators 
also worked to distinguish entities as outside or external to this world 
of potential relations. Hence 44 competitors were also identified, ranked 
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according to size and spend, and their particular video-based, algorith-
mic data analysis systems were presented in terms of their inferior capa-
bilities. This despite our algorithms continually running into problems.
The work here by the coordinators was similar to that carried out by 
our algorithms. Separating out, calculating, preparing and qualifying 
some entities while disqualifying others (such as competitors), grasping 
features of the world out there and bringing them to the system, pro-
vided the basis for building a potential world of investment relations. 
Alongside segmented geographies, everything from governments to 
pixel numbers became entities of this putative market work. The enti-
ties segmented and qualified (and disqualified) were drawn together into 
the world of relations in a document entitled ‘The Exploitation Report’. 
Here the qualified (and disqualified) entities made sense as providing a 
basis for investment. At the centre of this world of relations, however, sat 
our algorithms, the system architecture, its components, and the delet-
ing machine as an investment vehicle whose technical efficacy remained 
absent from accounts. Technical capabilities remained silent, rendering 
the Report’s content accountably certain and ordered. The preparatory 
calculations embedded in the Report and the censure of any uncertainty 
in terms of the demonstrable proof of technical efficacy would now 
provide the basis for performatively accomplishing an effect: building a 
world of investors. Through convincing investors that the Report was 
compelling proof of the viability of investment and that the technological 
system qualified as a reasonable investment risk, the coordinators hoped 
to also build investors into the world of the algorithms.
Inclusions, exclusions and careful calculation provided the means 
for the coordinators to try and build a compelling narrative that would 
achieve this performative effect. Rather than relying on a single utterance 
(as in Austin’s illustrative examples of performativity), accomplishing this 
effect relied on the Report’s extended narrative as a means to provide a 
particular kind of evidence (not of technical efficacy, but of investment 
potential) on a particular scale (across industries and geographies). In 
place of uncertainty derived from 44 competitors came the assertion that 
none of the competitors could deliver as sophisticated a solution as that 
promised by the project. In place of a concern with governments cut-
ting budgets in times of austerity came the assertion that governments 
must look to cut costs and therefore should look for the kind of cheap 
storage solutions that auto-deletion technologies could provide. In place 
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of a concern that a new surveillance system might attract privacy-based 
criticism came the assertion that this system carried with it and provided 
a response to that privacy criticism. And in place of any concern from 
among project members that the technology didn’t work came nothing; 
technological inadequacies were excluded from the Report and its audi-
ence. Building this compelling narrative (Simakova and Neyland 2008) 
was central to accomplishing the performative effect.
From the preceding analysis, we can see that our algorithms are not 
left to fend for themselves, abandoned as a result of their technical inef-
ficacies. Neither are they exactly excused from any further role in the 
project. They are in the Exploitation Report, but their lack of efficacy is 
excluded. To accomplish the performative effect, they need to be pres-
ent as an investable entity, at the same moment as key features of their 
activity are absent. The orderly world of the investment proposition is 
as much dependent on these absences as the presence of the algorithms. 
Understanding performativity is not then restricted to single speech 
acts or even the content of the Exploitation Report alone, but requires 
understanding the concerted efforts to segment, calculate, and prepare 
a world of people, things, processes, resources and relationships that the 
investors can enter. Preparing the putative world for investors involved 
these presences and absences, but also the possibility of accumulat-
ing something further. This built on the segmentation, calculation and 
preparation work to narrate future returns on investments from building 
an ethical, algorithmic surveillance system. The system could be invested 
in and might go on to do the work that might be required of compa-
nies in the emerging and changing Data Protection and privacy land-
scape where such matters as a right to be forgotten (see Chapter 4) have 
gained momentum. Complying with policy requirements and customer 
expectations of privacy, and delegating this compliance to our algorithms 
(or at least, future renditions of our algorithms), might become a mar-
ketable good and attain a value.
Following many weeks of labour by the project coordinators in pro-
ducing ‘The Exploitation Report’, the preparation work of segmen-
tation, calculation and absenting of certain forms of data (on technical 
efficacy) was hidden. Making sense of the performativity through which 
an investment proposition is given effect requires an understanding of 
this preparatory work, but also cannot ignore the compelling narrative in 
which it is subsequently involved. Market value here achieves its potential 
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through the segmentation of geographies, technologies, competitors and 
customers, the apportioning of a calculative value (or non-value) to these 
entities and evidence from third parties to support the values evidenced. 
This work is only partly evident in the Report. The outcomes rather than 
the means of calculation, for example, are made prominent. However, 
the Report itself also needs consideration. The preparation work to seg-
ment, calculate and value entities had to be drawn into a compelling 
narrative that supported the future development of the algorithmic sys-
tem. Work was thus done to connect things we all know are happen-
ing now (such as government austerity measures and the need to cut 
budgets) with features of the technological future (such as deletion), to 
generate a compelling narrative for investment in the algorithmic tech-
nologies (in this instance, that austerity measures and cost-cutting could 
be achieved through deletion by cutting data storage costs). And other 
things that we know are taking place (such as the introduction of the EU 
General Data Protection Regulation) could be connected with a range of 
required activities (compliance with the legislation) that could be accom-
plished via our algorithms. Certainty in the narration of problems (that 
these problems exist and will be faced by these customers) and solutions 
(that this system will address these problems) might prove compelling. 
At the same time, producing a compelling narrative also required that 
some numbers (technical efficacy) and forms of calculation (how the 
world of the Report was prepared) remained absent. This continual 
switching between temporalities—the world as we know it now and the 
investable future—and accounts—things to be made available and things 
to be absented—became the means to attempt to compel investors to 
join the world of relations being built into the algorithmic system; that 
its market value would arrive.
the everydAy life of the Algorithm
Where does this leave our algorithms? As the slightly embarrass-
ing and incapable project partner to be excluded from financial calcu-
lations, a waste of time and money? And what does this tell us about 
the drama played out in current academic writing and in the media (see 
Introduction), in which algorithms are expected to take over our lives, 
run wild with our data or operate in ways that we cannot see? To address 
these questions, we need to step back and take a look at the everyday 
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lives of our algorithms as they have developed throughout the chapters 
of this book. We need to see just where our algorithms have got to in life 
to make sense of their proposed future, their social, economic and tech-
nical prospects.
In the Introduction, we met the abandoned luggage algorithm and 
its IF-THEN rules. Little more than a set of step-by-step instructions 
that set out some conditions and consequences, these rules seemed 
far removed from the drama of artificial intelligence, big data and the 
opaque and inscrutable algorithm. Indeed scrutinising these IF-THEN 
rules appeared to offer little prospect of a great step forward. They were 
not about to leap off the page and create great change in the world. 
In order to understand this algorithm and the drama in which it was 
expected to participate, we needed to get close to its everyday activity. 
We needed to know just how this algorithm participated in everyday 
life, grasped or even composed everyday life and participated in the pro-
duction of effects. We needed to know something about its prospects of 
becoming the everyday. It seemed clear that the IF-THEN rules alone 
would have little consequence. We needed to know who and what the 
algorithms were working with. Rather than treat the non-human as an 
incidental figure (as much of the sociological writing on the everyday has 
tended to), the algorithm would be accorded a specific kind of status. As 
a first move, we needed to de-centre the human as we know it from the 
middle of the drama. We could not afford to assume that this was pri-
marily a story to be told by people. We needed to give the algorithm and 
its technical partners, at least in principle, the same potential agential sta-
tus as the humans and then we needed to make sense of how they each 
participated in the composition of effects. We then needed to enter into 
the varied and only partially integrated everyday lives of the algorithm.
In Chapter 2, the human-shaped object and luggage-shaped object 
(among other objects) provided a focal point for our engagement with 
the algorithms’ everyday lives. Computer scientists in the project sought 
an elegant solution that was concise (using only the minimum amount 
of processing power required) and could solve the problems posed by 
the project to the satisfaction of various audiences. Here we could get a 
first glimpse of how the algorithms might engage in the everyday. Was 
this grasping everyday life (as if its major constituents were there prior 
to the work of algorithms, just waiting to be collected and displayed) or 
composing everyday life (a more fundamental working up from scratch 
of the objects to be made)? As a surprise to me, an ethnographer with 
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an inclination towards composition, it turned out to be both. The algo-
rithms were in the business of composing the everyday, with models built 
from scratch of the parameters of what it meant to be human-shaped, 
classifying small segments of streams of digital video data into putative 
humans, and then offering those forward as a means to classify the action 
states of those objects. Even articulating the everyday on these terms 
seems like a new form of composition, at least in contrast to how we 
might go about our everyday lives. But these algorithms also needed to 
grasp the everyday. They were not free to compose without limits as if 
there was no a priori world from which these objects could be mustered. 
The life of the airport, the people and objects in it had to be given a life 
within the algorithmic system that could be traced back through the air-
port and train station. Actual distances in centimetres, speeds at which 
people walk, distances covered, the angle and zoom of cameras among 
many other features of the everyday had to be accorded a form that ena-
bled them to be grasped. And they had to be grasped in such a way by 
the algorithms that the journey could be made back in the other direc-
tion, from algorithm back to train station and airport. These were the 
demands that an elegant solution had to meet.
So our algorithms were beginning to be competent in grasping and 
composing everyday life. But their own lives were not without con-
straints. They were not just in the business of producing results, but 
demonstratively proving that they had produced the right kind of results. 
These were outputs that accountably and demonstrably accomplished 
the project’s three ethical aims, to see less, to store less and to do so 
without creating any new algorithms. Elegance alone was insufficient. 
To an ethnographer assessing their ethics, to an ethics board and later in 
ethical demonstrations, our algorithms had to continually and accounta-
bly prove their capabilities. The abandoned luggage, moving the wrong 
way and movement into a forbidden area algorithms had to work with 
other system components in Chapter 3, the User Interface, the Route 
Reconstruction system, probabilistic trees, algorithmic children, param-
eterisation, classification of objects and action states, to collectively 
demonstrate that everyday life could be improved by the emerging 
system. This was composition of everyday life, then, but one that was 
also morally improved. The world was not just grasped, but ethically 
enhanced. The accountable order that the algorithms could participate 
in, while in their experimental activities, had to intersect with a more 
formal sense of accountability. An opportunity had to be developed for 
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future data subjects of algorithmic decision-making and their represent-
atives to question the system. The algorithms also had to engage with 
the ethics board to begin to give effect to the ethically enhanced world. 
Unfortunately for our algorithms, these effects and the confidence with 
which they were demonstrated, began to dissipate as the system moved 
beyond experimentation.
In Chapter 4, it became clear that the system’s ethical aims might 
have a value beyond experimentation, in accomplishing compliance 
with new regulatory demands to delete data. Deletion might provide a 
means to accomplish a market value for our algorithms. Yet it was here 
that problems began to emerge. As preparations were made to use the 
algorithms to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant data and pro-
vide demonstrative proof that irrelevant data could be effectively and 
accountably deleted, project members started to disagree. Just what 
should constitute adequate deletion? Changing the route by which a 
user connects to data, overwriting, corrupting or expunging data from 
the system? As the project coordinators sought the most thorough means 
of deletion possible, as a prior step to developing a market for the sys-
tem, the computer scientists struggled to match their demands. A sys-
tem log was developed to produce accountable reports for humans of the 
algorithms’ ability to delete. But the system did no more than continu-
ally report the failures of the system: data was not deleted in its entirety, 
orphan frames were left behind, and the demarcation of relevant from 
irrelevant data came under scrutiny. The production of nothing (the 
deleted), required the production of something (an account of deletion), 
but the failure to successfully accomplish nothing (with deletion under-
mined by the stubborn presence of orphan frames) created a troubling 
something—a continually disruptive presence that questioned our algo-
rithms’ abilities to produce nothing. Much of everyday life—somewhere 
between 95 and 99%—it turns out is irrelevant and can be deleted. By 
failing to grasp all this irrelevance and instead leaving a trail of data 
and reports that attested to this failure, the prospects of our algorithms 
becoming the everyday of the airport and train station were diminished.
This was the start of some escalating troubles for the algorithms. As 
they continued their journey from experimentation, they had to enter into 
the ever greater wilds of everyday life. From experimentation in settings 
with matching flooring and lighting, project participants acting out the 
roles of normal humans, and cameras supplying data from the right angle 
and height and distance, at the right frame rate for our algorithms to see, 
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our algorithms now had to grasp real space, in real time. Here people, 
things and events unfolded in a naturally occurring away, across different 
floorings and lighting conditions, at different frame rates, with humans 
who now acted in oddly normal ways. Children went this way and that 
way, adults stood still for too long, luggage did not behave as it ought 
and humans wore the wrong kinds of outfits that looked just like the 
airport floor. Grasping and composing this everyday was too challeng-
ing. Under test conditions, in place of 6 items of potentially abandoned 
luggage came 2654 items. The relevant and irrelevant intermingled in a 
disastrous display of technical inefficacy. What had seemed like reasona-
ble demonstrations of the algorithms’ capabilities to ethical audiences, 
now had to be questioned. Questions of the material integrity of these 
demonstrations (and the extent to which a relation of undoubted corre-
spondence could be maintained between the system put on show and the 
world to which it pointed) were only matched by questions of their visual 
integrity (of who and what was in a position to see who and what). These 
questions continued and even grew for a time as our algorithms moved 
towards their final demonstrations to research funders. The king of Event 
Detection—abandoned luggage—could only be demonstrated through 
a careful whittling away of confounding variables. The flooring, light-
ing, luggage-type, positioning, behaviour of the luggage’s human owner, 
frame rate of the camera and other human-shaped objects of the airport 
each had to be closely controlled. In place of the algorithm going out 
into the world grasping or composing real time, real space everyday life, 
a more modest and controlled everyday had to be brought to the system.
And so we find in our final chapter that the algorithms are somewhat 
quiet. Away from the drama of contemporary academic writing and popu-
lar media stories, the algorithms take up a meek position in an Exploitation 
Report. In place of any fanfare regarding their technical efficacy, comes a 
carefully composed account, depending on imaginative and dextrous cal-
culative work. Here, more and less valued geographical regions, customer 
types and inferior competitors stand in as proxies for our algorithms. The 
calculations, instead of talking about current technical efficacies, point 
towards a future potential of market value that could be achieved with 
investment. The performative accomplishment of the investment proposi-
tion negates the need for our algorithms’ everyday life to be put on dis-
play. At the end, they are not entirely absent from our story, but from the 
Exploitation Report their grasp and composition of everyday life, their pros-
pects of becoming the everyday of the airport and train station, are deleted. 
Goodbye algorithm.
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